

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ANTI-COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES

HEARING BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

**SPECIAL HEARING
Congressional Witnesses
Department of Defense
Department of State
Nondepartmental Witnesses**



5181-10

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

MARK O. HATFIELD, Oregon, *Chairman*

TED STEVENS, Alaska
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., Connecticut
JAMES A. McCLURE, Idaho
PAUL LAXALT, Nevada
JAKE GARN, Utah
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota
JAMES ABDNOR, South Dakota
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., Wisconsin
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, New York
MACK MATTINGLY, Georgia
WARREN RUDMAN, New Hampshire
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WILLIAM PROXMIRE, Wisconsin
DANIEL K. INOUE, Hawaii
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
LAWTON CHILES, Florida
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
JIM SASSER, Tennessee
DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona
DALE BUMPERS, Arkansas
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
TOM HARKIN, Iowa

J. KEITH KENNEDY, *Staff Director and Clerk*

REBECCA M. DAVIES, *Deputy Staff Director*

FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, *Minority Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED PROGRAMS

ROBERT W. KASTEN JR., Wisconsin, *Chairman*

MARK O. HATFIELD, Oregon
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, New York
WARREN RUDMAN, New Hampshire
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

DANIEL K. INOUE, Hawaii
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona
JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi
(*Ex Officio*)

SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF

JAMES D. BOND

JANE S. MCGHEE

RICHARD L. COLLINS, *Minority*

CONTENTS

Congressional witnesses:	
Statements of Members of Congress:	Page
Opening remarks of Senator Kasten.....	1
Statement of Senator D'Amato.....	3
Statement of Representative Stephen J. Solarz.....	4
Prepared statement.....	14
Department of State:	
Statement of William Schneider, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.....	33
Prepared statement.....	46
Department of Defense:	
Statement of Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.....	33
Prepared statement.....	37
Nondepartmental witnesses:	
George Washington University:	
Statement of Prof. Charles Moser, GW University.....	63
Prepared statement.....	68
Freedom Research Foundation:	
Statement of Jack Wheeler.....	73
Prepared statement.....	78
Wall Street Journal, articles from.....	85, 86
UNITA, Cambodian Resistance, and Afghan Resistance:	
Statement of Figueirido Paulo, spokesman, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.....	90
Statement of Sangwar De Lopez, Khmer People's National Liberation Front.....	92
Prepared statement.....	97
Statement of Mohammad Nabi Salehi, Afghan Resistance Force.....	102
Prepared statement.....	103
Submitted questions:	
Questions submitted by Senator D'Amato.....	111
Questions submitted by Senator Specter.....	113
MATERIAL SUBMITTED SUBSEQUENT TO HEARING	
Letter from Hon. Jim Leach, U.S. Representative from Iowa.....	116
Prepared statement.....	117
Prepared statement of Samuel T. Dickens, Director of Inter-American Affairs, American Security Council Foundation.....	119

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ANTI-COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES

WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 9:38 a.m. in room SD-124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Kasten, Jr. (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Kasten, D'Amato, Specter, Johnston, and DeConcini; also present: Senator Humphrey.

CONGRESSIONAL WITNESSES

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR KASTEN

Senator KASTEN. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning we will examine a relatively new phenomenon and what the United States response should be to that phenomenon. Since 1975, when Communist regimes came to power in such far-flung places as Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, and Cambodia, for the first time a number of serious anti-Communist insurgencies have come into existence. The Congress has responded inconsistently to the challenge of what our response to these groups should be, as has the administration. On the one hand, Congress is overwhelmingly on record as being supportive of resistance groups in Afghanistan, while recently the House of Representatives declined to provide any aid to the anti-Communist insurgency in Nicaragua.

The administration has shown a willingness to support anti-Communist insurgencies, but at the same time in Mozambique, for example, the administration proposes to provide aid to the Communist regime who is struggling against a vibrant anti-Communist insurgency.

COMBAT ON COMMUNIST TERRITORY

Recently, a collection of essays was published, "Combat on Communist Territory," edited by Professor Moser, who will be one of our witnesses this morning. These essays detail the activities of most of these anti-Communist groups around the world, including the Contras

in Nicaragua; the Afghanistan Freedom Fighters; the non-Communist Cambodian resistance movement; the anti-Communist movement in Angola; and other examples of growing guerrilla movements opposed to Communist regimes. This book is a good first step in examination of this subject.

Also instructive is an essay by Secretary of State Shultz which appeared in Foreign Affairs Magazine in which he says, "It's been a noble American cause to assist those struggling for their freedom."

Last month, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported legislation which contained an amendment by the Honorable Stephen Solarz which authorizes military or other types of assistance to the non-Communist resistance movement in Cambodia. Congressman Solarz will be our first witness at our hearing this morning.

EXAMINATION OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

The purpose of this hearing is not to decry the Communist regimes in the countries where these movements are active. I do not think there is much disagreement on our attitude toward these governments, but rather the purpose here is to examine the resistance movements themselves—who are they? What kind of support should they receive from the United States?

This hearing is not an attempt either to have a public hearing on what covert assistance might be ongoing in any of these areas. We are not interested in discussing that subject, but rather what should be open public policy with respect to U.S. assistance for these organizations.

RECOGNITION OF WITNESSES

As I mentioned, Congressman Steve Solarz will be our first witness, followed by two witnesses from the administration—William Schneider, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, and Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. They will be followed by two men who have written extensively in this field, Jack Wheeler of California and Professor Charles Moser of George Washington University. We will also receive testimony from a number of spokesmen and representatives of these various resistance groups.

We have a lot of ground to cover this morning—many witnesses. Therefore, in order to have enough time for questions, I ask the witnesses to summarize their statements. We will also try to use a light system to ensure all Senators have ample time to ask questions.

Congressman Solarz, it's a pleasure to have you with us here today. I first would like to ask Senator D'Amato if he would like to make a brief opening statement. Senator, do you have a statement you would like to make at this time?

Senator D'AMATO. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR D'AMATO

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to congratulate you for calling these hearings on this important issue of U.S. aid to anti-Communist insurgencies. I particularly would like to speak about the aid to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the world forgets too easily the tragedy of the Soviet war in Afghanistan that has been raging for over 5 years. Over half a million Afghans have perished; 3 million have been forced to flee their country and the infrastructure of Afghanistan has been laid to ruin. Children have been deliberately maimed through the use of so-called butterfly bombs which look like toys. Civilian populations have been killed and brutalized and scarred, and the country has been ravaged. We are here today to discuss the possibilities of providing aid to the Afghan people.

S. RES. 34

Early in the 99th Congress, I introduced a resolution, Senate Resolution 34, to condemn the 5 years of Soviet brutality in Afghanistan and to urge the President to provide the much-needed medical, military, and food assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters. There are over 40 cosponsors on this resolution, and I certainly hope to have it passed in the near future.

In our efforts to restore good relations with Moscow, we must never forget the heinous acts perpetrated by the Soviet Union and its satellites. The attempted assassination of the Pope in 1981, the downing of the Korean Airline Flight 007 in 1983, and the senseless recent murder of a U.S. Major in East Germany are just some examples of the barbaric international behavior of the U.S.S.R. The most savage act of current aggression, however, is the carnage that it is now inflicting upon the people of Afghanistan.

ATROCITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

The atrocities that the Afghans have had to endure are overwhelming. The Soviet armies expected quick annexation of this Moslem nation. It did not count on the tenacity and the fortitude of the Afghan freedom fighters. The Mujahideen, as they are called, deserve our support. They are not just a band of rebels who sporadically inflict casualties on the Soviet occupying forces. They are a spirited fighting force, which has denied the Soviet armies 90 percent of Afghanistan and has withstood everything the Soviets could throw at them.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased we are holding these hearings today. Frankly, I am concerned that we have waited far too long. Many years ago we knew the freedom fighters were a significant fighting force. Each year when the Soviets launched a new and more brutal spring offensive, we in the West wondered whether the brave, but massively outnumbered and outgunned people of Afghanistan would survive. They have survived, and they will continue to survive.

To date, the freedom fighters have inflicted an estimated 20,000 casualties on the invading forces of the U.S.S.R. and that has cost them over \$6 billion annually. We must provide the freedom fighters with adequate assistance to help them in their courageous struggle against tyranny. There is an estimate that there are 115,000 troops now in Afghanistan with thousands more just across the Soviet border. They have used chemical weapons; have relied upon the scorched earth policy to destroy crops which could feed the freedom fighters; medical facilities are being destroyed and the Soviet Army enters Pakistan with impunity to bomb the 300 or so refugee camps.

Afghanistan's neighbors are reluctant to antagonize the threatening Soviet forces. Soviet global strategy clearly indicates expansion in this area in the quest for a warm water port. It is imperative the nations in the region and the United States show their collective resolve to resist Soviet military hegemony. Evidence is bountiful, regardless of human rights violations by the Soviets in Afghanistan. Reports from Helsinki Watch, entitled—and it is a book people should read—"Tears, Blood and Pride," the human rights violations in Afghanistan since the invasion are recorded for history displaying the severity of the Soviet atrocities, the pictures, the stories here put this in its proper perspective.

We have a moral imperative to assist the Afghan people in their monumental struggle for survival in their fight against the Soviet incorporation. The United States would be remiss for not coming to their aid.

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted you called these hearings, and I certainly pledge to you any offer of assistance that you may need to include aid to the Afghan people in the next funding bill. The message of our commitment must be sent not only to the freedom fighters, but to the Soviet Union as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am certainly delighted that we have as our first witness and my good friend and colleague from the Congress, from the district in Brooklyn, Congressman Stephen Solarz, who has been a leader in this area.

Senator KASTEN. Congressman Solarz.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SOLARZ

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Representative SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Senator D'Amato.

Let me say at the outset how very much I appreciated the invitation to participate in these hearings and to explain to your committee the justification for the initiative taken by the House Foreign Affairs Committee a short while ago to provide \$5 million in appropriated assistance to the non-Communist resistance movement in Cambodia and to place that initiative in the larger context of U.S. foreign policy.

Let me begin by noting an irony of American history. In the 1960's, the big question for the makers of American foreign policy was whether the United States should oppose wars of national liberation and, if so, which ones. Now the wheel has turned, and the issue is whether the United States should support wars of national liberation, and, if so, which ones.

ROLE OF UNITED STATES IN FOREIGN CONFLICTS

What is the proper role for the United States in the conflict in Afghanistan? In Cambodia? In Nicaragua? In Angola? And in South Africa? I specifically mention the latter country, Mr. Chairman, because it seems to me it might be useful for you to consider broadening the scope of this inquiry to include not just those insurgencies directed against Communist regimes, but insurgencies directed against non-Communist ones as well. It is not just against the Communist governments or Communist occupying armies that people may be fighting for freedom elsewhere around the world. To the extent our commitment to human rights is one of the justifications, it is advanced for our support for anti-Communist freedom fighters, we ought to at least consider the possibility of providing assistance to those people fighting for freedom against repressive regimes that may not necessarily be Communist ones.

These are exceedingly complex questions, as I know you recognize, Mr. Chairman. Clearly, it is one thing to lay out general guidelines for dealing with these matters. It is quite another to apply them in individual instances. And I think what we really need here is some very clear and systematic analysis, because there is a real temptation in justifying American assistance to one group of freedom fighters to advance arguments and rationals which could be equally applicable to other situations where we might deem it not to be in the American interest to be involved.

And I think, therefore, it is incumbent upon us as we consider these various situations to see if we can fashion and formulate a set of criteria which can provide meaningful guidelines for us to determine which insurgencies it is in our interest to support and which insurgencies it is not in our interest to support.

SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

Having said that, let me turn, first of all, to the situation in Cambodia and give you what I believe was the rationale which led an overwhelming majority of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House to support my recommendation that we provide \$5 million in assistance which could be used for military purposes to the non-Communist resistance forces in Cambodia.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the United States has two overriding objectives in Cambodia. The first is to secure the withdrawal of Vietnam, thereby making possible self-determination of the Cambodian people and simultaneously reducing the threat which Vietnam poses to Thailand, a friendly country with respect to which we have both bilateral and multilateral defense commitments.

In the event of a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand, it would clearly call into question those American commitments and we have, therefore, a very real interest in reducing the Vietnamese military threat to Thailand.

At the same time, I think we have another major interest in Cambodia, and that is to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge and the restoration to power in Phnom Penh of Pol Pot and his murderous minions. As much as we want the Vietnamese to leave, it would be unthinkable and unacceptable to have the Khmer Rouge come back. And I must say, speaking perhaps only for myself, that if I had to make a choice between the two, I would prefer to have Vietnam remain than to have the Khmer Rouge return. Hopefully, however, there is another alternative, and I believe that it is possible to facilitate the emergence of a Cambodia dominated neither by Vietnam nor ruled by the Khmer Rouge—a decent and democratic Cambodia, where the Cambodian people themselves are in a position to determine their own future.

LACK OF VIETNAM WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE CAMBODIA

Now I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that the achievement of both of these objectives—the withdrawal of Vietnam and the elimination of the Khmer Rouge—are best achieved by strengthening the non-Communist resistance forces. We should be under no illusions about the willingness of Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. The presence of 50,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos, 10 years after the end of the war in Indochina, in the absence of any resistance movement of any significance in that country, provides suggestive evidence that even in the absence of a resistance movement in Cambodia that the Vietnamese would not be so willing to withdraw. And I would submit, therefore, that the only way of ever achieving a Vietnamese withdrawal would be to substantially increase the political, diplomatic, economic, and military pressures on Vietnam as a result of their occupation of Cambodia.

That is why we felt in the Foreign Affairs Committee that this assistance to the non-Communist resistance movement could help to increase the military pressure on Vietnam in Cambodia. At the same time, if Vietnam should ever agree to withdraw from Cambodia, and that is presumably one of the fundamental objectives of our policy, we need to ask ourselves, who would prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning? Right now, they constitute the largest and most powerful of the three resistance movements. I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that if the Vietnamese actually withdraw that we are not about to send the Marines to Cambodia to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning. The ASEAN countries did not lift a finger against Pol Pot when he was in power for 5 years, so it is rather doubtful they are going to do it. China is the chief supporter of the Khmer Rouge, and I doubt the Peoples Liberation Army is going to be sent to Cambodia to keep Pol Pot out of Phnom Penh.

In the final analysis, we probably will have to depend on the indigenous anti-Communist resistance movement to prevent Pol Pot from

returning to power in Phnom Penh, which is another reason why we believe it is in our interest to try and strengthen the non-Communist resistance forces.

FIVE MILLION DOLLAR AID PACKAGE

As some have suggested, that \$5 million is not enough to significantly strengthen them, but would result in the Americanization of the conflict in Cambodia, and, therefore, would be neither in the interest of the resistance movements nor in the interest of the United States.

The \$5 million figure was not, however, picked out of thin air. We estimated that the total requirements for the non-Communist resistance forces in the next year to significantly increase the size of their order of battle was in the vicinity of \$15 to \$20 million, and the \$5 million figure would come to between 20 and 30 percent of that amount. We felt it was important to preserve the principle that the primary responsibility for supporting the non-Communist resistance movement lay with the other countries of Southeast Asia rather than with the United States, but that within the framework of that principle, there was a role for the United States to play in contributing to this effort to strengthen the non-Communist resistance forces.

There are others who say this is an enterprise which is doomed to failure. I must confess that I am not overly optimistic with the prospects for success of the resistance movement in Cambodia. The fact of the matter is that in the last several years, the two non-Communist resistance forces have increased the number of men they have under arms from several hundred to over 20,000, and while everyone agrees that there is no way they will ever be able to drive the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, it is not inconceivable that they could substantially increase the cost of the Vietnamese occupation to the point where Vietnam begins to seriously consider a political settlement of the conflict.

Furthermore, the \$5 million would clearly enhance the morale of the resistance movement, particularly in the wake of the recent Vietnamese offensive. It would also encourage the ASEAN countries to continue providing support to the non-Communist resistance forces, and it would send a signal to Vietnam that it may not be as easy as they had anticipated to solve their problems in Cambodia from a military point of view.

Others have suggested that \$5 million in U.S. assistance to the non-Communist resistance movement will inevitably and reluctantly lead to the escalation of American involvement in Indochina until we once again have half a million American troops fighting in Southeast Asia. Frankly, I think this is ridiculous precisely because of our previous involvement in Vietnam. There is no possibility whatsoever that American support in financial terms for the non-Communist resistance movement will lead to the reintroduction of American combat forces into the region. The non-Communist resistance forces have not asked for it; the ASEAN countries do not want it; and the Congress and the American people would never permit it. Neither would this lead to an open-ended, ever-escalating financial commitment. We would, I think, be

fully capable of preserving the principle that the primary obligation rests with the ASEAN countries and only secondarily with the United States, which is why we picked the \$5 million figure.

If the resistance movement can enhance its effectiveness, if it can recruit more fighters, if its budgetary needs go up, I would expect that we would be asked to provide more, but always within the framework of an arrangement where the ASEAN countries provide the bulk of the assistance.

POSSIBILITY OF AID DIVERTED TO KHMER ROUGE

Others have said that however well-intended this may be, that some of our aid might be diverted into the hands of the Khmer Rouge. And to this I can only respond by saying that it would indeed be unthinkable and unacceptable, not to mention uncommendable for any American assistance to be given to the Khmer Rouge. Nevertheless, I believe that it is entirely possible and practical to devise procedures to prevent this.

You have three separate armies in three separate locations, and there is no reason why our aid to the non-Communist forces need be given to the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, there is a real irony here because it would be, I think, rather ironic to refrain from providing aid to the non-Communist resistance movements out of a fear that it might end up in the hands of Pol Pot when one of the primary purposes of providing that assistance in the first place is to strengthen the non-Communist resistance forces in order to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge to power in Phnom Pen in the event that the Vietnamese ever agree to withdraw.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, I fail to see how \$5 million in assistance is going to Americanize the conflict—we didn't create this insurgency; we are not sending advisors there; we are not sending troops there, but this would be an expression of a willingness on the part of the United States to support these brave people who are fighting for freedom, and let me just say in conclusion here on the Cambodian issue, Mr. Chairman, that what is at stake is not just the future of a country but of a civilization. No people have suffered more over the last decade than the people of Cambodia; first during the course of a bloody civil war, then during the course of one of the most bloody rules in human history, that of Pol Pot, then as a result of the Vietnamese occupation.

VIETNAMIZATION OF CAMBODIA

Vietnam is now in the process of moving hundreds of thousands of settlers into Cambodia. They are Vietnamizing not only the countryside but the culture of the country, and this is the last chance to save an independent Cambodia. I do not know whether the non-Communist resistance forces will succeed, but so long as there are Cambodians who are willing to stand up against this foreign occupation in their country, I think we should be willing to help them.

Let me just say here if we were to provide this assistance, it would be in response to the request by our friends in the region to do so. In

February, the five ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a public statement calling on the international community to provide assistance to the resistance movement. The United Nations has voted overwhelmingly to call for the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, and I think we could expect fairly widespread regional and international support for such an initiative. And I hope you would carefully consider this in your own deliberations in the committee and in the Senate when the relative legislation comes up on the floor.

REASONS FOR SUPPORT FOR CAMBODIAN AID

If I could sum up in more general terms, Mr. Chairman, the lessons and the implications I draw from this argument with respect to Cambodia, and the reasons why I think aid to the KPNLF, Kampuchea Peoples National Liberation Front, and the National Army of Sihanouk is justified, and then apply that criteria to a few other national liberation movements elsewhere in the world.

First of all, the struggle in Cambodia is without doubt a struggle for national liberation. Indigenous patriotic forces are fighting of their own free will to end the occupation of a foreign army.

Second, the targeted resistance is an international pariah. Outside the Soviet bloc, few countries recognize the puppet regime in Phnom Penh. The overwhelming majority of the countries around the world have voted in the United Nations to condemn the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and called on it to withdraw its troops.

Third, under existing conditions, the prospects for a negotiated solution on anything close to acceptable terms are somewhere between nil and negligible. I explored those prospects during a visit to Hanoi last December, and I met a stone wall. More recently, the three Indochinese countries have issued a statement on this subject, and when one carefully considers it, it is clear that it is more of a formula for dividing ASEAN and China from the resistance and the resistance within itself than it is a real formula for peace, which would be acceptable to the Cambodian people.

Fourth, American military assistance to the non-Communist resistance is supported by virtually all of our friends in Southeast Asia. Since the action that was taken by the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Singapore have both publicly praised it, China has endorsed it, and Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, the leaders of the Communist resistance forces, have endorsed it as well.

Fifth, there is a reasonable chance I believe that the non-Communist resistance, if it grows substantially, and I believe it can, can greatly increase the cost Vietnam pays for the occupation of Cambodia. A long time emergence of a free and independent Cambodia is in the interest of the United States, because it would enhance regional stability and make possible the self-determination of the Cambodian people.

AFGHANISTAN

Let me apply these criteria to these other situations around the world—Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Southern Africa. In my view, the situation in Afghanistan is very similar to the situation in Cambodia. You have a foreign army of occupation dominating a previously sovereign and independent country. Most of the nations of the region and around the world support the resistance movement, and I think what we are doing there is regionally and internationally acceptable. Finally, if there is going to be any hope whatsoever for a political settlement in Afghanistan, it will require a more effective resistance movement. The Mujahideen quite clearly, like the Cambodians, do not have the capacity to drive the Red Army out of Afghanistan, but they do have the capacity to increase the price of the Soviet occupation, and that is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for a political settlement. Consequently, it seems to me that American support for the resistance movement in Afghanistan, like Cambodia, is justified.

NICARAGUA

The situation in Nicaragua, and here I recognize some of the members of your committee, Mr. Chairman, may disagree with me, differences in my judgment from both Afghanistan and Cambodia in a number of fundamental respects. To be sure, the Sandinistas have taken steps to destabilize their neighbors and oppress their own people, and it is clearly in the interest of the United States to get them to stop supporting revolution throughout Central America and, if possible, to fulfill the Democratic promises of their own revolution.

On those two fundamental propositions, there is no argument between us whatsoever.

Nevertheless, I believe that American military assistance for the Contras would be inappropriate because of the ways in which the conflict in Nicaragua differs from the conflict in Cambodia and Afghanistan. Unlike the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and KPNLF in Cambodia, the Contras are not trying to drive out a foreign army of occupation. Their goal is the overthrow of a government that, for better or worse, is recognized by and has diplomatic relations with most of the countries of the world, including the United States. In essence, the Contras and the Sandinistas are engaged in a civil war, a contest among Nicaraguans for the future of their own country.

Moreover, in contrast to the regional and international attitudes regarding Afghanistan and Cambodia, most countries in Latin America, not all but most, would oppose the resumption of American military assistance for the Contras, as would our allies in Western Europe.

And finally, it seems to me that there is still a very real prospect that a negotiated settlement through the Contadora process would achieve U.S. objectives in Central America. Managua has indicated a willingness in principle to accept those provisions of the Contadora concerning noninterference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries and non-support for insurgencies in those countries. They have also agreed in principle to remove all foreign military advisors from their country.

Whether Nicaragua would accept and observe a verifiable treaty incorporating those provisions, as well as agree to an equitable balance of military power in the region, is not yet clear. What is clear is that the Sandinistas have really not been put to the test concerning their intentions.

It is also clear that unlike Nicaragua, neither the Soviet Union nor Vietnam have shown any indication of flexibility on the substance of negotiated settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan or Cambodia. So long as there appears to be a reasonable possibility of a settlement in Nicaragua, it seems to me that aid to the Contras is clearly inappropriate. So long as the Soviet Union and Vietnam stonewall negotiated settlements in Afghanistan and Cambodia, then support of the resistance is justified as the only way of breaking the negotiated logjam.

I also oppose aid to the Contras, because I worry about the implications of support for our broader foreign policy. The truth is that there are many governments around the world which have internal arrangements we abhor and who are engaged in efforts to destabilize their neighbors. Should the United States, therefore, support opposition movements against those regimes? That seems to me to be a formula for widespread interventionism, which would be unacceptable to the American people and opposed by our friends around the world.

I think we have to be very, very careful in advancing justifications for support for the Contras that would not willy-nilly be equally applicable to a variety of other situations around the world where we would deem it not to be in our interest to be involved.

ANGOLA

Mr. Chairman, from time to time, some people have suggested that the United States provide assistance to the National Union for the Integration of Angola. There is no disagreement among us that Angola has close ties to the Soviet Union; that Cuban troops are present in the country; and that Jonas Savimbi, who I met personally, the leader of UNITA, is a man of the West. I believe it would be a mistake to repeal the Clark amendment which requires assistance to UNITA. Providing such support would invoke little support in black Africa and produce substantial opposition to U.S. policy throughout the continent. We would in the process implicitly be aligning ourselves with South Africa which has supplied arms to UNITA and that would be a diplomatic kiss of death for the United States throughout the continent and much of the world.

Furthermore, an assistance program for UNITA would be extremely divisive at home and it would probably be impossible to sustain a broad consensus for such an undertaking over the long term.

In addition, although we clearly have an interest in facilitating the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, we need to recognize the Cuban troops are not to Angola what Soviet troops are to Afghanistan and Vietnamese troops are to Cambodia. If the government in Luanda

asked the Cubans to leave, there is every reason to believe that they would do so. The Angola Government, whatever its faults, does have an independent identity and freedom of action. The regimes in Kabul and Phnom Penh, on the other hand, are wholly owned and operated subsidiaries of Moscow and Hanoi. Consequently, American support for UNITA would make us a party to a civil war and would set a dangerous precedence when other insurgencies who are also seeking to overthrow established governments—of which there is no shortage—ask the United States for aid.

SOUTH AFRICA

Finally, and purely for the purposes of discussion, should the United States provide assistance to the African National Congress in its fight against the Government of South Africa? To be sure, South Africa is professedly an anti-Communist country and, therefore, does not fall presumably under the purview of these hearings. Yet its policies constitute an objective stimulus to Communism in the region and provide a pretext for Soviet intervention since those rebelling against Apartheid look to Moscow for arms.

The United States by not pushing Pretoria harder to end Apartheid makes more likely the very outcome we seek to avoid, which is the triumph of communism in Southern Africa.

An interesting argument could be made that one of the best ways for the United States to preempt Soviet influence in Southern Africa would be to provide assistance to the ANC and so obviate its need to seek arms from Moscow.

Do I, therefore, believe that the United States should provide assistance to the African National Congress? I do not. First of all, the Government of South Africa, for better or for worse, enjoys a wide measure of international recognition. There may be few governments in the world that like the Apartheid regime, but there are also few that disagree that it constitutes the established Government of South Africa.

Second, the conflict in South Africa is a proto-civil war. Whatever else it may be, it is not a struggle against a foreign army of occupation.

Third, although a policy of American assistance for the ANC might be popular in certain parts of Africa, it probably would not enjoy the broad support within the United States necessary to make it viable over the long term.

Finally, I hold out the hope, as I am sure you do, that other forms of pressure will encourage an end to Apartheid in South Africa and eventually make possible a negotiated settlement of the conflict throughout Southern Africa as a whole. A violent revolution in South Africa would be a bloody one, with extensive suffering on the part of blacks as well as whites and every conceivable means, and method should be attempted to forestall a violent solution to the country's problems.

QUESTIONS DETERMINING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN ARMED RESISTANCE

By way of summation, Mr. Chairman, let me pose for your consideration and consideration of the other members of the committee the following questions which I believe should be answered in determining whether the United States should support armed resistance groups in other countries. If the answer to all of these questions is in the affirmative, then, in my view, American assistance is justified.

First, is the conflict an indigenous nationalist effort to drive out a foreign occupier?

Second, is there broad regional and international support for the armed resistance movement and ostracism of the resistance's opponent, and would there be significant political and diplomatic support from other countries for U.S. assistance to the resistance movement?

Third, would American military assistance enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the conflict or a solution on terms favorable to U.S. interests and ideals?

Fourth, would American support for the resistance demonstrably advance a significant American objective rather than being just the expression of a preference for one side over another in a conflict that is peripheral to American interests?

And finally, does American support for the resistance movement in question enjoy broad support within the United States which is necessary to sustain such an undertaking over time?

Mr. Chairman, I think you have posed one of the most important questions of our country and the Congress to consider at the present time. This represents an initial effort on my part to suggest some answers to that question. I want to, in conclusion, compliment you once again for undertaking on a systematic and comprehensive basis an effort to look at this entire question rather than continuing to confront it as we have until now on a case-by-case, country-by-country basis because, without a set of overall guidelines to channel our efforts in this regard, I think we run the risk of ultimately involving the United States in conflicts abroad where our interests would suggest we would be better off staying out.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Representative Solarz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. I AM PRIVILEGED AND HONORED TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOUR SUBCOMMITTEE REGARDING MY INITIATIVE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN CAMBODIA. IN ADDITION, I AM PLEASED TO RESPOND TO YOUR REQUEST THAT I PLACE THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT, AND THE AMERICAN STAKE IN IT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY.

LET ME BEGIN BY NOTING AN IRONY OF HISTORY. IN THE 1960s, THE BIG QUESTION FOR THE MAKERS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WAS WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD OPPOSE WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, AND, IF SO, WHICH ONES. NOW THE WHEEL HAS TURNED, AND THE ISSUE IS WHETHER WE SHOULD SUPPORT WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, AND, IF SO, WHICH ONES. WHAT IS THE PROPER U.S. ROLE IN THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN? IN CAMBODIA? IN NICARAGUA? IN ANGOLA? IN SOUTH AFRICA? IF WE DO DECIDE TO HELP RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS OR INSURGENCIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES, WHAT FORM SHOULD OUR AID TAKE? SHOULD WE PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ALL CASES? OR SHOULD WE CONFINED OURSELVES TO NON-LETHAL OR HUMANITARIAN AID?

THESE ARE COMPLEX QUESTIONS, AS I KNOW YOU RECOGNIZE, MR. CHAIRMAN. IT IS ONE THING TO LAY OUT GENERAL GUIDELINES TO GOVERN UNITED STATES POLICY ON THIS ISSUE. IT IS ANOTHER MATTER TO APPLY THOSE GUIDELINES IN EACH AND EVERY CASE SO THAT AMERICAN ACTIONS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH BOTH OUR INTERESTS AND OUR IDEALS. BUT YOU ARE TO BE COMMENDED, SENATOR KASTEN, FOR INITIATING A SERIOUS AND SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY CONCERNING THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND CRITERIA UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES SHOULD COMMIT ITS RESOURCES AND PRESTIGE TO THE NEW NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF THE 1980s. THIS DEBATE IS LONG OVERDUE, AND YOU MAKE A PROFOUND CONTRIBUTION TO BOTH THE CONGRESS AND OUR COUNTRY BY HOLDING THESE HEARINGS.

LET ME TURN NOW TO THE CURRENT WAR IN INDOCHINA. IN RECENT YEARS,

NO NATION HAS SUFFERED MORE TERRIBLY AND TRAGICALLY THAN CAMBODIA. SINCE 1970, ITS PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE HAVE BORNE FIVE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR, FOUR YEARS OF GENOCIDE BY POL POT AND HIS BUTCHERS, AND, MOST RECENTLY, SIX YEARS OF VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION. NO CAMBODIAN FAMILY HAS BEEN SPARED DEATH AND SORROW. THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S SUBTLE AND SOPHISTICATED CULTURE HAS BARELY SURVIVED A DEBILITATING SIEGE FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF CAMBODIANS SIMPLY ACCEPTED THE FATE OF A CAPTIVE PEOPLE TOO TRAUMATIZED TO RESIST THE DEATH OF THEIR CIVILIZATION. AND WHO WOULD BLAME THEM?

YET CULTURAL SUICIDE IS NOT TAKING PLACE. IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, OVER 20,000 PATRIOTIC CAMBODIANS HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS, WILLING TO RISK LIFE ITSELF FOR THE SAKE OF TWO OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST IS TO ENCOURAGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 170,000 VIETNAMESE TROOPS OCCUPYING THEIR HOMELAND. THE SECOND IS TO STAND AS AN HUMANE ALTERNATIVE TO THE BRUTAL KHMER ROUGE, WHICH REGRETTABLY STILL EXISTS WITH 35,000 ARMED COMBATANTS AT ITS DISPOSAL. TWO NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE GROUPS ARE IN THE FIELD: THE KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (KPNLF) LED BY MR. SON SANN, A FORMER PRIME MINISTER, AND THE ARMEE NATIONALE SIHANOUKISTE (ANS), LED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK. THE KPNLF NOW HAS ABOUT 15,000 ARMED FIGHTERS, AND THE ANS ABOUT 7,000. MORE ARE READY TO FIGHT IF THE TWO MOVEMENTS CAN EQUIP THEM.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT ARE IDENTICAL TO THOSE OF THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE GROUPS. THE FIRST IS TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAM, THEREBY PERMITTING THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY AND REDUCING THE VIETNAMESE THREAT TO THAILAND. THE OTHER IS TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF THE KHMER ROUGE, THEREBY SAVING THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE FROM A REPETITION OF THE MURDEROUS RULE OF POL POT.

IN SUPPORT OF THESE OBJECTIVES, THE UNITED STATES HAS REFUSED TO ENTER INTO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM AND ITS PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN CAMBODIA. WE HAVE MAINTAINED A TRADE EMBARGO AGAINST THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. WE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORK OF THE

UNITED NATIONS BORDER RELIEF OPERATION ON THE THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER. AND WE HAVE VOTED FOR UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS THAT ADVOCATE A VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL AND INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED ELECTIONS IN CAMBODIA.

I BELIEVE THAT THE PAST ACTIONS OF OUR GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH NECESSARY AND WORTHWHILE, ARE NOT PROPORTIONATE TO OUR OBJECTIVES. OUR CAMBODIAN FRIENDS KNOW THAT NATIONAL LIBERATION REQUIRES THEM TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE PRICE THAT VIETNAM PAYS BY OCCUPYING CAMBODIA; OTHERWISE HANOI WILL NEVER AGREE TO WITHDRAW. AFTER ALL, TEN YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE LAST INDOCHINA WAR, VIETNAM STILL HAS 50,000 TROOPS IN LAOS, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY GENUINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT THERE. OUR CAMBODIAN FRIENDS ALSO KNOW THAT THEIR KHMER ROUGE ADVERSARIES BELIEVE, AS MAO ZEDONG TAUGHT THEM, THAT POLITICAL POWER FLOWS OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT IF VIETNAM WITHDRAWS, THEY WILL HAVE TO BE A STRONG, INDIGENOUS BULWARK AGAINST THE KHMER ROUGE.

IF THE UNITED STATES IS SERIOUS ABOUT OUR PROCLAIMED OBJECTIVES-- OF GETTING THE VIETNAMESE OUT OF CAMBODIA AND PREVENTING THE KHMER ROUGE FROM RETURNING TO POWER IN PHNOM PENH--THEN WE MUST DO MORE TO BUILD UP AN EFFECTIVE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. WHILE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUSTAINING THE RESISTANCE RESTS WITH THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES AND WITH THEIR FRIENDS IN ASIA, THE UNITED STATES ALSO HAS A MEANINGFUL ROLE TO PLAY.

AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO THE KPNLF AND THE ANS WOULD SHOW THE VIETNAMESE THAT THE RESISTANCE WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME THAN ANTICIPATED. COMING NOT LONG AFTER THE RECENT VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE, U.S. AID WOULD ALSO BOOST THE MORALE OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT BY INDICATING THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT IN ITS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. FINALLY IT WOULD BE A CONCRETE RESPONSE TO THE COUNTRIES OF ASEAN, WHICH IN FEBRUARY APPEALED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPORT THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE "IN THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUGGLE TO LIBERATE THEIR HOMELAND FROM FOREIGN OCCUPATION."

AMERICAN AID TO THE KPNLF AND THE ANS WOULD ALSO HELP THEM PREVENT THE RETURN OF THE KHMER ROUGE TO POWER IN THE EVENT OF A VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL. WHO, AFTER ALL, WOULD BE ABLE AND WILLING TO STOP POL POT FROM RE-ESTABLISHING HIS REIGN OF REPRESSION IF NOT THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE? THE UNITED STATES CLEARLY HAS NO INTENTION OF REINTRODUCING COMBAT TROOPS INTO INDOCHINA. THE ASEAN COUNTRIES FAILED TO LIFT A FINGER AGAINST POL POT WHEN HE WAS IN POWER. AND CHINA HAS BEEN THE CHIEF SPONSOR OF THE KHMER ROUGE.

ON THE BASIS OF THIS RATIONALE, THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, WITH OVERWHELMING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT, RECENTLY VOTED TO PROVIDE \$5 MILLION IN ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE, TO THE TWO NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE FORCES IN CAMBODIA. THE COMMITTEE'S ACTION HAS NOT, HOWEVER, TOTALLY ENDED CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL. WITH YOUR INDULGENCE, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE MAJOR OBJECTIONS.

OPPONENTS OF THE INITIATIVE CONTEND THAT THE CAMBODIANS WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO DRIVE THE VIETNAMESE OUT, AND THAT OUR AID WILL ONLY INCREASE THE SUFFERING OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. TO BE SURE, THERE IS NO WAY THE RESISTANCE CAN FORCE A VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL. BUT THAT IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE. THE KPNLF AND THE ANS INTEND, THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE, TO DO TO VIETNAM WHAT THE VIETNAMESE DID TO THE AMERICANS OVER A DECADE AGO--RAISE THE COSTS OF CONTINUED INTERVENTION TO SUCH A HIGH LEVEL THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BECOMES THE MOST ATTRACTIVE OPTION.

FOR AMERICA TO REFRAIN FROM ASSISTING THE FORCES OF FREEDOM IN CAMBODIA WILL NOT END THE RESISTANCE, BUT ONLY DIMINISH ITS PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS. IT IS NOT UP TO US TO DECIDE WHETHER THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE WILL CARRY ON THEIR STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. THE ONLY QUESTION WE FACE IS WHETHER TO AID THEM IN THAT EFFORT.

SOME HAVE ARGUED AGAINST AMERICAN ASSISTANCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT U.S. AID MIGHT END UP IN THE HANDS OF POL POT AND HIS MURDEROUS MINIONS. IT WOULD, INDEED, BE UNTHINKABLE AND UNCONSCIOUS FOR ANY AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO GO TO THE KHMER ROUGE. YET WITH THREE SEPARATE

RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS IN THREE DIFFERENT AREAS, PROCEDURES CAN SURELY BE ADOPTED TO PREVENT THE DIVERSION OF OUR ASSISTANCE. IT WOULD BE IRONIC IF WE REFRAINED FROM AIDING THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE OUT OF FEAR THAT WE WOULD THEREBY HELP POL POT, WHEN A PRIMARY PURPOSE OF OUR AID WOULD BE TO BUILD UP THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES AS AN EFFECTIVE COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE KHMER ROUGE.

OTHERS HAVE EXPRESSED THE CONCERN THAT U.S. AID WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO THE REINTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN COMBAT FORCES INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA. YET PRECISELY BECAUSE OF OUR PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY THAT LIMITED AMOUNTS OF U.S. AID WILL LEAD TO THE REINVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS.

CRITICS HAVE ALSO CONTENDED THAT \$5 MILLION WOULD NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN CAMBODIA. YET \$5 MILLION IS NOT THE SOLE EXTERNAL SUPPORT THAT THE RESISTANCE WOULD RECEIVE. FIVE MILLION DOLLARS REPRESENTS ROUGHLY 30 PERCENT OF WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR A SIGNIFICANT AND FEASIBLE EXPANSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE OVER THE NEXT YEAR. THE REMAINING 70 PERCENT WILL BE PROVIDED BY FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN ASIA, WHO BEAR THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUSTAINING THE RESISTANCE. THE NOTION THEREFORE THAT THIS AMOUNT WILL RESULT IN THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE CONFLICT IS LUDICROUS. STILL, A UNITED STATES WILLINGNESS TO MAKE A LIMITED YET SIGNIFICANT WILL DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO CAMBODIA'S FREEDOM WHILE ENSURING THAT ASIAN COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO PLAY THE LEAD ROLE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, YOU ASKED THAT I OFFER MY VIEWS ON AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS NOT ONLY IN CAMBODIA BUT AROUND THE WORLD. IN RESPONSE, I WOULD LIKE TO IDENTIFY SEVERAL REASONS WHY AID TO THE KPNLF AND THE ANS IS JUSTIFIED, AND THEN APPLY THOSE AS CRITERIA TO OTHER STRUGGLES.

FIRST OF ALL, THE STRUGGLE IN CAMBODIA IS WITHOUT A DOUBT A STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. INDIGENOUS, PATRIOTIC FORCES ARE FIGHTING OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL TO END THE OCCUPATION OF A FOREIGN ARMY.

SECOND, THE TARGET OF THE RESISTANCE IS AN INTERNATIONAL PARIAH. OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC, FEW COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE PUPPET REGIME IN PHNOM PENH. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD HAVE VOTED IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO CONDEMN THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA AND TO CALL ON IT TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS.

THIRD, UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION ON ANYTHING CLOSE TO ACCEPTABLE TERMS ARE NEXT TO NIL. I EXPLORED THOSE PROSPECTS DURING A VISIT TO HANOI LAST DECEMBER, AND MET A STONE WALL. MORE RECENTLY, THE THREE INDOCHINA FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE OFFERED A PROPOSAL WHOSE SIMPLE INTENT IS TO DIVIDE ASEAN AND THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE, AND TO LEGITIMIZE THE PUPPET REGIME IN PHNOM PENH--SOMETHING THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

FOURTH, AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IS SUPPORTED BY ALL OUR FRIENDS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION. AS I NOTED PREVIOUSLY, THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ON FEBRUARY 11, CALLED ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPORT THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE "IN THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUGGLE TO LIBERATE THEIR HOMELAND FROM FOREIGN OCCUPATION." THE ACTION OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO PROVIDE AID TO THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE WAS PUBLICLY WELCOMED BY THE COUNTRIES OF ASEAN, BY CHINA, AND BY THE RESISTANCE LEADERS THEMSELVES.

FIFTH, THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT THE NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE, IF IT GROWS SUBSTANTIALLY, CAN GREATLY INCREASE THE COST THAT VIETNAM PAYS FOR ITS HEGEMONY OVER ITS NEIGHBOR.

AND SIXTH, THE LONG-TERM EMERGENCE OF A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CAMBODIA IS IN THE UNITED STATES INTEREST, FOR IT WILL SERVE TO INCREASE REGIONAL STABILITY. A PROLONGATION OF THE STATUS QUO CARRIES THE RISKS OF INSTABILITY AND WIDER CONFLICT.

LET ME NOW APPLY THESE SIX CRITERIA TO THREE OTHER SITUATIONS: AFGHANISTAN, NICARAGUA, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

IN MY VIEW, THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN CLOSELY PARALLELS THE CONFLICT IN CAMBODIA. THE MUJAHIDDIN ARE AN INDIGENOUS, PATRIOTIC FORCE FIGHTING BOTH AN ARMY OF SOVIET OCCUPATION AND A PUPPET GOVERNMENT THAT LACKS INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THE VALIANT STRUGGLE OF THE MUJAHIDDIN HAS EVOKED BROAD REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, AS EXPRESSED IN UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER WAYS. SERIOUS ATTEMPTS TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH WOULD ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY HAVE FOUNDERED ON SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE. CONSEQUENTLY THE COSTS TO THE SOVIET UNION OF ITS OCCUPATION MUST BE RAISED--AND CAN BE RAISED--IF THERE IS GOING TO BE ANY REAL PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. CONSEQUENTLY, AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDDIN IS APPROPRIATE.

THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA DIFFERS FROM BOTH AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA IN CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL RESPECTS. TO BE SURE, THE SANDINISTAS HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO DESTABILIZE THEIR NEIGHBORS AND OPPRESS THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE. IT IS DEFINITELY IN THE AMERICAN INTEREST TO GET THEM TO STOP EXPORTING REVOLUTION THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AMERICA, AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO FULFILL THE DEMOCRATIC PROMISES OF THEIR REVOLUTION.

I BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE CONTRAS WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE WAYS IN WHICH THE CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA IS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN CAMBODIA AND AFGHANISTAN. UNLIKE THE MUJAHIDDIN IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE KPHLF AND THE ANS IN CAMBODIA, THE CONTRAS ARE NOT TRYING TO DRIVE OUT AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION. THEIR GOAL IS THE OVERTHROW OF A GOVERNMENT THAT, FOR GOOD OR ILL, IS RECOGNIZED BY AND HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MOST OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. IN ESSENCE, THE CONTRAS AND THE SANDINISTAS ARE LOCKED IN A CIVIL WAR, A CONTEST AMONG NICARAGUANS FOR THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY.

MOREOVER, IN CONTRAST TO THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES REGARDING AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA, MOST COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA WOULD OPPOSE A RESUMPTION OF AMERICAN AID FOR THE CONTRAS, AS WOULD OUR ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

FINALLY, THERE IS STILL THE VERY REAL PROSPECT THAT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE CONTADORA PEACE PROCESS WILL ACHIEVE UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. MANAGUA HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO ACCEPT THOSE PROVISIONS OF CONTADORA CONCERNING NONINTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND NON-SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES. WHETHER NICARAGUA WOULD ACCEPT AND OBSERVE A VERIFIABLE TREATY INCORPORATING THOSE PROVISIONS, AS WELL AS AGREE TO AN EQUITABLE BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, IS NOT CLEAR AT PRESENT. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE SANDINISTAS HAVE REALLY NOT BEEN PUT TO A SERIOUS TEST CONCERNING THEIR INTENTIONS.

IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT, UNLIKE NICARAGUA, NEITHER THE SOVIET UNION NOR VIETNAM HAVE SHOWN ANY INDICATION OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS OF THE CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN OR CAMBODIA. SO LONG AS THERE APPEARS TO BE A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY OF A SETTLEMENT IN NICARAGUA, AID TO THE CONTRAS IS INAPPROPRIATE. SO LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION AND VIETNAM STONEWALL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA, THEN SUPPORT OF THE RESISTANCE IS JUSTIFIED AS THE ONLY WAY OF BREAKING THE NEGOTIATING LOGJAM.

I HAVE ALSO OPPOSED AID TO THE CONTRAS BECAUSE I WORRY ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH SUPPORT FOR OUR BROADER FOREIGN POLICY. THERE ARE MANY GOVERNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD WHOSE INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS WE ABHOR, AND WHO ARE ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE THEIR NEIGHBORS. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES THEREFORE SUPPORT OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AGAINST THOSE REGIMES? THAT SEEMS TO BE A FORMULA FOR WIDESPREAD INTERVENTIONISM, WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND OPPOSED BY OUR FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD.

FROM TIME TO TIME, PEOPLE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITA MOVEMENT IN ANGOLA. THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT THAT ANGOLA HAS CLOSE TIES TO THE SOVIET UNION, THAT CUBAN TROOPS ARE PRESENT IN THE COUNTRY, AND THAT JONAS SAVIMBI, THE LEADER OF UNITA, IS A MAN OF THE WEST. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO REPEAL THE CLARK AMENDMENT, WHICH BARS ASSISTANCE TO UNITA.

PROVIDING SUCH SUPPORT WOULD EVOKE LITTLE SUPPORT IN BLACK AFRICA AND PRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL OPPOSITION THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT. WE WOULD IMPLICITLY BE ALINED WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH DOES SUPPORT UNITA. THAT WOULD BE A DIPLOMATIC KISS OF DEATH FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE REGION. FURTHERMORE, AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR UNITA WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIVISIVE AT HOME, AND IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN A BROAD CONSENSUS FOR SUCH AN UNDERTAKING OVER THE LONG TERM.

IN ADDITION, ALTHOUGH WE CLEARLY HAVE AN INTEREST IN FACILITATING THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM AFRICA, WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT CUBAN TROOPS ARE NOT TO ANGOLA WHAT SOVIET TROOPS ARE TO AFGHANISTAN OR VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE TO CAMBODIA. IF THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA ASKED THE CUBANS TO LEAVE, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD DO SO. THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT, WHATEVER ITS FAULTS, DOES HAVE AN INDEPENDENT IDENTITY AND FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE REGIMES IN KABUL AND PHNOM PENH, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE WHOLLY OWNED AND OPERATED SUBSIDIARIES OF MOSCOW AND HANOI. CONSEQUENTLY, AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR UNITA WOULD MAKE US A PARTY TO A CIVIL WAR, AND WOULD SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WHEN OTHER INSURGENCIES THAT ARE ALSO SEEKING TO OVERTHROW ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS, OF WHICH THERE ARE NO SHORTAGE, ASK THE UNITED STATES FOR AID.

FINALLY, AND PURELY FOR THE PURPOSES OF DISCUSSION, SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA? TO BE SURE, SOUTH AFRICA IS PROFESSEDLY ANTI-COMMUNIST. YET ITS POLICIES CONSTITUTE AN OBJECTIVE STIMULUS TO COMMUNISM IN THE REGION AND PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION, SINCE THOSE REBELLING AGAINST APARTHEID LOOK TO MOSCOW FOR ARMS. THE UNITED STATES, BY NOT PUSHING PRETORIA HARDER TO END APARTHEID, MAKES MORE LIKELY THE VERY OUTCOME WE SEEK TO AVOID--THE TRIUMPH OF COMMUNISM IN SOUTH AFRICA. AN INTERESTING ARGUMENT COULD BE MADE THAT ONE OF THE BEST WAYS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PREEMPT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WOULD BE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE ANC, AND SO OBYIATE ITS NEED TO SEEK ARMS FROM MOSCOW.

DO I THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROVIDE

ASSISTANCE TO THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS? I DO NOT. FIRST OF ALL, THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA, FOR GOOD OR ILL, ENJOYS A WIDE MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THERE MAY BE FEW GOVERNMENTS IN THE WORLD THAT LIKE THE APARTHEID REGIME, BUT THERE ARE ALSO FEW THAT DISAGREE THAT IT CONSTITUTES THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA.

SECOND, THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA IS A PROTO-CIVIL WAR. WHAT EVER ELSE IT MAY BE, IT IS NOT A STRUGGLE AGAINST A FOREIGN ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

THIRD, ALTHOUGH A POLICY OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE ANC MIGHT BE POPULAR IN CERTAIN PARTS OF AFRICA, IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT ENJOY THE BROAD SUPPORT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES NECESSARY TO MAKE IT VIABLE OVER THE LONG TERM.

FINALLY, I HOLD OUT THE HOPE THAT OTHER FORMS OF PRESSURE WILL ENCOURAGE AN END TO APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA AND MAKE POSSIBLE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA. A VIOLENT REVOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE A BLOODY ONE, WITH EXTENSIVE SUFFERING ON THE PART OF WHITES AS WELL AS BLACKS. EVERY CONCEIVABLE MEANS AND METHOD SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED TO FORESTALL A VIOLENT SOLUTION TO THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS.

BY WAY OF SUMMATION, LET ME POSE FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WHICH I BELIEVE SHOULD BE ANSWERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SUPPORT ARMED RESISTANCE GROUPS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. IF THE ANSWER TO ALL THESE QUESTIONS IS AFFIRMATIVE, THEN, IN MY VIEW, AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IS JUSTIFIED.

--IS THE CONFLICT AN INDIGENOUS, NATIONALIST EFFORT TO DRIVE OUT A FOREIGN OCCUPIER?

--IS THERE BROAD REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED RESISTANCE GROUP AND OSTRACISM OF THE RESISTANCE'S OPPONENT, AND WOULD

THERE BE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FOR US ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE GROUP?

--WOULD AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT?

--WOULD AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE DEMONSTRABLY ADVANCE A SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN OBJECTIVES, RATHER THAN BEING JUST THE EXPRESSION OF A PREFERENCE FOR ONE SIDE OVER ANOTHER IN A CONFLICT THAT IS PERIPHERAL TO AMERICAN INTERESTS?

--DOES AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE GROUP IN QUESTION ENJOY BROAD SUPPORT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IS NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN SUCH AN UNDERTAKING OVER TIME?

SENATOR KASTEN, LET ME AGAIN COMMEND YOU FOR INITIATING A DISCUSSION OF THIS VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE. AT THIS TIME, I WELCOME ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES MAY HAVE.

LEGITIMACY OF REGIMES IN CAMBODIA AND AFGHANISTAN

Senator KASTEN. Thank you very much for your very thoughtful testimony.

Clearly you are focusing on the basic questions we are trying to deal with here. I know there will be differences among the witnesses. What we are trying to understand is what are the essential traits distinguishing certain freedom fighter groups from others, which make it proper to grant assistance to some and not to others. Your concluding check list, I think, is a useful starting place.

Is there a sense, in your view, that the Samrin regime in Cambodia or the Karmal regime in Afghanistan are less legitimate than, for example, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua? I do not want to discuss whether we are for or against the Sandinistas, but on a broad base, are those two governments less legitimate than the Sandinistas? Is there really any difference, in other words, in the policies of those two governments, their popularity with the people and the fact they all are depending overtly upon outside assistance in order to remain in power?

Representative SOLARZ. It is a very good question, Senator, and my short answer is, it is like the difference between night and day. The fact is that the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh and Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul have no legitimacy whatsoever.

When I was in Hanoi in December, I met with a number of Western

Ambassadors who were there, and one of them, in commenting on the Heng Samrin government and the Communist Party of Cambodia, said the Communist Party of Cambodia is not a party, it's a club. It has several hundred members at most. There are Vietnamese advisors in every one of the Ministries down to the mid-junior levels. There is no question but that the Government of Cambodia is a wholly owned and operated subsidiary of Vietnam. So far as I can determine, it has no indigenous legitimacy whatsoever. And, indeed, the leadership of that government were part and parcel of the Pol Pot crowd until shortly before Pol Pot was overthrown by Vietnam when they, largely to save their own skins because of internal purges within the Khmer Rouge, defected.

In Afghanistan, if possible, there is even less legitimacy than there is in Cambodia. If the Red army were to withdraw from Afghanistan, I suspect Babrak Karmal's life expectancy would be somewhere between 30 and 60 minutes, and it is very clear the entire nation has virtually taken up arms against the government and they have no legitimacy, they could not possibly win an election. I doubt they would get as many votes as the Communist Party of Poland would get if it ever had a free election in Poland. And I don't think the Communist Party of Poland would get more than 5 percent of the vote there.

NICARAGUA

Now, in Nicaragua, while there is clearly a lot of opposition to the Government of Nicaragua, anybody who has been down there and who has spoken to people in Nicaragua knows, the fact is there is also some significant indigenous support for the Sandinistas. Most of the Western Ambassadors and other sort of impartial observers who I have spoken to during the course of my visits to Nicaragua have said that if you had a genuinely, totally free and fair election in Nicaragua, they think the Sandinistas would probably win, although without getting much more than 50 percent of the vote, but probably they would win.

Now, that indicates to me that maybe close to half of the population in Nicaragua is opposed to the Sandinistas, but at least one-half and maybe more, for a variety of ideological and political reasons, are supportive.

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO SANDINISTAS

Finally, while the Sandinistas are, obviously, getting outside support—Cuba, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere—and that support is very important to them, one cannot say that their survival is contingent on the presence of foreign armies in the same way that the survival of the governments in Cambodia and in Afghanistan are dependent on the presence of foreign armies. Indeed, I can think of allies of the United States that have an indigenous legitimacy that would be in very, very difficult straits if we were not willing to provide significant amounts of military assistance and, in some cases, economic assistance to them.

So the fact that Nicaragua may be dependent on economic aid and military aid from other countries does not necessarily mean it does not

have a domestic legitimacy. So I do think that there are, in the terms in which you posed it, significant differences between these three situations.

If I can add one other thought here, one source of the Sandinistas' legitimacy, which is clearly lacking in Cambodia and Afghanistan, is that the Sandinistas did play a central role in the overthrow of the Somoza regime which enjoyed at the time the revolution took place the overwhelming support of the Nicaraguan people. There are many who believe, as I do, that they have betrayed the democratic promises of their revolution. Nevertheless, I know of no one asking for the return of Somoza, and to the extent there are still many people in Nicaragua who are glad Somoza was overthrown, there are still many who are prepared to accord the Sandinistas a degree of legitimacy for the role they played in removing a totally corrupt and discredited previous regime.

POL POT OVERTHROW IN CAMBODIA

In Cambodia, the Heng Samrin government had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the overthrow of Pol Pot. Indeed, its leading cadre, once members of the Khmer Rouge themselves, and in Afghanistan, the government there is hopelessly tainted by virtue of its association with a foreign army of occupation which they allegedly invited in but which we know had no choice in the matter, because the Soviets saw the situation going down the tubes and felt they had to send in their own forces to prevent the overthrow of the previous Communist regime.

THIRD FORCE IN NICARAGUA

Senator KASTEN. I don't want to get involved in a debate. We have a number of different witnesses here. Let me say just one thing, just as you were able to in Cambodia suggest there are two evils and a third good force may emerge, a number of us would argue in Nicaragua that there are two governments that did not work and a third force which could work may emerge. We can argue that.

Representative SOLARZ. I think you can argue it, and it has been argued with great force, and I think even those who may disagree with the argument certainly need to accord it the respect to which it is entitled. But the question I would ask you, Senator, to consider is if you believe we should support the Contras because we think that this is a third alternative to Somoza or to the Sandinistas, then I think you have got to ask yourself on what basis do we refrain from involving ourselves in other civil war-type situations?

Senator KASTEN. That is the exact purpose of this hearing. We then go to Mozambique, which is a perfect example of that question, and we are going to try to explore that kind of a situation.

RACIAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Representative SOLARZ. I hope you will look at Mozambique, but I also hope you look at South Africa. The imagination and concerns of our country ought not to be solely focused on repression in Communist

countries, and one could make an argument from a human rights point of view the situation in South Africa is substantially worse than the situation in Nicaragua and Mozambique and there is a resistance movement there and I think one has got to be prepared to answer the question why we are supporting the Contras but not the ANC in a way that is persuasive and plausible to the American people.

Senator KASTEN. We are going to begin the questioning with Senator Johnston. We are pleased to have Senator Gordon Humphrey join us. He is not a member of the subcommittee, but he has been deeply interested in the Afghanistan issue and has been a leader on this issue. We are happy, Gordon, you are here. We will begin with Senator Johnston.

ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to the committee, Steve. Steve Solarz is one of the brightest and most capable members of the House whose lead I usually follow and whose leadership I await on these issues. I am almost persuaded, but not quite. So let me give you an opportunity to convince me on some of these things.

First of all, do the elections in Nicaragua legitimize the regime of the Sandinistas, in your view?

Representative SOLARZ. Not entirely. I think the elections left a lot to be desired. On the other hand, I think the elections were far better than the elections which are generally held in Communist countries. Opposition parties were permitted to participate. The opposition did get over a third of the vote, which in and of itself speaks presumptively—

Senator JOHNSTON. There was really only one opposition group with any credibility and that was Arturo Cruse, and he tried to campaign and had the thugs come in and disrupt his election.

Representative SOLARZ. Quite, and I did indicate the elections left a lot to be desired.

Senator JOHNSTON. They were not free, were they?

Representative SOLARZ. They were not free in our sense of the term, but they were a lot better than the elections which are held in other Communist countries.

Senator JOHNSTON. There is only one candidate.

Representative SOLARZ. In the sense there were opposition parties that did participate, both to the left and to the right of the Sandinistas. Daniel Ortega did not do as well as Mr. Gorbachev will do in the Soviet elections. He didn't get 99.9 percent of the vote. Opposition candidates did run. They got over one-third of the vote.

Now, I am not suggesting, therefore, the elections were completely free for the reasons you mentioned. They obviously were not.

Senator JOHNSTON. You say they are not completely free. I would say they are a more sophisticated charade.

Representative SOLARZ. I would say they are about as much of a charade as the elections in the Philippines, Senator, in the sense, yes, the opposition did not have a real opportunity to wage its campaign. Therefore, the Nicaraguan people did not have a fair opportunity to

genuinely express their preference. Yet, the elections were better than might have been anticipated in the same sense that the elections in the Philippines were fundamentally fraudulent, yet they were better than previous elections that were held in the Philippines.

AID TO NICARAGUA FOLLOWING REVOLUTION

Senator JOHNSTON. You say the Sandinistas have not been put to the test. I happen to have been one of those Senators who voted for aid to Nicaragua and more important than that, I think, was the role of the United States and all the international agencies in seeing that they got aid from the international agencies right after the Sandinistas had taken over. That was at least some test, was it not? Wasn't that some show of good faith on our part and under President Carter's Presidency which was by any standard the most human rights oriented President we have had in recent times?

Representative SOLARZ. It certainly was, and to a certain extent, it is precisely because of the failure of our effort to extend the hand of friendship to the Sandinistas to elicit a more constructive response on their part that I take a rather dim view of the Nicaraguan Government at the present time. But when I said they have not really been put to the test, what I meant, Senator, is they have not really been put to the test in the context of the Contadora process. The fact is, and if you have been down there you must know this, that they have said that they are prepared to accept the Contadora agreement which would prohibit interference in the internal affairs of other countries in the region which would, therefore, explicitly preclude them from providing continued assistance to the guerrillas in El Salvador or training guerrillas for subversive purposes in Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, or elsewhere in the region. They say in principle they are prepared to accept a Contadora agreement that would require the withdrawal of all military advisors and foreign forces. They say in principle they are prepared to accept—

INTERNATIONAL AID TO NICARAGUA

Senator JOHNSTON. Let me just get to my question. We gave them in 2 years more aid than they have gotten in all the years of Somoza—I think \$175 million in 2 fiscal years—plus, as I say, all the aid from the international organizations. That was certainly some test, was it not?

Representative SOLARZ. Yes; it was. Since then a number of things have happened and it may well be—

Senator JOHNSTON. I don't want to go into all that history. I just wanted to speak to your question of whether they were put to the test.

You say, "As long as there is a possibility of settlement in Nicaragua, we should not aid the Contras." On what terms would you settle in Nicaragua?

Representative SOLARZ. I would settle for a Contadora agreement which precluded the establishment of foreign military bases in the region, prohibited the interference of the countries of the region in the

affairs of their neighbors, require the withdrawal of all or most foreign military advisors which provided for the establishment of an equitable balance of military forces in the region and which also required a measure of progress toward the establishment of genuine political pluralism in all of the countries of the region.

I would not, however, Senator, insist as a condition for an acceptable settlement of the conflict in Nicaragua unwillingness on the part of the Sandinistas to remove themselves from power, because I think that is utterly unrealistic.

POLITICAL PLURALISM

Senator JOHNSTON. When you say "political pluralism," what do you mean?

Representative SOLARZ. I mean the opportunity for people to express their opinions, to run for office, to have a free press, political pluralism to the greatest extent possible, but recognizing that it may not be possible in most of the countries in the region to get the same degree of political pluralism that we enjoy here in the United States.

Senator JOHNSTON. I really have a lot of questions, and I enjoy speaking to you in the committee and out, but our chairman says we have to move on.

Thank you very much.

Senator KASTEN. Senator, I do not want to in any way inhibit your questions.

Senator JOHNSTON. Well, in that case then, let me ask you—
[Laughter.]

Senator KASTEN. Senator D'Amato is next, but before we go to Senator D'Amato, I would like to call on Senator Specter.

REMARKS OF SENATOR SPECTER

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I will only take a moment. I would like to thank Congressman Solarz for appearing here today and commend him on his work on this and related subjects and commend you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this important hearing.

I am obligated to be elsewhere and I would like to submit questions for the record.

Senator KASTEN. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator D'Amato?

REMARKS OF SENATOR D'AMATO

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask any questions of my friend and colleague, Stephen Solarz. I would like to commend him for one of the most, although we do have some differences on certain points, one of the most thoughtful presentations that I have ever heard given in this difficult area and very important area of concern. You make a very substantial contribution to this hearing, and I am going to review your testimony, Steve, very carefully again. Excellent statement.

Representative SOLARZ. I appreciate it, Senator, very much.

Senator KASTEN. Senator DeConcini, do you have any questions at this time?

SOLUTION TO CONTADORA PROCESS

Senator DeCONCINI. The only question I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, is in the Contadora process, Mr. Solarz, an enforcement provision seems to be missing, and having talked to three of the heads of state of the Contadora nations, I have found that they are not that anxious at all to offer any multilateral or multinational force to enforce an agreement. It just occurs to me that if there is a solution there with this Contadora process, the United States should seriously consider funding such a multinational force without providing any personnel to see that, hopefully, the provisions of a Contadora agreement could be carried out. Can you give me a quick reaction to that—in your judgment, is it something that can or should be done?

Representative SOLARZ. If there is ever a Contadora agreement, I think any proposal to provide U.S. assistance to a verification procedure, which would require financial commitment on the part of the United States, would sail through the Congress. We clearly have an interest in making it possible to Contadora countries and other nations of Central America that would be party to such an agreement to make sure that the agreement is implemented, not just in principle, but in practice, and, furthermore, I think that we could make a useful contribution to the verification of a Contadora agreement by making available to the Contadora countries intelligence which we are in a position to obtain by virtue of the techniques available to us so that they can have some additional input as to whether or not—

Senator DeCONCINI. Excuse me, would it not be advantageous for us to take the initiative and propose the funding of such a force, to be on the offensive instead of what appears to be the defensive and not really having a policy down there that at least can get approved by Congress?

Representative SOLARZ. I think it would be useful.

Senator DeCONCINI. Is that going to happen, do you think?

Representative SOLARZ. Well, I would hope it would happen, but I must say in all candor that I do not think the perception that it would not be possible to adequately fund a verification panel of procedure is a serious obstacle to an agreement in the Contadora process. I think most of the countries down there probably assume that if there is an agreement, it won't be difficult to get resources to verify the agreement. Nevertheless, as a demonstration of American support for Contadora, I think this would be a useful initiative for us to take.

Senator DeCONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Humphrey, I do not know if you have any questions of this witness. If you would like to ask a brief question, we invite you to do so, otherwise you can wait for the Under Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Senator HUMPHREY. I will wait, Mr. Chairman.

BIPARTISAN SUPPORT OF CENTRAL AMERICA POLICY

Representative SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, can I conclude with just one thought? That is, you are dealing in the course of these hearings not only with some complex but obviously some very controversial issues, and I would very strongly suggest that one of the greatest contributions you could make would be to search for a formula which would make possible the broadest bipartisan consensus possible with respect to dealing with these matters. It would probably be better for the United States to refrain from supporting some insurgencies, which some of us might otherwise think is in our interest to support, if we can have broad bipartisan support with respect to those insurgencies we are supporting than to be involved all over the lot and to transform this whole question of policy into a major source of partisan political controversy in the country because in the long run, if this becomes enmeshed in major partisan controversy, it is not going to be possible to develop and sustain the kind of enduring support which is necessary in a democratic society, such as ours, for continuing an effective policy.

Therefore, I think what we need to do is not just determine which of these insurgencies to support and which not to support but to come up with a coherent and convincing rationale for why we are doing what we are doing in some places and why we are not doing what we are not doing in other places around which Republicans as well as Democrats, liberals as well as conservatives, can hopefully rally.

Senator KASTEN. I would like to suggest to you, first of all, that is what we are attempting. The fact the gentleman from New York is a leader in the Democratic Party in the House of Representatives, I think, is significant. The fact is you are leading off this hearing, and you are willing to come and start to wrestle with these issues with us and that we have strong bipartisan interest in this committee at this time. We have more people here today than we had for the Secretary of State. [Laughter.]

Senator JOHNSTON. Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. The Senator from Louisiana.

Senator JOHNSTON. I would very much like to agree with that and say with respect to Nicaragua we tried to do that very hard on the Democratic side in the Senate. We came up with complete unanimity of all those Democrats involved on an aid package for Nicaragua and submitted it to the President. I said, indeed, he could not refuse but he did, unfortunately. We really ought to try to put that together, not just for Nicaragua, but elsewhere, so we can have a unified foreign policy.

Senator KASTEN. I would like to thank you very much for your testimony, and we look forward to working with you and your ideas.

Representative SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENTS OF:

WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR., UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

Senator KASTEN. Our next witnesses will be the Honorable William Schneider, Under Secretary of State, and Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Gentlemen, we understand Secretary Armitage has a time problem. Therefore, we ask Secretary Armitage to stay as long as you can, and there will be someone who can answer questions for you if you have to leave. We understand.

Gentlemen, please proceed with your statements.

Mr. ARMITAGE. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will lead off.

It is not unusual for the Department of Defense giving guidance and leadership to the Department of State anyway. [Laughter.]

Unlike Steve, I testified in front of Congressman Solarz quite often. He is one who always admonishes the witnesses to be very brief and yet I notice he engaged in a bit of filibuster. I will not take that temptation.

I would like to acknowledge to the committee, the patience of the committee is of inverse proportion to the length of our opening statement. You want to ask questions and that is what we are here for.

I am pleased you did invite me. I happen to feel quite comfortable with the subject matter, from a practical standpoint. I have dealt with counterinsurgencies most of my adult life. I welcome the opportunity you are offering and the ability to testify.

U.S. SUPPORT OF COMMUNIST-ENFORCED TYRANNY

I would like to start off very briefly by just saying resistance to tyranny associated with Communist regimes is, indeed, consistent with our national interest, and to ignore or deny that would be inconsistent with our own historical roots.

President Reagan, in his inaugural address, said that "We must not break faith with those who risk their lives on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua to defy Soviet-supported aggression and to secure rights which have been ours from birth."

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, George Shultz, Secretary of

State, indicated, "The American people have a long and noble tradition of supporting the struggle of other peoples for freedom, democracy, and independence. In the 19th century, we supported Simon Bolivar, Polish patriots, and others seeking freedom—reciprocating the aid given to us in our own revolution by other nations like France. If we turn our backs on this tradition, we would be conceding the Soviet notion that Communist revolutions are irreversible."

In our view and certainly in view of freedom fighters around the world, the Brezhnev doctrine is dead and socialism is not irreversible.

I have attempted, Mr. Chairman, as you suggested in your invitation, to lay out some general guidelines on how we would formulate policy. They are not all inclusive, but I would like to illuminate a few of them. I am sure the committee has very strong ideas as well. Before I get to that point, I would like to make one other point, and that is the importance of security assistance.

SITUATION IN PHILIPPINES

Congressman Solarz brought up the Philippine situation, and I think it is an ideal example. It is more important for us, where possible, to prevent our having to make the decisions on whether or not to support an anti-Communist resistance group, than it is to obviate the need for that support by supporting and strengthening democratic institutions to include the use of security assistance. We are attempting to do this and are involved in a bit of a debate on the Philippines situation, but I would like to congratulate the Congress for the success story we feel we have had in El Salvador.

We have obviated the need to wrestle with this thorny question in the El Salvadoran context.

If I may, I would like to make one further point and then get into the guidelines. In our view, there is vigor in revolutionary movements right now. I would be so bold as to say a democratic revolution is afoot. I think one of the reasons is that the United States has regained its primacy in moral terms, political terms, and, indeed, military terms, and that we do strongly support the traditions and principles on which our own country was founded. So the question then is not so much if we will assist the anti-Communist resistance movements; it is how we will assist them.

For the committee's consideration, I would like to provide the following. These are some of the guidelines that policymakers have to consider when we address the issue of support for anti-Communist revolutions: One, we have to consider and, indeed, determine who is worthy of our support. The enemy of our enemy will be assured of our friendship if he shares our values in his opposition to an enemy. A resistance group to have our support must, indeed, be preferable to the regime that is in power.

KHMER ROUGE EXAMPLE

Congressman Solarz indicated a classic example of how the enemy of our enemy might not necessarily be our friend in the discussion of the Khmer Rouge. My testimony agrees with much of that by Congressman Solarz; one thing we clearly agree upon is that we find the Khmer Rouge absolutely reprehensible. I won't stress that further.

OVERT/COVERT ASSISTANCE

Another consideration we have to make is whether to be overt or covert in our provision of assistance. We would prefer in general to be overt because by doing so we can indicate a political and public solidarity with those movements which deserve our support. But in many cases, or in some cases, at least, it is preferable to be covert. Where the Soviets and their surrogates can disguise their assistance, it may not be in our best interest to be very public about our own. I would like to stress that another guideline we have to consider is what I call the suitability of our aid. That is, does it, indeed, meet a need of the resistance movement? And further, as satisfying as it might be to some people to be able to provide weapons and bullets in every case, frankly, this might not be the answer. Medical supplies might be, information might be, political support might be the right answer.

So we have to make sure our aid is suitable to the need.

The most important thing that follows from this is that once given assistance, we must be very careful to assure that the resistance groups have a reasonable expectation of the long-term nature of that assistance. To give today and take away tomorrow would be a greater detriment to the groups than to not give today.

Finally, the last two points are that one has to consider the effect on East-West relations in provisions of assistance to anti-Communist resistance. This does not mean in any way, shape, or form that we give the Soviets a veto over our actions. Policymakers have to take the effect on United States-Soviet relations into consideration when we propose a course of action.

And finally, it is aid in concert with our friends and our allies, which is more effective than aid simply—given and donated—provided by the United States alone. I think this is for obvious reasons.

CONCLUSIONS

That leaves me with three rather broad conclusions. First, the United States does have at our hands a very wide range of tools to use in support for anti-Communist resistance; political, economic, humanitarian, military, informational, intelligence, even military hardware.

Second, that this is a problem that is not to be solved only by the executive branch. It has to be solved by the executive branch and the legislative branch working in concert.

And third, in order to be successful in gaining support for these type programs, we have to be very clear in our objectives and, indeed, to be able to prove to the American public, certainly to the members of the

appropriate committees, what we are really doing is helping people to help themselves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT

I submit my prepared statement for inclusion in the record at this point.

Senator KASTEN. Without objection.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to express some views with regard to the extremely important issue you have chosen as the focus of today's hearing. As you might expect, we in the administration have thought long and hard about how the US government should deal with anti-communist insurgencies throughout the world. I'd like to share with you some of our views and conclusions. And speaking personally from my own background -- approximately six years in Indochina, the majority of it concerned with counterinsurgency warfare, as well as two years as an instructor in counterinsurgency -- I feel comfortable with the subject matter.

Let me begin by stating clearly where our sentiments lie. We have a strong and profound sympathy for those groups which have devoted their efforts, and in many cases, their lives, to opposing tyranny, and in particular, that tyranny associated with various communist regimes throughout the world. Their resistance is consistent with our own national interests, and to ignore or deny this would be inconsistent with the historical roots of the United States. We believe that the appellation of "freedom fighters" to many of these groups is accurate and apt, and as such, we are compelled by our own traditions and history to support such movements. As the President stated in his State of the Union Address:

"... We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives -- on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua -- to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth."

And as George Schultz recently wrote -- "The American people have a long and noble tradition of supporting the struggle of other peoples for freedom, democracy, and independence. In the nineteenth century, we supported Simon Bolivar, Polish patriots and others seeking freedom --

reciprocating, in a way, the aid given to us in our own revolution by other nations like France. If we turn our backs on this tradition, we would be conceding the Soviet notion that Communist revolutions are irreversible . . ."

In the contemporary world, anti-communist groups in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua and elsewhere are engaged in deadly struggle with the forces of tyrannical regimes. These anti-communist groups deserve our support and assistance not only because we as a nation stand for liberty, but also because their struggles have undercut decisively the ideological claim that the spread of Communist regimes is inevitable. Indeed, their resistance alters what the communists call the correlation of forces in favor of those who believe in liberty. In our view and that of resistance groups, the Brezhnev Doctrine is dead: Socialism is not irreversible. So, for us, the issue is not whether freedom fighters deserve our support; the real question is what support should be offered.

This question should be seen against two general aspects: The first is that anti-communist insurgencies tend most often to emerge from those societies and nations in which the communist regime they oppose has been imposed, either by the Soviet Union directly or with the material and military support of the USSR. Thus, to the extent that we are successful in strengthening the democratic institutions within nations and the capacity of those nations to resist Soviet influence, we will be successful in deterring Soviet aggression and subversion. In short, our security assistance programs of today are an important form of insurance.

The security assistance we give to such nations as the Philippines, which today faces a virulent communist insurgency, can obviate the potential requirement to support anti-communist opposition in the Philippines in the future. This does not mean that unlimited security assistance funds would solve the problem of Philippine insurgency. Funds alone will not. There must be a broad program of reform -- economic, political and military -- to complement our security

assistance. But the most far reaching political reform, the most effective economic policies and the most humane social programs will fail if they fall prey to an unrelenting communist insurgency.

Indeed, the security assistance we have provided El Salvador has been key to preventing the further spread of Marxism there, and has been a major success in helping pro-democratic groups there build a nation better able to meet the aspirations of its citizens and better able to defend itself against external and internal threats. There is a logic that ties successful security assistance programs to viable democratic nations and, ultimately to no need for anti-communist insurgencies. It is absolutely essential that Congress and the American people understand the true and important nature of our security assistance programs, and how these programs make possible the stability and security under which democracy can grow and flourish.

The second observation is that the vigor of resistance to communist regimes in various parts of the world is growing and will continue to grow. This partly reflects the growing recognition that communism, and in particular, the Soviet brand of communism, offers little for the spirit or material benefit of mankind -- particularly when it is exported by force to nations like Afghanistan and Cambodia. There is a democratic revolution afoot in the world, built on the spirit of freedom, independence and national development

But the rising opposition to communist regimes also reflects an expanding recognition that the United States has regained its primacy and now strongly supports the traditions and principles on which it was founded. The United States stands as a beacon for those seeking freedom in distant, and not so distant, lands, not only because our Declaration of Independence and history has committed us to such a role, but because our growing economic, international and, yes, military strength is increasingly acknowledged by the world. Accordingly, it is certain that anti-communist resistance groups will turn to us for assistance in their struggle and that we will increasingly face the question of how to respond.

To answer this question correctly, we must consider a number of factors, and recognize that there may not always be quick, easy answers. Always, we must take into account the direction the country is moving and the regional dynamics which are involved. But there are some considerations which may apply to the varied and different situations in which the question comes up -- working guidelines, if you will -- which may help determine the nature and extent of our support to groups which oppose communist regimes. Among these guidelines are the following:

Worthiness of Support

The enemy of our enemy will be assured of our friendship if he shares our values in his opposition to our enemy. A fundamental basis of any decision to support a resistance group will be our judgment that if it succeeded, it would be preferable to the regime in power. Obviously, every resistance group will not be perfect, and not every group that professes anti-communism deserves our support. The resistance of one tyrant to another's tyranny is not a sufficient claim on US assistance, for we do not believe it is correct or useful to overthrow one tyranny in favor of another. There are cases where we cannot support resistance groups because of their own tactics and principles. For example, U. S. assistance in virtually any form to the Khmer Rouge would be a classic example of where a lack of discrimination on our part would be wrong. Pol Pot and his henchmen are unworthy of our support regardless of how much they may share our conviction that the Vietnamese communists should leave Cambodia. Support for the Khmer Rouge, even if indirectly supplied, would be ludicrous and reprehensible. Support for the non-Communist opposition in Cambodia, however, is consistent with our values and should be continued. The only real issue here is the type of support which should be offered. In short, our assistance must be designed to improve the prospect of self-determination, liberty, long-term stability and democratic expression wherever possible.

Overt or Covert Support

A critical decision we must make early on is whether overt or covert assistance will be of greatest utility. In our democracy, our aid must be acceptable to Congress and the American public. Wherever practical, our aid should be openly proposed and provided. Assistance openly proposed and openly arrived at has political solidity and demonstrates concretely the solidarity of the American people. This method of providing aid is most consistent with our history and our values.

But in some instances too public a stance on the details of our assistance can undercut its utility. Let us be frank. In cases where the battle between contending parties is fought over national legitimacy and we publicize our support while the Soviet Union and its allies disguise theirs, we can actually hurt the group we intend to help. This does not mean that we should not aid those groups where our assistance would be less effective if it were highly publicized. But it may mean that low-key assistance may be more effective than openly acknowledged and highly publicized assistance can be. Far too often it can work to our disadvantage to have groups described as "U. S. backed rebels." Thus, in some cases, our open advocacy of groups opposing Communist regimes may be counterproductive in the sense that it provides a rationale for those regimes to avoid the justified criticisms and opposition of internal groupings. Too public a stance and highly publicized details of our assistance may delay resolution of the problem in other ways also. Afghanistan may be a case in point. Our immediate objective there is to get the Soviets to withdraw. But a Soviet withdrawal might be easier to obtain if the Soviets are not confronted with highly publicized, detailed discussions of our assistance to the Afghanistan freedom fighters.

In other cases, open and publicized assistance may be far more valuable and effective than covert aid ever could be. It may be very effective to signal, clearly, to the communist regimes and to the people suffering under those regimes that we stand with and support the opposition.

The point is, I think, that there will always be instances when we must look very carefully at the specific case involved and recognize that highly publicized assistance can be less effective in promoting freedom and democracy in some cases than in others.

Suitability of Aid

Obviously, our aid to anti-communist groups should meet their needs. Ideally, our assistance should be adequate and timely, reflecting the particular circumstances of the insurgency. Useless assistance can be worse than no assistance at all. And the definition of what is useful, effective and helpful depends very much on what group is the recipient and the circumstances of its struggle. In some cases, economic or medical assistance can be of immensely more benefit than weaponry. In some cases, radios can be of much greater efficacy than rifles. And, in some cases, simple vocal, political, or informational support may be better than material aid. The point is that the groups which deserve our help vary in terms of the assistance which can be most helpful, and a blanket commitment of assistance without regard to these differences would not only be mindless, it could also be counter-productive.

There is one need which is probably common to all recipients, namely that they should have a good idea as to the extent of our support and a good sense of what they can and cannot expect from us. And once we have extended aid the recipients should have a reasonable expectation that the aid will continue. The long term nature of our assistance is extremely important and should be assured wherever possible.

Aid with regard for Broad US Security Concerns, including East-West relations

The effect of US assistance on East-West relations must also be considered. This is a fact of life. Ever since the United States assisted Yugoslavia in its struggle against Soviet hegemony, the US-Soviet relationship and the effect of US aid programs on that relationship have

figured in decisions with regard to the mode, extent and character of our assistance to anti-communist freedom fighters. This is not to say that we should fear to aid those groups which deserve our help because such assistance is disturbing to the Soviet Union. Absolutely not! But for policy makers, it is essential to view the problem in its full international dimensions, and assess the actions we take to assist freedom fighters in terms of how the Soviet Union will react. In Afghanistan, for example, we see little advantage to supporting the Mujahidin in ways which would stimulate the USSR to attempt to spread its control of that country by either greater draconian measures internally, or by spreading their military operations into Pakistan. The point is not that we should accord the Soviet Union any kind of veto over the aid we might give to freedom fighters. We should not, for to do so would undercut the fact that our aid is directed precisely to limit and exclude Soviet influence. It is simply that choosing the mode and style of our assistance without regard to how it will affect the Soviet Union would disregard the fact that the struggle of anti-communist groups takes place within and affects an international context in which the stakes are very high.

Aid in concert with friends and allies

Finally, we believe it is generally to our advantage to enlist other nations in assisting freedom fighters rather than to seek to support these groups unilaterally. We share a common commitment to liberty with many of the world's nations and by pooling our assistance, our aid can be that much greater. ASEAN support for the Cambodian opposition to the Vietnamese invaders is one of the free world's successes. The US has supported ASEAN's efforts to deny legitimacy to the Vietnamese occupation and maintain pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces and agree to a political settlement that will enable the long suffering Cambodians to live in peace under a government of their own choosing.

Mr. Chairman, we believe these general considerations can help

us in dealing with the thorny questions of who should be assisted and how. I hesitate to claim that they are either complete enough or explicit enough to define the character and amounts of aid which should be offered to anti-communist insurgencies wherever they may occur. But we think they are necessary considerations in determining our specific policy with regard to each of the anti-communist insurgencies now underway and those which may emerge in the future.

Mr. Chairman, let me try to summarize briefly. We welcome your interest in this subject and the opportunity to discuss it with you, for it is an issue on which I believe there are many shared executive and legislative views, at least on the basic morality and necessity of supporting those groups abroad which oppose tyranny. It is obviously difficult to state precisely and comprehensively how this support should be implemented. It is also obvious, however, that we cannot and should not simply react, without due regard to existing circumstances, to instances in which groups in opposition to communist regimes request our assistance.

Let me conclude with a few observations. The first is that the United States has a broad range of ways in which it can assist those groups struggling against communist regimes. The issue is which of these and which combinations of political, economic, information, humanitarian, and military hardware are appropriately applied. It is not an issue which can be resolved by the executive branch alone, nor should it be. The answer should and can be forged on a case-by-case basis by the responsible members of the executive and legislative branches working together.

The second observation is that once a decision has been made to support a group struggling to promote democracy, it is important to maintain that support for as long as the struggle lasts and for as long as the group we support remains committed to its struggle for the right reasons. Intermittent support and broken promises to deserving anti-

communist insurgents is as much a shame as continued support to groups which shift from worthy opposition toward efforts to simply replace communist tyranny with another form of tyranny. But while we must always monitor the progress of the opposition to communist regimes and the actions and views of those groups we may choose to support, the world should not perceive us as fickle in our commitment to those groups which deserve our support.

The third is that we should be clear about why we support anti-communist insurgencies. Our objective is to help people help themselves. Our support is and has been devoted to containing or preventing an expansion of turmoil, conflict, death and war. Indeed, our support of opposition groups has been and is now devoted to containing and preventing these miseries. In each case of support for anti-Communist insurgency, we in the Reagan Administration have sought to encourage negotiations and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We intend to continue along this course in the future as well.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT

Senator KASTEN. What we will do is go to the testimony of Secretary Schneider and ask the committee to direct questions to either Secretary or to both. Secretary Schneider.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this very useful hearing that you have convened.

Mr. Chairman, I have a statement of modest length. I would like to, with your permission, offer that statement for the record and just summarize a few of the essential points.

Senator KASTEN. Without objection.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on the subject of US policy toward anti-communist insurgencies. I have long believed that totalitarian communist regimes are the natural target of insurgencies, and the recent rise of guerrilla groups struggling against repressive regimes helps validate that belief.

Anti-communist guerrilla movements are a relatively recent phenomenon. I believe the mid - and late - 1970's were a watershed in that regard. During that period, Marxist regimes of one form or another -- exploiting fully the self-induced paralysis and disarray reigning over our foreign policy-making at the time -- came to power in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, and Mozambique. Soon thereafter, totalitarian governments were installed in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Grenada.

These regimes all shared in common a total disregard for even the most basic human rights of their subjects and a ruthless willingness to destroy all vestiges of opposition. Some entertained imperialist designs on their neighbors, and all exhibited a blind hatred of America and all we stand for. These regimes introduced levels of despair and poverty never experienced before by the countries they ruled; a despair that has led millions of persons to risk all to escape. We see the

mute testimony of this fact today in the massive refugee populations in Pakistan, Thailand and elsewhere.

Now we see a new spectacle: men and women taking up arms to overthrow these dictatorships and trying to accomplish something no indigenous group anywhere has ever been able to do -- unseat a ruling communist government.

Who are these people? The groups and the regimes they are opposing are diverse. Each group has different motivations and leadership. In Nicaragua, for example, the groups have Contras in reaction to the excesses of the Sandinista radical forces which had successfully overthrown the authoritarian regime of Anastasio Somoza. In Angola, they have lost out to more radical forces in the struggle to oust colonial rulers. In Afghanistan and Cambodia, insurgents must deal not only with a local communist regime but also with the regular armed forces of an outside communist power. In Ethiopia and Mozambique, there are different elements at work. In Ethiopia, there is a traditional separatist strain animating the guerilla movement. In Mozambique, the dissidence is closely linked to the ongoing confrontation in the region concerning Zimbabwe's independence and pressures against South Africa.

Thus, while these groups have some things in common, they also have many differences. Some have democratic or other ideological motivations, while others simply want power. Some represent tribal, religious, or ethnic groups, whose actual goal is a separate state rather than gaining control of the existing one. Some guerrilla movements are unified, while others are badly split into contending factions with little in common beyond a desire to eject the government in power.

What has been the U.S. response to the growth of these

movements? In truth, Mr. Chairman, the legacy of U.S. policy in this regard has been a convoluted one, thanks to a combination of executive and legislative action which has been anything but consistent. Let us look at the record:

- we have the Clark Amendment, which expressly prohibits assistance to "any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola";
- we have last year's example of both bodies of Congress voting for a resolution supporting the Mujaheddin in their struggle to unseat the Soviet -- supported Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul;
- we have this year's House vote on assistance to the contras in Nicaragua which has the effect of making further U.S. aid impossible;
- we have the proposed Solarz amendment to the FY 1986 authorization bill, which would provide assistance to Thailand for the purpose of aiding the non-communist resistance in Cambodia;
- we have the Administration's recent efforts to reprogram FY 1985 military assistance funds and to request in our regular FY 1986 bill military aid for the Machel government in Mozambique.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that the record is in fact less inconsistent than this admittedly patchwork review would indicate.

Whatever the differences between the various groups, our

policy toward them is guided by our respect for the principles of international law and our desire to promote national interests of the U.S. There is both a general and a specific criterion by which these interests are measured, with the general taking precedence over the specific. The U.S. Government does not use force against regimes simply because it has ideological, philosophical or even substantive disagreements with them. Rather, we attempt to work with governments to resolve all differences peacefully, using traditional diplomatic means. For example, in some instances we might grant or withhold foreign assistance or such other benefits as we are in a position to provide. This carrot and stick approach often succeeds in weaning radical governments from dependence on communist states, allows them to follow a more balanced foreign policy and encourages them to move toward a freer political and economic system. Our goal is to have peaceful, normal relations with all nations of the world in accordance with shared principles such as are embodied in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration. If we cannot resolve differences, however, we live with them as best we can. A moment's thought will reveal the bleak consequences of any other course of action.

It is only when a regime is unwilling itself to live within these norms of "non-intervention" and instead threatens or attacks its neighbors that we may and should on a case-by-case basis consider sterner measures. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia and Nicaraguan support for Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador fit into this category. In these instances we may limit ourselves to severe political or economic sanctions or to helping neighboring countries build up their own defenses -- or we may provide more substantial help to anti-government guerrillas.

While each situation differs from the rest in important particulars, and we must tailor our responses to each accordingly, this Administration has sought to establish an underlying theme for our responses: totalitarian regimes posing a threat not only to their own people but to their neighbors, their region, and to the vital interests of the Free World cannot assume that they are immune at home so they may do as they wish abroad. For too long, the free nations have restricted themselves to drawing lines in the dust--conceding the Communists their conquests while at most seeking to resist further conquests. In other words, we have been on the defensive, engaged in a slow retreat before the apparently inexorable advance of "revolution." We must retain the freedom to put the would-be totalitarians on the defensive, to help introduce uncertainty into their imperialist plans. To do less is a prescription for not retaining freedom at all.

I would be happy to try and answer any specific questions members may have.

U.S. WEAKNESS PROMPTED SOVIET ADVENTURISM

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, the Soviet forces taking advantage of the diplomatic and military weakness of the United States in the latter part of the 1970's began a rather energetic effort to extend their influence in a number of areas of the world. The effects of American military weakness in the 1970's has shown up subsequently in Soviet direct intervention in Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the domination by Soviet client states in Ethiopia, in South Yemen and, of course, Nicaragua and elsewhere. The hearings you are having today basically reflect the problems associated with the Western democracies confronting the reality of Soviet power in those areas. This hearing, I think, provides a very good opportunity to come to grips with some of these circumstances.

The people in the regions affected, of course, as has been noted by other witnesses, are not inert to the fact of communist domination of their countries. They have begun to take up arms against them.

Who are these people? Well, the groups and the regimes they are opposing are diverse. Each group has different motivations of leadership. In Nicaragua, for example, the Contras have risen in reaction to the excesses of the Sandinistas radical forces which have successfully over-

thrown the authoritarian regime of Somoza. In Angola, the insurgency lost out to more radical forces in the struggle to oust colonial rulers. In Afghanistan and Cambodia, the insurgency must deal with not only local Communist regimes but regular armed forces of outside Communist power. In Ethiopia and Mozambique, there are different elements at work.

Thus while these groups have some things in common, they also have many differences. Some have democratic or other ideological motivations, while others simply want power. Some represent tribal, religious, or ethnic groups whose actual goal is separate state rather than gaining control of an existing one. Some guerrilla movements are unified while others are badly split into factions with other common desire to eject the government in power.

What has been the U.S. response to the growth of these movements? In truth, the legacy of U.S. policy in this regard is a rather convoluted one, than, to a combination of executive and legislative action which has been less than consistent.

CLARK AMENDMENT

Looking at the record for a moment, we have the Clark amendment which expressly prohibits assistance to "Any nation, group, or organization, movement or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola."

We have last year's example of both bodies of Congress voting for a resolution supporting the Mujahideen in their struggle to unseat the Soviet-supported Babrak Karmal regime in Afghanistan.

We have this year's House vote on assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua; the proposed Solarz amendment dealing with Kampuchea, and so forth.

U.S. USE OF CARROT-AND-STICK APPROACH

Mr. Chairman, I submit that the record is, in fact, somewhat less inconsistent than this admittedly patchwork review would indicate. Whatever the differences between the various groups, our policy to them is guided by our respect for principles in international law and our desire to promote the national interest of the United States. There is both a general and specific criteria by which these interests are measured with the general taking precedence over the specific. The U.S. Government does not use force against regimes simply because of ideological, philosophical or even substantive disagreements with them. Rather, we attempt to work with governments to resolve all differences peacefully using traditional diplomatic means.

For example, in some instances we might grant or withhold assistance we might provide. This carrot-and-stick approach succeeds in weakening radical governments from dependence upon Communist states and encourages them to move toward a freer political and economic system.

Our goal is to have peaceful and normal relations with all nations of the world. If we cannot resolve differences, however, we live with them as best we can. Any moment's thoughts will reveal the bleak conse-

quences of any other courses of action. It is only when a regime is unwilling itself to live with these norms of nonintervention and instead threatens or attacks its neighbors that we may and should on a case-by-case basis consider stern measures. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, and Nicaraguan support for Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador fit into these categories. In these instances, we might limit ourselves to severe political or economic sanctions or help developing countries build up their own defense, or we may provide more substantial help to antigovernment guerrillas. We certainly reserve the right to provide any assistance of this sort depending upon how our national interest is affected.

While each situation differs from the rest in important particulars, we must tailor our responses to each accordingly. This administration has sought to establish an underlying theme for our responses. Totalitarian regimes posing a threat not only to their own people but also to their neighbors, their region, and vital interests of the free world cannot assume they are immune at home so that they may do as they wish abroad. For too long free nations have restricted themselves to drawing lines in the dust—conceding the Communists their Third World conquests while at most seeking to resist further conquests.

In other words, we have been on the defensive, engaged in a slow retreat before the apparently inexorable advance of revolution. We must obtain the freedom to put would-be totalitarians on the defensive, introduce uncertainty to their imperialist plans. To do less is a prescription for not obtaining any freedom at all.

Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer any specific questions you or other members may have.

Senator KASTEN. I will yield my time right now to Senator D'Amato and then I will catch up with questions later.

Senator D'Amato?

OVERT AID TO AFGHANISTAN

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two other questions, so I will try to be brief.

Secretary Schneider, you made reference to a convoluted theory in terms of application of any principles, and I would suggest to you one of the most convoluted theories that I have seen practiced is the State Department's opposition to overt aid to Afghanistan, be it medical supplies, be it food assistance, military, and then coming forward in a manner in which we put aside the attempt to resolve the difficult dispute in the Senate that my colleagues—Senator Johnston, Senator DeConcini, and myself—offered, and come forward with overt aid to Nicaragua.

Now, I supported the overt aid to Nicaragua but why, why in the world would you send that even humanitarian aid, et cetera, overtly. Don't you think these people need aside from what you are doing in a covert way, what if anything we are doing, don't you think symbolically it becomes rather important that there be not just words but that, yes, we show and demonstrate to the Soviets—they know what we are doing, but publicly, I cannot believe it.

You said convoluted, it is convoluted; it is ridiculous, absolutely ridiculous.

We introduced a resolution, S. 34, 40 Senators—we didn't push it that hard—who signed on to it. Senator Humphrey has similar resolutions and you opposed them. You want to talk about convoluted theories? I will tell you, I think you have a piecemeal theory; you hop from crisis to crisis. There is absolutely nothing set out. Oh, we are against bad people, people who are against us. You are like little kids. Why? Tell me why?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. With respect to humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Senator D'Amato, we have a reprogramming request that will be coming up to the Congress that will provide—

Senator D'AMATO. Oh, you mean you are changing again? That's good.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No; we have to go through several procedures to get funds reprogrammed.

ASSISTANCE UNDER S. 34

Senator D'AMATO. We are now going to support S. 34 which urges the President to provide medical, military, and food assistance right up on the table in an overt manner? What is the State Department saying about that?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I haven't personally read your resolution, Senator, but we are seeking a reprogramming that will provide actual funds to provide humanitarian assistance that you have discussed.

Senator D'AMATO. Well, that is a start in the right direction. Mr. Armitage, what do you have to say?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I would like to add that there are some considerations, some aspects that policymakers need to take into consideration when we develop a program, and a couple of those, I think, are quite obvious to you. One, what are the views of the neighboring countries in this regard?

Senator D'AMATO. Sure.

OVERT OR COVERT AID

Mr. ARMITAGE. And second of all, is it more to the benefit or to the ultimate objective to have our aid overt or covert?

In the case of Afghanistan, I would just offer the observation that to the extent you stand up and publicly claim you are sending x, y, z in, you may make it more difficult for the Soviets to withdraw. This is something that would be discussed and is discussed in our hearings in front of the different committees. I just offer that for your consideration.

Senator D'AMATO. Sure, I understand that, and I am not suggesting you telegraph every single thing you are sending over there in an open manner, overt manner. Certainly, I think if we are going to claim the moral leadership of the world in aiding, particularly use the Afghan stance as an example, we had better be able to come up front because the Soviets know what we are doing and at the least the very minimum,

in terms of food, medicine, some of these others—I go so far as military—but let's suppose reasonable people can disagree with that, certainly not with respect to food, certainly not with respect to humanitarian aid. There is just absolutely no reason for us not to do that.

I suggest we are sending the wrong signal to freedom fighters throughout the world, particularly those who may not understand what we are doing in a nonvisible manner. I just urge upon you—talk about convoluted. I think it is a little bit convoluted. I would hope we would be more forceful, more forthcoming and demonstrate—we talk about what the Soviets do. If you are not prepared to say in a very tangible way what commitments we are going to make publicly—publicly—they are going to keep pushing and pushing and they never back down.

Mr. ARMITAGE. There are several difficulties, Senator D'Amato. You are much more acquainted with than I am because of your position in the Senate. One is the long-term nature of our support, exactly what I alluded to in my opening remarks, and it is very difficult for us to be up front and indicate publicly the long-term nature of our support with our procedures and the laws as they are.

Senator D'AMATO. If you did not oppose that resolution and said let's see and get an expression, you had 80 or 90 Senators who signed on, then I would suggest that is the kind of way to build long-term bipartisan support for the freedom fighters in Afghanistan as an example, but that principle can be applied in other areas, and we have not been doing it and you know why, I think, because little bureaucrats, they want to have their own program and when they want to put it forth and when they want to pull it back—I tell you, that is nothing what it is—power.

AFGHANISTAN AS A SOVIET/U.S. STRUGGLE

Senator DeCONCINI. Would the Senator yield just for a comment?

Mr. Armitage, would you agree if we did what the Resolution 34 says that that would make it more of a Soviet/U.S. struggle there rather than a Soviet/Moslem struggle? And isn't it better to be a Soviet/Moslem struggle than a Soviet/U.S. struggle? Maybe no.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I have not read his resolution. So with your permission, I won't comment on S. 34. I will comment on the statement about being more public in our assistance. I think you can make a very cogent argument that highly publicized assistance to the Afghan resistance may make it more difficult for the Soviets to withdraw. One must not confuse making that argument with the fact we should not assist the Mujahideen. I probably, on balance, would make the argument today, to the extent we are very public about it and beat our breast about it, we run the risks of two things. It is one thing to perhaps make it more difficult for the Soviets to eventually withdraw, if that is possible at all, and two, I wonder about the consequences if after 2 or 3 years we have not been able to bring about that desired result, we have different administrations, we have different members of Congress and the support is not there for a program, and then how does that look in international eyes?

HUMPHREY AMENDMENT

Senator D'AMATO. You know, if I might, that sounds good, but let me go one step further. That is good. There is an authorization bill, 1986 authorization bill on the floor and my good friend and colleague, Senator Humphrey, as I understand, is going to offer an amendment for \$15 million for humanitarian aid to the Afghans. That bill, I understand, has been passed with that \$15 million in the House of Representatives. Do you know who is opposing it? Do you know?

Mr. ARMITAGE. No; I don't know personally.

Senator D'AMATO. Do you know the administration is opposing it, and do you know where it comes from? From the bowels of OMB—[Laughter.]

Senator D'AMATO. OMB. It's a new start. [Laughter.]

Senator D'AMATO. They oppose a new start. What kind of way is that to run foreign policy? We have Dave Stockman running all of this. Talk about the bureaucrats who want to control. You want to cut off Amtrak, OK, but \$15 million in humanitarian aid, I want to tell you, my colleague is right; I am going to support him. We should expose them for the hypocrisy, absolute hypocrisy—OMB. I would like to see the State Department and the Defense Department stand up for America, stand up for people. Can you really go along with OMB on this? Do you think they are right? You better be careful, he will cut a line out of your budget. [Laughter.]

Mr. ARMITAGE. The way things are going, he has to hurry; other people are cutting the budget for him.

Senator D'AMATO. That is the frustration, and we hear convoluted, it is convoluted. You better believe it. Three of the boys get together and say, let's put the money in; it is good time to put it in. That is not the way to run a shop that is so important to establish policy, continuity, reliability, to send a signal out there clear and convincing. And the Soviets know what is going on right now. They have got their people. They know we are frittering around talking about are we going to put \$15 million in overtly. They have to be laughing. What kind of resolve do we demonstrate? I just think it is a sad policy. I want to tell you that. I made up my mind I am just going to push to expose these kinds of things.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

POLICY IN NICARAGUA

Senator KASTEN. Senator Johnston.

Senator JOHNSTON. Gentlemen, I guess this would be first to Secretary Schneider, although either one of you might respond to it.

As you may know, I have been a strong supporter of aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. At the same time, I have been a little bit concerned about our policy there, either because we may be possibly muddled in our thinking about what we are asking of the Nicaraguans, the Sandinistas or, alternatively, that we are giving them an offer that they can't accept. What I mean is this:

It seems to me very clear that the things we ought to insist on is that they not have the strongest army in Central America supplied by the Soviets, that we should have the outsiders—the Cubans, the Russians, the Eastern block group—out of there, we ought to insist they not export revolution; that they not be the staging area, the command and control area for El Salvador. Those kinds of things are very clear, and we have a right to expect that they do not do that, and they have not convincingly promised not to do those things.

Consequently, I voted for aid.

What does concern me, and I confess I am not clear in my own thinking yet, is what we have a right to expect of them with respect to their government, with respect to elections, with respect to human rights, with respect to free enterprise, with respect to what Congressman Solarz called pluralism in what do we want, what should we have the right to expect and does that relate to other countries as well?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will give a brief answer now. I would like to expand on my response for the record with some more detail. Secretary Schultz has remarked on a number of occasions, we do not have any interest in seeking to dictate the internal content of the regime in Nicaragua, but we have only asked that they accept the principles they announced, the organizing principles of the revolution back in 1979, which would provide a regime that would provide for pluralism. It does not require they have any particular form of economic organization or any particular form of conducting the electoral process, but merely provides basic guarantees for human rights and civil liberties, which is sort of a minimum that we have been seeking in other countries of the region. So I think the political—

Senator JOHNSTON. Human rights and civil liberties.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. I am for those things, but we obviously do not give aid, covert or overt, against other regimes because they do not provide for human rights and civil liberties. Is there any symmetry there?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. As both Secretary Armitage and I mentioned, these matters need to be addressed in the particular political and historical context we find them. The circumstances you mentioned in your question about the size of the army, the foreign intervention, and so forth, is taken together with the particular political context of that region. It is not to say in every case our national interest necessarily requires the set of political ideals that I just described to you.

In the particular context in Central America, some modicum of civil liberties and human rights is essential to maintaining a non-interventionist regime in that area.

ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN NICARAGUA

Senator JOHNSTON. But suppose, for example, Ortega announced he wanted to make Nicaragua into an Albania, in the Hoxha mold, that he was going to seal off its borders, going to kick the Russians out, Cubans

out, everybody out, the Americans, didn't want anybody in there, and he was going to turn the thumbscrew down as the Albanians do. Would we accept that? What would we do?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think in that context if it were, in fact, practical, yes. We do not have any particular interests in the form of government as far as our national security is concerned, except, when you look at it in the particular historical context of Central America, in the case of regimes that are not democratic, that also have this litany of large army, of foreign operations, of foreign intervention and a large fraction of their security apparatus, and so forth, which are necessarily a threat to our own security.

So in this particular case, our interest has been served by this complex of political and, say, security objectives.

Senator JOHNSTON. Which of those security objectives have the Nicaraguans refused to do?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. To the best of my knowledge—and I will refine the argument for the record—to the best of my knowledge, they have offered to make no more than token reductions in any of these areas, that is, they have offered some modest reduction in the presence of Soviet bloc forces, they have made some vague offers about reducing the size of their armed forces but, to the best of my knowledge, it has not extended to the point where the country would no longer be a threat to its neighbors.

Senator JOHNSTON. They have not agreed to stop their command and control to the guerrillas in El Salvador?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is my understanding.

Senator JOHNSTON. Secretary Armitage.

Mr. ARMITAGE. If I may, Senator, we talk about wanting the Sandinistas to live up to their promises which they made to the OAS in 1979. But the fallout from permitting any democratic process is profound. As Bill said, we are not interested in dictating an economic system or things of that nature. I would submit to you the fallout from any democratic process would be a country which does not export revolution and would not be able to because democratic states find it difficult to raise large standing armies, to fund them and all those things that are so well known to all of us. I submit in that word the phrase "to permit democratic political processes," there are some very fundamental fallouts that would come from that, and we are perplexed by their inability to live up to their promises.

Senator JOHNSTON. I very much would like to have a further expounding on this question. I do not know that it is terribly useful to try to define the situation under which you give aid, covert or overt, to any countries, because the complexity of the issues, the difference in circumstances, all of the various factors, are so different in each case that about the best you can do is paint with a very broad brush, as you have done in your statement.

I am concerned about Nicaragua, not in disagreement, necessarily, just concerned about what it is we want them to do, and I would like

to put maximum pressure but have in our mind what it is we really—have a negotiating position that makes sense. I really do not know what our negotiating position is. I know that they have not acceded to anything they should accept but at the same time I am not sure we have in the back of our mind, our collective U.S. mind, a position they can accept. I look forward to getting further expounding on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE RIGHT TO EXPECT

The transfer of power from Somoza to the Sandinistas was greatly facilitated by support from regional countries and from the United States. That support was freely given in response to certain specific commitments made to the OAS by the FSLN concerning the Sandinistas' intention to implement in Nicaragua a governmental system guaranteeing political pluralism, human rights, "genuinely free elections," and a mixed economy. The principle of democratic pluralism is also a key element in the 21 objectives adopted by all of the Contadora countries, including Nicaragua. Thus, we are asking for nothing more than the Sandinistas have promised and what Nicaragua and its neighbors have jointly agreed to. As to the reasons we feel strongly about the need for democracy, we believe that a democratic system that accommodates the broadest possible range of political activities and opinions is essential to genuine national reconciliation and to end the conflict in Nicaragua and all of Central America. Furthermore, history shows that threats to peace and security come from totalitarian states, not societies where democratic checks and balances act to ensure policies responsive to the public will. There is currently in process a healthy, dynamic trend toward democratization of the Central American region, and the United States is using its influence in various ways to facilitate and accelerate that process. El Salvador is a graphic example of the kind of positive change we seek in the transition to democratic systems.

NICARAGUAN THREAT TO SECURITY

The GON has failed to address substantively any of the security interests of either the United States or the Central American region as a whole. The U.S. position has been and is that the GON must cease export of subversion, reduce its grossly oversized military to restore regional military equilibrium, sever its military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and implement the promises made to the OAS in 1979 concerning internal democratization. The only responses by the Sandinistas have been superficial gestures. They claim, for example, to have withdrawn 100 Cuban military advisors, but without verification such a claim is meaningless. Moreover, the number involved amounts to only 3 percent of the total number of Cuban military advisors resident in Nicaragua. They have offered an arms freeze on new acquisitions that legitimizes and leaves in place a massive Nicaraguan military edge over its neighbors.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

Senator KASTEN. Thank you, Senator.

Let me just shift to another part of the world. The administration has proposed we provide military assistance to the Communist regime in Mozambique. First of all, are there any other examples in the world where the administration is proposing military assistance to a Communist regime which is subject to an internal active military insurgency? And I might point out that later in the prepared testimony that we have from another witness today, the statement is made, "of all the democratic insurgencies struggling against the Marxist fascism imposed upon their countries from Moscow, the one closest to outright victory is * * * the Mozambique National Resistance."

First of all, is there any other instance you can recall in which we are proposing military assistance to a Communist regime, and, No. 2, what is the rationale for supporting military assistance to Mozambique when the insurgency is developing continued support and is working along the lines that all of us have been describing today?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that you have very well developed views on the subject and I respect them. With respect to the situation in Mozambique, I think the nature of the administration's judgment on this reflects the fact that ultimately we are interested in the behavior of foreign states, including foreign states that are dominated by Communist regimes. And there are a number of ways in which the United States has at its disposal to influence Communist states, and the decision to provide or request from the Congress military assistance for Mozambique was based upon an analysis of a number of alternatives, of which providing military assistance was one, based upon recent historical experience with the behavior of the regime in Mozambique.

U.N. VOTING RECORD OF MOZAMBIQUE

Senator KASTEN. Such as their voting record at the United Nations? What other kinds of indications do you use?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I certainly wouldn't defend their voting record. The immediate stimulus that suggested that this policy might be useful—I have to underscore the fact, this is not physics, this is a calculated risk that this instrument would be more effective than some other instrument. I may well be mistaken in that in the way things eventually turn out, but I am describing to you the thought process that went into the formulation of the process.

Senator KASTEN. But do you agree with the statement that of all the democratic insurgencies struggling against Marxist fascism, the one closest to outright victory is the Mozambique National Resistance?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think it is a close race between the resistance in Afghanistan and the military effectiveness of the resistance in Mozambique. Both are having a very telling effect on the regimes. But I wouldn't take sharp issue with the basic characterization the insurgency is very far advanced.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Armitage, you can address yourself to both these questions, if you would.

Mr. ARMITAGE. I might add, I am not sure in my own mind what the ultimate goals really are and the ability to put those goals into effect, if they were to be successful. I think one has to look at that when you make a decision. I like Bill's phrase, it is a calculated risk. Honest men obviously differ in their views. The ability or the statement that they are close to victory reminds me of one anecdote—I just have to say, I am a baseball fan, they used to talk about Shoeless Joe Jackson when they talked about the Black Sox scandal. Apologizing for this English I will change his answer and say, "Saying don't make it so." I am not sure how close they are to victory. We get different views in the region, including the South Africans. I only submit that for the committee's consideration.

ROLE OF PRINCIPLE IN DECISIONS

Senator KASTEN. Whether they are close or not, \$1 million in military assistance to me is thoughtless. We are going to work with the administration, but for the time being, it seems to me whether they are close, whether they are in a tie, whether they are about to win, for us to spend taxpayer dollars for military assistance on the other side, just does not make any sense.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield on that point to let me ask a rhetorical question? Where does principle fit into this scheme? What does it matter how close the democratic insurgents are to winning? What about principle?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Good question. I think, indeed, that is the question I tried to outline in my statement. I do not mean to ask another question, but I am not sure—I am making a statement—I am not sure of their ultimate goals. I understand the professed goals, the people who make up RENAMO are desperate. I think one has to ask that question. The principle, I think, we already established. It would be contrary to our traditions not to support anti-Communist regimes in general, and then I went down, Senator, on a case-by-case basis to give some rhyme and reason to our thought process.

Senator KASTEN. Senator DeConcini?

CHILE AND SOUTH AFRICA

Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Let me just add my support for what you are trying to do, and the question by Senator Humphrey, I think, underscores something that I hope our State Department would seriously look at. I hope the administration would not put Congress in the position of standing against a principle which we say is our foreign policy and then we support just the opposite of that.

Mr. Armitage, you state that it is a policy for us to be involved in helping anti-Communist freedom fighters. What about being against dictatorships or repressive governments that are not Communist? And let me mention two, one being the government today in Chile, the other, in my judgment, the government in South Africa. Is the only reason we do not give support to any opposition forces is because there are none, or is it really a policy decision by this country that these are friends even if they are dictatorships and repressive and violate human rights? How do you resolve that, in your own mind and from the administration's point of view?

Mr. ARMITAGE. In my own mind, and it is the way I would portray this to the administration, the judgment we make is based on the direction the governments are moving, Senator. We all have questions, particularly in South Africa's case, about the pace. We are all concerned with the pace. We feel it is not rapid enough. But we have to look at the direction it is moving and then what alternatives we have. I would have to say the direction the South African Government is moving is correct. I think to a certain extent that holds true for Chile.

CHILE

Senator DeCONCINI. I disagree with you about South Africa. I have to agree with you it has moved. It is just absolutely hard for this Senator to understand how we can continue to support that government and not insist that it move rapidly. What about Chile?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I am insisting they move rapidly. I am sorry if I wasn't clear.

Senator DeCONCINI. What do we do to increase that pace?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Mr. Crocker has testified on many occasions, I am getting out of my field, but Mr. Crocker has expressed my own feeling that we are moving; perhaps not as rapidly as we want to, but we are moving in a positive direction and there is constant dialog which he feels is having some success.

Senator DeCONCINI. Let's talk about Chile then or maybe, Mr. Schneider, you can help us on Chile. What movement has the Pinochet regime made to lessen oppression or to support anything else that our principles stand for? Why don't we have the courage to impose any economic sanctions on that government that is extremely repressive? It may not be exporting revolution as the Sandinista government is, but I find it very inconsistent that we would not take more forceful action than what we are doing to Chile.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. As I say, looking at the general case, our interest is in changing the behavior of these governments. There are repressive governments throughout Africa, for example, that are perhaps more grossly repressive than even some of the countries we have talked about. It is a question of means. What ways in which we can influence behavior.

In the case of Chile or South Africa, we have various means where we can encourage them. I share the anxiety Secretary Armitage mentioned about the pace, and we have had a very vigorous policy of discussions with South Africa, trying to bring them along. Likewise with respect to Chile to try and bring them into a more democratic mode, one which would respect human rights and move toward a restoration of civil liberties, which is our objective. There have been setbacks in both cases, but I think the trajectory of our efforts has been in the right direction. I certainly hope—

Senator DeCONCINI. Excuse me, do you think Chile is moving in the right direction?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes; although there have been setbacks. If you begin with the period 10 years ago and get to where we are now, I think the situation is improved. It is not satisfactory. I would not represent to you that it was, but it is moving in the right direction and we have the means to encourage that.

SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Senator DeCONCINI. Would you say that our policies have improved the situation in South Africa, that there is less violence and less death and less repression now—even though there have been some changes

by the South African Government—than it was 5 years ago; has there been an improvement?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. There have been instances of violence, for sure. But the direction of South Africa in moving away from the rigor of the regime that they have imposed over the past 40 years is less onerous now than it was 10 years ago. The problem is the expectations that have arisen as a consequence of these very modest steps on liberalization.

Senator DeCONCINI. If we assume that the Government of South Africa has moved toward greater liberalization, haven't the current episodes of violence and repression been as bad if not worse than that which has occurred in the past? Have we seen any betterment of the quality of life for the majority black population there and less repression and less bloodshed imposed on those people as the government has made some moves toward greater liberalism, and I grant that they have?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The situation is better than it was 20 years ago, but it is not as good as it needs to be.

Senator DeCONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator KASTEN. I would like to thank both of you. There are going to be additional questions from the members of the committee, but I thank you very much for your participation and for your very interesting testimony.

Our next witnesses are Professor Charles Moser and Mr. Jack Wheeler.

There is a record vote on the Senate floor right now and the committee will stand in recess for about 5 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

STATEMENTS OF:

PROFESSOR CHARLES MOSER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
JACK WHEELER, CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

Senator KASTEN. The committee will come to order.

Our next witnesses are Professor Charles Moser and Mr. Jack Wheeler. Professor Moser, I first of all would like to compliment you on the excellent book you edited which presents a thorough discussion on many resistance movements, which is the subject of our hearing this morning. I am hopeful this book is going to get wide distribution.

Mr. Wheeler, I am aware of your extensive experience in the area, particularly your travel to most of the regions where these troubles are ongoing. We very much appreciate your appearance here today and ask that you now proceed with your testimony.

As you know, your entire testimony will be made part of the record. We hope you can summarize your testimony to have as much time as possible for questions. I think as you both have already seen, this morning's hearing and clashes of ideas, I think, have already taken us a couple of steps further than the Congress has been on this whole set of issues, and it is due to some of the work that you two have been doing that we are now starting to really try to develop an overall policy and an overall sense of direction. So we look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Charles Moser.

Mr. MOSER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ANTI-COMMUNIST FREEDOM FIGHTERS

I would like to add my voice to those who have complimented you for holding these hearings because the hearings deal with exceedingly important foreign policy questions, and I believe those who have already appeared as witnesses here have made single contributions to that question, and I hope I may, too, and I am sure my colleague, Jack Wheeler, will.

My academic field is primarily Russian literary history. I have taken a long interest in foreign affairs, although I have not done the extent of travel Mr. Wheeler has.

Marxist doctrine holds that there can be no such thing as an anti-Communist insurgency. But reality has a way of ignoring doctrine, and over the past decade in particular anti-Communist freedom fighters

have written new and heroic pages of history in country after country across the globe: in Cambodia under Son Sann, in Mozambique under Afonso Djacama, in Angola under Jonas Savimbi, in Afghanistan under Ahmed Shah Massoud, in Nicaragua under Adolfo Calero and Eden Pastora. And yet very few Americans know much about these men and many others who have waged a struggle for freedom that is also ours.

COMBAT IN COMMUNIST TERRITORY

Since that story was so little known, I undertook to edit and coauthor the book "Combat on Communist Territory," with a foreword by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming Malcolm Wallop. The book was brought out in March 1985 by Regnery and by the Free Congress Foundation, whose president, Paul M. Weyerich, found the resources needed to bring it into being.

Combat on Communist Territory contains chapters by well-qualified contributors on the history and doctrine of many past and contemporary anti-Communist insurgencies, including the lengthy resistance to Soviet power in the Ukraine and Lithuania after World War II and the contemporary insurgencies in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. It also contains an account of the liberation of Grenada in 1983, which lays to rest the canard that a well-established Communist regime can never be ousted; there is one on the anti-Communist resistance within the Soviet Union itself by the late Dr. Igor Glagolev; and a contribution to the theory of anti-Communist insurgency as well as policy recommendations for future action.

INCONSISTENT POLICIES TOWARD ANTI-COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES

Unfortunately, the United States and the free world have historically pursued inconsistent policies toward anti-Communist insurgencies. That is an inconsistency that persists down to the present and one I would like to address.

More prominent commentators than I have noted that it is often unsafe to be a friend of the United States in this world. The leaders of the Nicaraguan insurgency are only the latest to receive concrete proof of that proposition. The Congress—and particularly the House of Representatives—has been the source of much of the hostility to our friends we have displayed in the last 10 to 15 years. Thus in 1975, speaking of our Cambodian allies, Representative Christopher Dodd declared that "calling the Lon Nol regime an ally is to debase the meaning of the word as it applies to our truest allies": as he spoke a literal night of the long knives descended upon our true friends in Cambodia in a holocaust which staggers the imagination. During the discussion recently on aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters the Speaker of the House described these brave men as butchers and maimers. After we have compiled such a record as this, we can only be astonished that the freedom fighters of the world continue to place their hopes in us at all.

That they do is proof that they are truly our friends, that they are dedicated to the ideals of democracy and justice which actuated those

who founded our Nation. Some of the freedom fighter leaders are highly sophisticated, others less so, but they all understand the basic fact—perhaps better than we do ourselves—that the United States is the beacon of hope for democracy in the world, that in the final accounting there is no other such people.

WHITE HOUSE POLICY TOWARD ANTI-COMMUNIST INSURGENTS

The White House in recent years has been quicker to support those friends fighting our battles in the world than the Congress, but its record has been inconsistent as well. Just recall the brief list of major political leaders I mentioned at the start of my testimony: Has one of them been proudly and openly received by President Reagan as our friend and ally? No. And yet the Kremlin regularly receives the leaders of Communist insurgencies, and usually provides all the political backing they could wish. And again: During the recent debate on aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, opponents asked why we should seek to overthrow a government which we officially recognize and with which we trade extensively. That question was entirely legitimate. It is sad that only after its congressional defeat has the administration begun to take certain steps it can undertake without congressional approval and which would, indeed, have strengthened its hand in the congressional debate.

We have diplomatic relations at some level with the Communist regimes of all those countries in which there are currently strong anti-Communist insurgencies with the exception of Angola and Cambodia. The puppet government of Afghanistan still enjoys most favored nation status, and it is only thanks to the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, Gordon Humphrey, who was here before, that this anomaly has even been addressed.

The Department of State seems to believe that we acquire valuable information through our diplomatic representation in these countries, but it is difficult to see that this could outweigh the importance of the recognition which it symbolizes. Diplomatic ties imply that we are ambiguous in our opposition to the Communist regimes which are our avowed enemies, and ambiguous about the anti-Communist opposition mounted by our avowed friends. And I submit that a democracy cannot formulate or follow a consistent policy founded upon such crucial ambiguities.

GENERAL POLICY TO COVER ALL ANTI-COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES

The anti-Communist insurgencies in the world today are elements of a single phenomenon. Though they may differ superficially, but in their essentials they are quite similar, and therefore a general policy should be formulated to cover them all.

In Afghanistan and Cambodia the freedom fighters are fighting against clear military aggression by a Communist nation, though the invader has established a native puppet government as a front. In Angola too the insertion of Cuban troops into the civil conflict was decisive, and so we have there what amounts to a foreign occupation. The U.S.

policy for South Africa based on the supposition that Angola will agree to the withdrawal of Cuban troops is foolish. The Luanda regime would never agree to any such thing, for if it did it would be overthrown as quickly as would the Cambodian regime if the Vietnamese withdrew or the Afghan Government if the Soviets left.

The situation in Nicaragua appears different superficially. The Sandinista regime came to power through internal insurgency and external pressure and presents itself as independent, but in fact it is heavily dependant upon Soviet bloc arms aid and personnel assistance, assistance which the Soviet Union is very willing to continue. The situation in Mozambique is more favorable to the free world because the Soviets are evidently reluctant to invest much more in the Machel regime, which has therefore turned to South Africa and the United States. Incredibly, current State Department policy is to denigrate the Mozambican National Resistance—we don't know who they are or what they want—while propping up the Mozambican Communist regime as a means of weaning it from Soviet influence. You might call it weaning policy, I suppose.

Our policy toward contemporary anti-Communist insurgencies, then, is remarkably inconsistent. Congress has supported substantial aid to the Afghan freedom fighters, and is moving to provide some assistance—though woefully inadequate—to the Cambodian resistance. On the other hand, the House of Representatives has just denied assistance to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, and the Clark amendment has since 1976 legally prevented the United States from aiding the Angolan freedom fighters.

But at least the Clark amendment prevents us from assisting the Angolan Communist regime, while in Mozambique the State Department works to shore up the Communist government against the anti-Communist resistance, and we permit the Ethiopian Communist regime to employ our humanitarian assistance for its own political ends.

POLICY OF ASSISTANCE TO ALL FREEDOM FIGHTERS

It is high time for us to formulate a foreign policy which envisions consistent and substantial assistance to our genuine friends in the world, and opposition to our avowed enemies around the globe. The United States should withhold diplomatic recognition from Communist regimes facing legitimate anti-Communist insurgencies, and sever economic ties with the peoples they oppress. And the Congress should provide the freedom fighter movements throughout the world with all the aid they can reasonably use: food, medicine, clothing, humanitarian aid of all sorts, of course, but most especially military aid.

Time and again the freedom fighters have looked to us for military aid. They are grateful for our humanitarian assistance, but they know that in the Communist world power stems from the barrel of a gun, and never from a ballot box. It is an unpleasant reality to contemplate, but there is no purely political solution to the problems of these countries, and it is a dangerous illusion to think otherwise: the resolu-

tion can only be military. That is why the most extensive aid to Afghanistan or Cambodia or Nicaragua fails to reach the root of the problem.

The freedom fighters do not ask us to do their fighting for them, for they understand what is at stake often much better than we. They do ask us to be the arsenal of democracy once again, as we were 40 years ago. We are both practically and morally obliged to heed them.

It is well for us to remember the Holocaust of 40 years ago, and we should never forget what happened then. But nothing we can do now will restore to us those millions who lost their lives now. But on this very day in which we sit here so comfortably, new holocausts are occurring, especially in Afghanistan and Cambodia, and we can do something about them. Yet when the representatives of these people appeal to us for help, we are indifferent. If we do not hear their appeal and aid them out of our abundance, we shall have only ourselves to blame.

History has already given us many chances to do what is necessary, and it offers them to us today. If we continue to refuse to aid our friends and allies, history will one day judge us harshly indeed.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Charles Moser follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. MOSER
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

My name is Charles Moser. I am Professor of Slavic and currently Chairman of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C. I have also served as Treasurer of the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation in Washington since its inception in 1977.

Although my academic field is primarily Russian literary history, I have long taken an interest in foreign affairs, and especially in the conflict between communist totalitarianism and the ideals of democracy and freedom, the major division of our time. I spent a year as a graduate student at Leningrad State University; I have traveled fairly extensively in the East European communist countries, especially Bulgaria; and I have thought and written a good deal on these subjects.

Marxist doctrine holds that there can be no such thing as an anti-communist insurgency. But reality has a way of ignoring doctrine, and over the past decade in particular anti-communist Freedom Fighters have written new and heroic pages of history in country after country across the globe: in Cambodia under Son Sann, in Mozambique under Afonso Djacama, in Angola under Jonas Savimbi, in Afghanistan under Ahmed Shah Massoud, in Nicaragua under Adolfo Calero and Eden Pastora. And yet very few Americans know much about these men and many others who have waged a struggle for freedom that is also ours.

Since that story was so little known, I undertook to edit and co-author the book COMBAT ON COMMUNIST TERRITORY, with a foreword by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming Malcolm Wallop. The book was brought out in March 1985 by Regnery and by the Free Congress Foundation, whose President, Paul M. Weyrich, found the resources needed to bring it into being. COMBAT ON COMMUNIST TERRITORY contains chapters by well-qualified contributors on the history and doctrine of many

past and contemporary anti-communist insurgencies, including the lengthy resistance to Soviet power in the Ukraine and Lithuania after World War II and the contemporary insurgencies in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan and Cambodia. It also contains an account of the liberation of Grenada in 1983, which lays to rest the canard that a well-established communist regime can never be ousted; one on the anti-communist resistance within the Soviet Union itself by the late Dr. Igor Glagolev; and a contribution to the theory of anti-communist insurgency as well as policy recommendations for future action.

Unfortunately, the United States and the Free World generally have historically pursued inconsistent policies toward anti-communist insurgencies. That inconsistency persists down to the present, and I should like to address it in my remarks today.

More prominent commentators than I have noted that it is often unsafe to be a friend of the United States in this world. The leaders of the Nicaraguan insurgency are only the latest to receive concrete proof of that proposition. The Congress -- and particularly the House of Representatives -- has been the source of much of the hostility to our friends we have displayed in the last 10 to 15 years. Thus in 1975, speaking of our Cambodian allies, Representative Christopher Dodd declared that "calling the Lon Nol regime an ally is to debase the meaning of the word as it applies to our true allies": as he spoke a literal night of the long knives descended upon our true friends in Cambodia in a holocaust which staggers the imagination. During the discussion recently on aid to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters the Speaker of the House described these brave men as "butchers and maimers." After we have compiled such a record as this, we can only be astonished that the Freedom Fighters of the world continue to place their hopes in us.

That they do is proof that they are truly our friends, that they are dedicated to the ideals of democracy and justice which actuated those who founded our Nation. Some of the Freedom Fighter leaders

are highly sophisticated, others less so, but they all understand the basic fact -- perhaps better than we do ourselves -- that the United States is the beacon of hope for democracy in the world, that in the final accounting there is no other such.

The White House in recent years has been quicker to support those friends fighting our battles in the world than the Congress, but its record has been inconsistent as well. Recall the brief list of major political leaders I mentioned at the start of my testimony: has one of them been proudly and openly received by President Reagan as our friend and ally? No. And yet the Kremlin regularly receives the leaders of communist insurgencies, and usually provides all the political backing they could wish. And again: during the recent debate on aid to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters, opponents asked why we should seek to overthrow a government which we officially recognize and with which we trade extensively. The question was entirely legitimate. It is sad that only after its Congressional defeat has the Administration begun to take certain steps it can undertake without Congressional approval and which would, indeed, have strengthened its hand in the Congressional debate.

Indeed, we have diplomatic relations at some level with the communist regimes of all those countries in which there are currently strong anti-communist insurgencies with the exception of Cambodia. The puppet government of Afghanistan still enjoys Most Favored Nation status, and it is only thanks to the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, Gordon Humphrey, that this anomaly has even been addressed.

The Department of State seems to believe that we acquire valuable information through our diplomatic representation in these countries, but it is difficult to see that this could outweigh the importance of the recognition which it symbolizes. Diplomatic ties imply that we are ambiguous in our opposition to the communist regimes which are our avowed enemies, and ambiguous about the anti-communist opposition

mounted by our avowed friends. A democracy cannot formulate or follow a consistent policy founded upon such crucial ambiguities.

The anti-communist insurgencies in the world today are elements of a single phenomenon. They may differ superficially, but in their essentials they are quite similar, and therefore a general policy should be formulated to cover them all.

In Afghanistan and Cambodia the Freedom Fighters are fighting against clear military aggression by a communist nation, though the invader has established a native puppet government as a front. In Angola too the insertion of Cuban troops into the civil conflict was decisive, and so we have there what amounts to a foreign occupation. A United States policy for southern Africa based on the supposition that Angola will agree to the withdrawal of Cuban troops is foolish. The Luanda regime would never agree to any such thing, for if it did it would be overthrown as quickly as would the Cambodian regime if the Vietnamese withdrew of the Afghan government if the Soviets left.

The situation in Nicaragua appears different superficially. The Sandinista regime came to power through internal insurgency and external pressure and presents itself as independent, but in fact it is heavily dependant upon Soviet bloc arms aid and personnel assistance, assistance which the Soviet Union is very willing to continue. The situation in Mozambique is more favorable to the Free World because the Soviets are evidently reluctant to invest much more in the Machel regime, which has therefore turned to South Africa and the United States. Incredibly, current State Department policy is to denigrate the Mozambican National Resistance while propping up the Mozambican communist regime as a means of "weaning" it from Soviet influence.

Our policy toward contemporary anti-communist insurgencies, then, is remarkably inconsistent. Congress has supported substantial

aid to the Afghan Freedom Fighters, and is moving to provide some assistance -- though woefully inadequate -- to the Cambodian resistance. On the other hand, the House of Representatives has just denied assistance to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters, and the Clark Amendment has since 1976 legally prevented the United States from aiding the Angolan Freedom Fighters. But at least the Clark Amendment prevents us from assisting the Angolan communist regime, while in Mozambique the State Department works to shore up the communist government against the anti-communist resistance, and we permit the Ethiopian communist regime to employ our humanitarian assistance for its own political ends.

It is high time for us to formulate a foreign policy which envisions consistent and substantial assistance to our genuine friends in the world, and opposition to our avowed enemies around the globe. The United States should withhold diplomatic recognition from communist regimes facing legitimate anti-communist insurgencies, and sever economic ties with the peoples they oppress. And the Congress should provide the Freedom Fighter movements throughout the world with all the aid they can reasonably use: food, medicine, clothing, humanitarian aid of all sorts, of course, but most especially military aid.

Time and again the Freedom Fighters have looked to us for military aid. They are grateful for our humanitarian assistance, but they know that in the communist world power stems from the barrel of a gun, and never from a ballot box. It is an unpleasant reality to contemplate, but there is no purely political solution to the problems of these countries, and it is a dangerous illusion to think otherwise: the resolution can only be military. That is why the most extensive aid to Afghanistan or Cambodia or Nicaragua fails to reach the root of the problem.

The Freedom Fighters do not ask us to do their fighting for them, for they understand what is at stake often much better than we. They

do ask us to be the arsenal of democracy once again, as we were 40 years ago. We are both practically and morally obliged to heed them.

It is well for us to remember the Holocaust of 40 years ago, and we should never forget what happened then. But nothing we can do now will restore to us those millions who lost their lives now. But on this very day in which we sit here so comfortably, new holocausts are occurring, especially in Afghanistan and Cambodia, and we can do something about them. Yet when the representatives of these peoples appeal to us for help, we are indifferent. If we do not hear their appeal and aid them out of our abundance, we shall have only ourselves to blame.

History has already given us many chances to do what is necessary, and offers them to us today. If we continue to refuse to aid our friends and allies, history will one day judge us harshly indeed.

FREEDOM RESEARCH FOUNDATION

STATEMENT OF JACK WHEELER

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Wheeler.

Mr. WHEELER. Thank you, Senator. Again, like everybody else, I just can't tell you how much I think you should be congratulated for having this hearing. I think it is the first time that anybody on the Hill—the Senate or the House—has focused attention on this entire phenomenon as a whole, and I think that is what needs to be done. You are doing it; you have taken the lead on it; and I think you are to be congratulated.

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

The term "national liberation movement" has long been associated with Third World insurgencies who are anti-Western, Marxist, and backed by the Soviet Union. Today, El Salvador notwithstanding, this association is becoming a relic of the past. What is emerging is what we might call the second stage of post-World War II liberation movements. The first stage was directed at Western colonialism, which Moscow attempted to control, manipulate, and use for its own imperialistic ends as much as possible. This strategy has now boomeranged on Moscow, for the majority of guerrillas and guerrilla wars in the world today are virulently anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist.

The emergence of these democratic liberation movements may well signify the end of the expansion of the Soviet imperialism and the initia-

tion of its contraction. With the era of Western imperialism over, there is a growing realization throughout the Third World that rather than Soviet Marxism being the road to the future, it is a one-way ticket to oppression and poverty, that Soviet Russia is the last great 19th century imperialist empire.

MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENCY

Of all the democratic insurgencies struggling against the Marxist fascism imposed upon their countries by Moscow, the one closest to outright victory is RENAMO, the Mozambique National Resistance, led by Afonso Dhlakama. Dhlakama's 20,000 or more guerrillas control upwards of 70 percent of Mozambique, and are operating on the outskirts of the capital, Maputo. The totalitarian dictatorship of Samora Machel does not possess the oil revenues as does its sister dictatorship in Angola to pay for Cuban mercenaries. It has thus lost its capacity to contain the rebellion.

DEMANDS OF RENAMO

When I interviewed Afonso Dhlakama in Africa last fall, he told me RENAMO has two demands: the withdrawal of all foreign troops and advisers from Mozambique, including the Tanzanians, Zimbabweans, East Germans, and especially the Soviets—"The Soviet Union is the world's curse," he said—and the dismantling of the current Marxist-Leninist system, with a democratic, multiparty system and free elections in its place. "We want each Mozambican," Dhlakama said, "to peacefully conduct his life and earn his living as he sees fit—instead of being told his purpose in life is to work for the benefit of the State and of Samora Machel."

Instead of working to achieve these goals, however, the State Department has developed an almost hysterical hostility to RENAMO, and is naively boasting how it can win Machel, a man responsible for the death and torture of tens of thousands, and perhaps many, many more, as they put it, "over into our camp." One can have nothing but revulsion toward State's equation of cynicism with sophistication in foreign policy, and its rhetoric of "peace and stability" with the consolidation of Marxist tyranny in Mozambique—and in Angola.

UNITA MOVEMENT IN ANGOLA

The movement of UNITA, with 50,000 or more guerrillas led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, has consolidated control of one-third of Angola, substantial control of another one-third—that's an area much larger than Texas—and is advancing into the remaining one-third and upon the capital, Luanda. It takes 35,000 Cuban mercenary soldiers, paid for by Gulf Oil through its concession royalties in Cabina, Angola, to keep the Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist regime of the MPLA in power. And it is now also taking Chester Crocker and the State Department.

By not calling for "liberty and democracy"—instead of "peace and stability"—for direct talks between the MPLA leader dos Santos and Savimbi, and Machel and Dhlakama, to negotiate a cease-fire and hold internationally supervised elections, and for the democratization of

Angola and Mozambique, Crocker and State are prolonging the conflict—and, in terms of practical politics, are backing losers. They are now part of the problem, rather than the solution.

Crocker's policies are a prime example of the piecemeal, fragmented, and inchoate foreign policy of the United States, and highlight the obsolescence of the policy of "containment." Some time ago, the Wall Street Journal ran an editorial entitled, "Why Not Victory?" The question embodies a perspective that many people at State and others in Washington seem unable to grasp.

For far too long have we had a foreign policy limited to containment and defensive reaction—genuinely reactionary. We need to reorient our perspective from a strategic defense to a strategic offense—to develop an activist, forward-looking, dynamic foreign policy with the clear-cut strategic goal of destabilizing the Soviet Empire, forcefully persuading it to disarm and democratize through an energetic and orchestrated exploitation of its vulnerabilities, which are many.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN NICARAGUA

The Reagan administration has indeed made laudable steps in this direction—most especially through its attempts to aid the freedom fighters in Nicaragua, the so-called Contras. But what the press has dubbed "The Reagan Doctrine" of support for anti-Soviet democratic liberation movements has not been put into practice consistently and coherently. Sadly, this doctrine exists more in Presidential rhetoric than in deeds.

What is required is a policy of coordinated material and diplomatic support for all these insurgencies across the board, for the entire phenomenon of democratic resistance as a whole. Perhaps the best way to effect such a policy would be for the President to appoint a White House Adviser on Democratic Liberation Movements capable of coordinating such a policy and overriding obstacles caused by, for example, State's affliction of "clientitis," and its insistence on maintaining diplomatic relations with Soviet colonies such as Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

What we must not do is look upon these anti-Soviet democratic insurgencies in isolation and piecemeal, but instead as all related parts of geopolitical phenomenon of immense historical importance: That just as the Third World rejected Western colonialism in the 1950's and 1960's, so it is rejecting Soviet colonialism in the 1980's.

What is vital for us to understand is that the Contras in Nicaragua are fighting the same struggle as the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the KPNLF in Cambodia, the ELOL in Laos, Phuc Quoc in Vietnam, UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, and the EPLF, TPLF, and others in Ethiopia.

Certainly the Soviets are making the connection. The extent of the disaster of the defeat in Congress of aid to the Contras can be seen in how Moscow is using it to weaken support for the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistan. Already, the Soviet-infiltrated NDP, National Democratic Party, is arguing for recognition of the Karnal puppet regime in Kabul

on the grounds that the United States is such an unreliable ally that it is safer to cut a deal with Moscow: If the United States can sell out the Contras in Nicaragua, who are resisting Soviet imperialism right on the United States' doorstep, it can sell out the Mujahideen as well. America cannot be trusted: That is the message Soviet agents are now spreading in Pakistan and around the world in the wake of Congress' vote.

AFGHAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

The Afghan resistance to Soviet colonization remains a national uprising on such a scale that it has no parallel in the 20th century. The Afghans are simply the bravest people on this earth. I traveled 2,000 kilometers with them. We have the pictures so you can see what is going on, courtesy of Afghanistan.

We need to encourage the new unity of Mujahideen groups under the leadership of Moulavi Younis Khalis. Because of our timidity with the Saudis, this unity is being undermined by the Saudis' demanding that their man—Rasul Sayyaf, who is ineffectual and has no followers but is bankrolled by the powerful Wahabi sect in Saudi Arabia—be leader instead.

An overt program of food and other humanitarian supplies should be instituted with flags flying on a Marshall plan scale if the continued mass slaughter of civilians and an impending Soviet-manufactured famine of Ethiopian proportions is to be avoided. The resistance should receive not merely an increase in the quantity of weapons—which has occurred recently—but in the quality of weapons, most especially those capable of shutting down the airbases: 80 percent of all Soviet combat and logistical operations in Afghanistan are airborne.

SOVIET MOSLEM POPULATION

Should the Soviets respond by stepping up subversion and sabotage in Pakistan for example, in Baluchistan, their next imperialist target, then we should respond in turn with a program of subversion among the Moslems of Soviet Central Asia, and encourage the Afghans to carry their Jihad into the Soviets' sanctuary. Soviet Moslems comprise the fifth largest Islamic population in the world, and are the most oppressed of all Islamic peoples. They represent a true Achilles Heel of the Kremlin's; the U.S.S.R. is itself colonial empire within its own borders, and of all its ethnic minorities, perhaps the Soviet Moslems are the greatest potential threat to its continued existence as an intact political entity.

The Democrats in Congress are to be congratulated for taking the lead in military aid to the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia. Only by strengthening, as Stephen Solarz pointed out, the KPNLF will the Cambodian people have a third alternative to their present dilemma of continued Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation or the nightmare of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge seizing power again.

OVERALL SUPPORT FOR ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENTS NEEDED

I can only hope that Congress would now apply the same logic to other democratic liberation movements, instead of devising contrived distinctions to rationalize treating them differently, as we saw today by Congressman Solarz. I have never seen such contorted logic. This list that he provided today that he would agree the liberation movement filled these requirements, he would support it. The Contras in Nicaragua fill the bill on each one of these things and yet he comes up with these incredible rationalizations.

I can only hope that the House and the Senate, Democrats and Republicans, would join together with the administration in a bipartisan commitment to forthrightly and proudly assist the most thrilling and hopeful geopolitical development of our time.

These heroic people, the Afghans, the Nicaraguans, the Cambodians, the Angolans, and others, know first hand the evil of Soviet Marxism. They are risking their lives, many sacrificing their lives, to fight against Soviet Marxism and to bring freedom to their country. These freedom fighters are on the verge of winning. They are handing us an opportunity to reduce, perhaps permanently, Soviet power and influence in the world—and thus its capacity to be a threat to our country—on a silver platter.

We are now at a real fork in the road of history. Down one path is the possibility that what the Soviets call "the correlation of forces" may turn dramatically against them. Their entire colonial structure is being challenged by the guerrilla wars being waged in eight of their colonies, and may unravel and collapse in the next few years. Down the other path is the possibility that unless we seize the window of opportunity available to us, and go on a strategic offensive against Moscow, then it will digest and consolidate its imperialist gains and soon go on the march again, whether in Central America or Baluchistan and the Saudi oilfields.

The Soviet Union bases its claim to superpower status on military force alone. Brute force is all it has left to offer the world. Only when that force ceases to be capable of achieving the continued expansion of the Soviet Empire will Moscow turn inward to try and solve its gross economic and demographic difficulties. This is the only hope for genuine and lasting peace, for Afghanistan, for Indochina, for Central America, for Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and for the entire world.

I want to thank you very, very much.

[The prepared statement of Jack Wheeler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACK WHEELER
DIRECTOR
FREEDOM RESEARCH FOUNDATION

My name is Jack Wheeler, and I am Director of the Freedom Research Foundation in Malibu, California, and Foreign Policy Consultant for Citizens for America in Washington. I have been cited by the Wall Street Journal as "an authority on Third World anti-communist guerrilla movements," having traveled with most of them through their liberated territories, met their leaders, and written extensively on them in various newspapers and magazines.

The term "National Liberation Movement" has long been associated with Third World insurgencies who are anti-Western, Marxist, and backed by the Soviet Union. Today, El Salvador notwithstanding, this association is becoming a relic of the past. What is emerging is what we might call the second stage of post-World War II liberation movements. The first stage was directed at Western colonialism, which Moscow attempted to control, manipulate, and use for its own imperialist ends as much as possible. This strategy has now boomeranged on Moscow, for the majority of guerrillas and guerrilla wars in the world today are viruently anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist.

There are wars of liberation being conducted in eight Soviet colonies on three continents at this moment: in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam. The emergence of these Democratic Liberation Movements may well signify the end of the expansion of Soviet imperialism and the initiation of its contraction. With the era of Western imperialism over, there is a growing realization throughout the Third World that rather than Soviet Marxism being the road to the future, it is a one-way ticket to oppression and poverty, that Soviet Russia is the last great 19th century imperialist empire.

Of all the democratic insurgencies struggling against the Marxist fascism imposed upon their countries by Moscow, the one closest to outright victory is RENAMO, the Mozambique National Resistance, led by Afonso Dhlakama. Dhlakama's 20,000+ guerrillas control upwards of 70% of Mozambique, and are operating on the outskirts of the capital, Maputo. The totalitarian dictatorship of Samora Machel does not possess the oil revenues as does its sister dictatorship in Angola to pay for Cuban mercenaries. It has thus lost its capacity to contain the rebellion.

When I interviewed Afonso Dhlakama in Africa last fall, he told me Renamo had two demands: the withdrawal of all foreign troops and advisors from Mozambique, including the Tanzanians, Zimbabweans, East Germans, and especially the Soviets -- "the Soviet Union is the world's curse," he said -- and the dismantling of the current Marxist-Leninist system, with a democratic, multi-party system and free elections in its place. "We want each Mozambican," Dhlakama said, "to peacefully conduct his life and earn his living as he sees fit -- instead of being told his purpose in life is to work for the benefit of the State and of Samora Machel."

Instead of working to achieve these goals, however, the State Department has developed an almost hysterical hostility to Renamo, and is naively boasting how it can "win" Machel, a man responsible for the death and torture of tens of thousands, "over into our camp." One can have nothing but revulsion towards State's equation of cynicism with sophistication in foreign policy, and its rhetoric of "peace and stability" with the consolidation of Marxist tyranny in Mozambique -- and in Angola.

The movement of UNITA, with 50,000+ guerrillas led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, has consolidated control of one-third of Angola, substantial control of another third (that's an area much larger

than Texas). and is advancing into the remaining third and upon the capital, Luanda. It takes 35,000 Cuban mercenary soldiers, paid for by Gulf Oil through its concession royalties in Cabinda, Angola, to keep the Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist regime of the MPLA (led by Eduardo dos Santos) in power. And it is now also taking Chester Crocker and the State Department.

By not calling for "liberty and democracy" (instead of "peace and stability"), for direct talks between dos Santos and Savimbi, and Machel and Dhlakama, to negotiate a cease-fire and hold internationally-supervised elections, and for the democratization of Angola and Mozambique, Crocker and State are prolonging the conflict -- and, in terms of practical politics, are backing losers. They are now part of the problem, rather than the solution.

Crocker's policies are a prime example of the piecemeal, fragmented, and inchoate foreign policy of the US, and highlight the obsolescence of the policy of "containment." Some time ago, the Wall St. Journal ran an editorial entitled, "Why Not Victory?" The question embodies a perspective that many people at State and others in Washington seem unable to grasp. For far too long have we had a foreign policy limited to containment and defensive reaction -- genuinely reactionary. We need to reorient our perspective from a strategic defense to a strategic offense -- to develop an activist, forward-looking, dynamic foreign policy with the clear-cut strategic goal of destabilizing the Soviet Empire, forcefully persuading it to disarm and democratize through an energetic and orchestrated exploitation of its vulnerabilities.

The Reagan Administration has indeed made laudable steps in this direction, -- most especially through its attempts to aid the freedom fighters in Nicaragua, the so-called "Contras." But what the press has dubbed "The Reagan Doctrine" of support for anti-

Soviet democratic liberation movements has not been put into practice consistently and coherently. Sadly, this doctrine exists more in presidential rhetoric than in deeds.

What is required is a policy of coordinated material and diplomatic support for all these insurgencies across the board, for the entire phenomenon of Democratic Resistance as a whole. Perhaps the best way to effect such a policy would be for the President to appoint a White House Advisor on Democratic Liberation Movements capable of coordinating such a policy and overriding obstacles caused by, e.g., State's affliction of "clientitis," its insistence on maintaining diplomatic relations with Soviet colonies such as Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

What we must not do is look upon these anti-Soviet democratic insurgencies in isolation and piecemeal -- but instead as all related parts of geopolitical phenomenon of immense historical importance: that just as the Third World rejected Western colonialism in the 1950's and '60's, so it is rejecting Soviet colonialism in the 1980's.

What is vital for us to understand is that the Contras in Nicaragua are fighting the same struggle as the Mujahaddin in Afghanistan, the KPNLF in Cambodia, the ELOL in Laos, Phuc Quoc in Vietnam, Unita in Angola, Renamo in Mozambique, and the EPLF, TPLF, and others in Ethiopia.

Certainly the Soviets are making the connection. The extent of the disaster of the defeat in Congress of aid to the Contras can be seen in how Moscow is using it to weaken support for the Afghan Mujahaddin in Pakistan. Already, the Soviet-infiltrated NDP (National Democratic Party) is arguing for recognition of the Karmal puppet regime in Kabul on the grounds that the US is such an unreliable ally that it is safer to cut a deal with Moscow: if the US can sell out the Contras in Nicaragua, who are resisting Soviet imperialism right on the US' doorstep, it can

sell out the Mujahaddin as well. America cannot be trusted: that is the message Soviet agents are now spreading in Pakistan and around the world in the wake of Congress' vote.

The Afghan resistance to Soviet colonization remains a national uprising on such a scale that it has no parallel in the 20th century. The Afghans are simply the bravest people on this earth. We need to encourage the new unity of Mujahaddin groups under the leadership of Moulavi Younis Khalis. Because of our timidity with the Saudis, this unity is being undermined by the Saudis' demanding that their man -- Rasul Sayyaf, who is ineffectual and has no followers but is bankrolled by the powerful Wahabi sect in Saudi Arabia -- be leader instead.

An overt program of food and other humanitarian supplies should be instituted with flags flying on a Marshall Plan scale if the continued mass slaughter of civilians and an impending Soviet-manufactured famine of Ethiopian proportions is to be avoided. The resistance should receive not merely an increase in the quantity of weapons (which has occurred recently), but in the quality of weapons, most especially those capable of shutting down the airbases: 80% of all Soviet combat and logistical operations in Afghanistan are airborne.

Should the Soviets respond by stepping up subversion and sabotage in Pakistan (e.g., in Baluchistan, their next imperialist target), then we should respond in turn with a program of subversion among the Moslems of Soviet Central Asia, and encourage the Afghans to carry their Jihad into the Soviets' sanctuary. Soviet Moslems comprise the fifth largest Islamic population in the world, and are the most oppressed of all Islamic peoples. They represent a true Achilles Heel of the Kremlin's: the USSR is itself colonial empire within its own borders, and of all its ethnic minorities, perhaps the Soviet Moslems are the greatest potential threat to its continued existence as an intact political entity.

The Democrats in Congress are to be congratulated for taking the lead in military aid to the non-communist resistance in Cambodia.

Only by strengthening the KPNLF will the Cambodian people have a third alternative to their present dilemma of continued, Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation or the nightmare of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge seizing power again.

I can only hope that Congress would now apply the same logic to other Democratic Liberation Movements, instead of devising contrived distinctions to rationalize treating them differently. I can only hope that the House and the Senate, Democrats and Republicans, would join together with the Administration in a bipartisan commitment to forthrightly and proudly assist the most thrilling and hopeful geopolitical development of our time. These Democratic Liberation Movements are on the side of history. History has now passed the Soviet Union and Marxism-Leninism by. The values we cherish, of liberal democracy and individual liberty, are what are inspiring people in the world today.

These heroic people, the Afghans, the Nicaraguans, the Cambodians, the Angolans, and others, know first hand the evil of Soviet Marxism. They are risking their lives, many sacrificing their lives, to fight against Soviet Marxism and to bring freedom to their country. These freedom fighters are on the verge of winning. They are handing us an opportunity to reduce, perhaps permanently, Soviet power and influence in the world -- and thus its capacity to be a threat to our country -- on a silver platter.

We are now at a real fork in the road of history. Down one path is the possibility that what the Soviets call "the correlation of forces" may turn dramatically against them. Their entire colonial structure is being challenged by the guerrilla wars being waged in eight of their colonies, and may unravel and collapse in the next few years. Down the other path is the possibility that unless we seize the window of opportunity

available to us, and go on a strategic offensive against Moscow, then it will digest and consolidate its imperialist gains and soon go on the march again, whether in Central America or Baluchistan and the Saudi oilfields.

The Soviet Union bases its claim to superpower status on military force alone. Brute force is all it has left to offer the world. Only when that force ceases to be capable of achieving the continued expansion of the Soviet Empire, will Moscow turn inward to try and solve its gross economic and demographic difficulties. This is the only hope for genuine and lasting peace, for Afghanistan, for Indochina, for Central America, for Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and for the entire world.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL FRIDAY, APRIL 26, 1985

The Contras Can Still Win With Private Aid

By JACK WHEELER

Even with the House's refusal to support the contras, the consolidation of Soviet and Cuban-sponsored Marxist fascism in Nicaragua is not inevitable. The Sandinista regime in Managua now devotes an estimated 60% of its budget to the military in order to quash internal dissent and fend off 9,000 ill-equipped guerrillas still inside the country. The Nicaraguan Democratic Force (abbreviated as FDN in Spanish), the main contra force, has 17,000 men trained and ready to fight. Hundreds of new volunteers sign up every week after fleeing from their forced evacuation to Sandinista relocation camps, from being forcibly conscripted by the Sandinistas, or from Sandinista tyranny in general. Dissatisfaction with the regime is building at such a rate that it is quite reasonable to project that—with sufficient material assistance—the FDN could double its forces in the next six months, and have upward of 50,000 men deployed within a year.

According to a U.S. official involved with the program who won't speak for attribution, maintaining the current contra force costs \$1.2 million a month. To double it would cost \$2 million a month, and to reach a 50,000-man force, \$3 million. These sums are not beyond reach—even without tax dollars. Sen. John Kerry (D., Mass.), an opponent of aid to the resistance, said last week that "up to \$12 million" had reached the contras from private sources since official help was cut off last summer. Americans have always gladly opened their wallets to foreign causes. In 1937, the Republican forces fighting Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War raised some \$2 million in the U.S. alone (the equivalent of \$15.5 million today).

With the Sandinistas already hard pressed to pay for their military and some \$3 billion in foreign debt, with empty foreign-exchange reserves and a currency trading at 1/20th its official rate, they cannot reasonably hope to contain a greatly expanded resistance.

It is false to believe propaganda that the contras can't win. The contras *will* win, if they get the support they need. Since Congress refuses to supply it, that support must now come directly from the Ameri-

can people. And it is President Reagan who must ask them for it. The president must now speak to the nation on television—and in forum after forum around the country—explaining what is at stake: the direction of history, toward totalitarianism or toward democracy; the expansion of Soviet imperialism or the beginnings of the unraveling of the Soviet Empire.

In 1975, Congress sold out South Vietnam and Angola. Today, 10 years later, Congress seems determined to sell out Nicaragua and its neighbors. But this time, the president must make forcefully clear, the American people will not let Congress get away with it.

The president must take whatever actions he can that don't require congressional sanction. He must break diplomatic relations with Managua, just as the U.S. has not maintained them with Cuba for 25 years. Congress now frees him to recognize a Nicaraguan government-in-exile. He must impose a complete economic boycott on all Nicaraguan imports. He must provide a guarantee to Honduras and Costa Rica, such as he can even under the terms of the War Powers Act, that their territorial integrity will be defended from Nicaraguan aggression, upon their request, by U.S. military forces.

He must explain relentlessly to the Nicaraguan people and to the world—via the Voice of America—that his goal is not to have U.S. troops fight for the freedom of Nicaragua, but to make it possible for Nicaraguans to fight for their own freedom: that his goal is to have the Sandinistas live up to their original promises of political pluralism and individual liberty—for it is the Sandinistas who are the true "counter-revolutionaries." It is they who betrayed the revolution. The president's goal is not the removal of the Sandinistas from political power, but the removal of their *monopoly* of political power, thus forcing them to submit to the will of the Nicaraguan electorate.

What's more, he must provide the American people with a clear picture of just who the contras are and for what they are fighting. What they are not are atrocity-committing "Somocistas," the left's bottomless capacity to believe Soviet-San-

dinista propaganda notwithstanding. As Robert Leiken of the Carnegie Institution recently pointed out in the New Republic, many of the local Somoza officials now operate the local Sandinista Defense Committees (a principal instrument of social control) throughout Nicaragua. I've been given a list of more than 30 former National Guard officers who are now officers in the Sandinista army or EPS. These Somocistas have simply gone from one dictatorship to another. Further, according to FDN intelligence, it is Sandinista assassination teams organized and led by EPS Capt. I. Calderon who, disguised as FDN guerrillas, pillage villages and kill peasants (mostly those they suspect are FDN sympathizers)—whereupon their actions are claimed to be contra "atrocities."

In reality the contras represent a genuine peasant rebellion, a volunteer army fighting not for power but for elections. They are part of a world-wide democratic revolution sweeping through the Soviet Empire from Afghanistan to Angola.

Those members of Congress so self-righteously opposed to aid for the contras should be ashamed of themselves. U.S. support for the contras should be a cause not for qualms but for celebration. For once we are supporting the forces of progressive democratic liberation against a reactionary totalitarian dictatorship. For once we are seizing the initiative and putting Moscow and Havana on the defensive. For once we are fighting both for our vital national security and for the liberty of an oppressed people. If President Reagan mobilizes the support of the American people, and asks them to get out their checkbooks and contribute directly to the FDN through Adolfo Calero's Nicaraguan Development Foundation in Miami, thereby bypassing the Central Intelligence Agency and the government entirely, then the contras will not lose, and peace, liberty and democracy will come at last to Nicaragua.

Mr. Wheeler, who has written extensively on anti-communist insurgencies, just returned from another incursion into Nicaragua with the FDN. He is a foreign-policy consultant for the Citizens for America group in Washington.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1985

Cambodian Foes of Hanoi's Imperialism Cry Out for U.S. Aid

Reading last week's accounts of the annual Vietnamese assault on the Cambodian refugee camps near Thailand has been a bitter experience. As one of the few Westerners to visit the camps, I know what the Vietnamese have now destroyed.

The Cambodian, or Khmer, people have arguably suffered more than any other nation of the 20th century. First the com-

ing in the resistance against the Vietnamese. But over the past few years, it has become an effective, well-trained and motivated guerrilla army that no one laughs at any longer, least of all the Vietnamese and the Soviets.

The KPRLF is, in fact, similar to other democratic liberation movements that have sprung up in recent years to fight Soviet-backed Marxist regimes, such as the contras in Nicaragua or the Afghan freedom fighters. Gen. Dien Del, the KPRLF founder, is like most of the non-communist Khmer an unabashed admirer of America. "You Americans are smart," he told me at the KPRLF headquarters at Ampil last July. "You are rich because you understand that Marxism is stupid. Singapore understands this, and that is why it is rich as well." I had noticed several books on Singapore's market economy in Gen. Dien Del's office. "This is what we want for Cambodia, an economy like Singapore's, like America's."

In an interview, Gen. Dien Del claimed that Cambodia's real enemy is no longer the Khmer Rouge. He blames the current war on the Vietnamese and their Soviet supporters, who supply as much as \$2 billion a year in money and arms to Hanoi.

It is because the KPRLF represents a force for political and economic freedom that it is such a threat to Hanoi. This is also the reason the recent Vietnamese offensive isn't directed at the Khmer Rouge camps. If Hanoi defeats the Khmer Rouge, it no longer has a rationale for occupying Cambodia. Instead, the Vietnamese offensive has aimed at the non-communist resistance loyal to Son Sann or the much smaller non-communist band loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

This July, nearly 60,000 Khmer refugees lived in Rukhsen, one of the border camps I visited. Each family lived in its own small thatched hut on a vast grid of dirt streets. Most cultivated a small garden, growing corn, tomatoes, manioc or papayas, with a vine-covered trellis for shade. The Khmer had built schools, bakeries, churches, mosques, Buddhist temples and scores of tiny market stalls selling vegetables, smoked fish and an abundance of merchandise smuggled from Thailand or from the Cambodian interior.

Anyone with any service to offer hung his shingle, from bicycle repairers to tailors to dentists. It was a kind of capitalism in action, similar to what prevailed in Cambodia before the bloody 1970s. It might

also be a vision of Cambodia's future, if Son Sann's non-communists could supplant the Marxists who have held sway for a decade. But over the past few weeks, Vietnamese tanks (Soviet-made T-54s) have ground that vision into the Cambodian dust. In one camp alone, Ampil, thousands of artillery shells are reported to have fallen before Vietnamese troops arrived and put the thatched homes to flame. By then, the refugees had fled elsewhere on the border or into Thailand. The Khmer guerrillas stayed to fight, but eventually they also fled, probably to regroup and fight another day.

So far, America has not yet found the courage to help these democratic freedom fighters. Son Sann met President Reagan in September 1983; he received nothing but sympathy. Only China has provided any substantial material support (though Singapore has provided a bit). But Peking supplies only one weapon to the KPRLF for every nine it gives the Khmer Rouge, its major client. As a result, KPRLF's sources told me, it can arm only 12,000 to 15,000 of the 20,000 men who are trained and ready to fight.

"We have stopped recruiting because we cannot arm and feed new men," the KPRLF chief of military operations, Col. Ea Chuur Kim Meng, told me. "If we had sufficient material and financial support, we could put 10,000 more men and officers to lead them in the field immediately, and in less than nine months have another 20,000 to 25,000 men trained and fighting." The colonel said that many Khmer Rouge would also defect if the non-communists had the food and arms to equip them. In particular, they want light arms, ammunition and antitank weapons. Now they fight only with AK-47 rifles against Vietnamese tanks and artillery.

As Sichan Siv, the KPRLF representative to the United Nations, puts it: "Most of the international community has demanded that Hanoi cease being a colonial exploiter and negotiate a withdrawal from Cambodia. But diplomats must realize that negotiations will be fruitless unless we are effective militarily. We are fighting to bring a real democracy, a real freedom to our country that has suffered so much. We desperately need America's material support. We think we deserve it."

Mr. Wheeler, who visited the Thai-Cambodian border last year, writes frequently about anti-Soviet insurgencies. This article is adapted from the February issue of Reason magazine. A related editorial appears today.

Asia

by Jack Wheeler

munist Khmer Rouge for the "red Khmers" led by Paris-educated Marxist-Leninists who were armed by China and Hanoi seized power in April 1975, killing hundreds of thousands before they were overthrown by the invading Vietnamese army in January 1979.

But while they aren't the victims of genocide any longer, the Khmer are scarcely free under the Vietnamese. Financed and encouraged by the Soviet Union, Hanoi now occupies Cambodia with more than 150,000 troops, ruling through a puppet regime in Phnom Penh led by a former Khmer Rouge commander, Heng Samrin. Some 80,000 Vietnamese troops also sit in Laos, where the government also takes its cues from Hanoi. Thus what was once French Indochina has become something close to a Soviet-backed Vietnamese Indochina, with the colonial capital, as it was under the French, at Hanoi.

Chased into the northern and southeastern Cambodian jungles, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge followers have reverted to being guerrillas again. Numbering some 30,000, the Khmer Rouge fighters are well armed by China. Hanoi claims, with justification, that it "liberated" Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge. And it says that its occupying army must remain to prevent the nightmare of Pol Pot seizing power once more. But there is an alternative to the colonial Vietnamese and the bloody Khmer Rouge for the Cambodian people: the nationalist, non-communist, anti-Marxist Khmer People's National Liberation Front, led by former Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann.

Originally an amalgam of tiny resistance groups along the Thai-Cambodian border organized by Cambodian Gen. Dien Del in 1979, the KPRLF was first seen as a quixotic movement with little hope of fig-

RECESS

Senator KASTEN. I want to thank you both for your testimony. Unfortunately, there is another vote on the Senate floor. I apologize to everyone. We are not in charge of the Senate schedule in the Foreign Operations Subcommittee. I am going to recess the committee briefly and go vote. I would like to ask one or two questions for the record. If you can wait, once more, I apologize to our final panel.

The committee will stand in recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

RESULT OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN AIDING GLOBAL ARMED STRUGGLES

Senator KASTEN. The committee will come to order.

I would like, if I could, to play devil's advocate for just a minute. How would each of you answer the criticism that we had today that a policy of assisting these resistance groups might only lead to direct U.S. involvement in a number of armed struggles around the world? Why don't we start with Mr. Wheeler.

Mr. WHEELER. I happen to think that Representative Solarz had some good points on that. But the thing is that these freedom fighters, these democratic anti-Soviet insurgencies do not want us to fight for them, and they are very concerned about that. They don't want the Marines, they don't want us to fight for them. What they want is material support to make it possible for them to fight for their own freedom. And that is why we do not run the risk of getting directly, militarily involved in these situations because the freedom fighters themselves do not want and will resist it.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Moser.

Mr. MOSER. I think that on the whole that is correct but I would simply add that we are involved in a worldwide conflict which has taken many forms, including many military forms, whether we like it or not. It is much better from a purely selfish point of view for us to provide aid for other peoples to fight for themselves than for us to fight for them or fight on our own shores because I sometimes go back to the situation of Constantinople. The Turks took Constantinople bit by bit, a little bit of territory here, a little bit of the hinterland there, and when they actually besieged Constantinople and it fell in 1453, there was nothing left. Constantinople had no friends and no allies and we could find ourselves very much in that same situation.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

Senator KASTEN. What about the argument that Mr. Armitage seemed to be touching on, and I think a number of people are concerned about, because we are talking about relatively small amounts of assistance. Are we providing false hope to some of these resistance movements, possibly raising unrealistic expectations, and I would also like you to just touch on the question of long-term and short-term commitment?

Mr. Moser, why don't you go first on this one?

Mr. MOSER. First of all, the commitment has to be long term because the struggle is long term and there is no way in which we can make simply year-by-year commitments. It's a protracted struggle and therefore, necessarily, we must have at least in mind a commitment to go long term.

There is always a problem, and this is one which has agitated us, that we would give too little aid just to enable the resistance to simply drag out and ultimately lose. We obviously cannot guarantee that any particular resistance would prevail if we give it the necessary level of aid. But I think it is indicative the difference between, let's say, Communist insurgencies where in most cases they have many more arms than men to fight an anti-Communist insurgencies where they have more men who want to fight but no arms. The arms are something we can easily provide, very little for us to do and we should be doing it. The Soviets understand the situation much better than we do.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Wheeler.

UNRELIABILITY OF UNITED STATES AS ALLY

Mr. WHEELER. I think that Secretary Armitage has a real concern. We are and have been an unreliable ally. It is difficult to provide things, support in the long run so that these are real and genuine concerns. But I think that if we prepare for that, if we start generating an understanding and a support among the American people for this, which is hard. Solarz says that he "requires broad support within the United States" for a movement. Well, there may be a great deal of support for Afghanistan, but Dr. Robert Simon, in trying to get private aid, private support to fund his surgical theaters inside Afghanistan is having a great deal of difficulty. Americans are generally not concerned about what is going on beyond their borders.

Nonetheless, I think the key can be summed up in one word, momentum. The Soviets have gained an incredible amount of mileage in the myth of historical inevitability, that history is on the side of Marxism and a lot of people, including some people on the Hill, are convinced that ultimately, yes, that is true, they are going to win, so we better cut a deal, we better negotiate a settlement because they are going to win in the long run and history is on their side. That is why this whole situation is so important and it must be supported as a whole and all these movements, because you have to have—Granada in this situation does not count. We threw out a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship backed by the Soviet Union from without. What has to happen is a genuine popular rebellion from within that removes a Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist regime from power. That has never happened but it clearly can happen. All that it has to happen is once. Once it happens once, then the world can see that the myth of historical inevitability is shattered, it is finished. If it can happen once, it can happen again. It is the whole way that people perceive history is moving.

If Upper Volta or Chad or French Equatorial Africa or one single country in the 1950's or 1960's demanded independence from one of the Western imperialist empires—France, Holland, England, whatever—it wouldn't have been a big deal. But once the world at large saw that the entire Third World, the whole movement was anticolonialism, and that Western imperialists had to divest themselves of it, then that is the way history was moving. That is the kind of perspective we have got to encourage and portray this as the Soviet Union cannot be an imperialist empire any more. If it wants to be treated as a civilized country and be within a community of nations it cannot impose its will and act as an imperialist power any more.

There are too many people that want their own liberty and independence and they have got to give up their empire.

Mr. MOSER. Might I make a comment?

Senator KASTEN. Very briefly.

GRENADA

Mr. MOSER. I wanted to say in the case of Grenada that what this illustrates is that even though the military force was applied from outside, it required relatively little to overthrow a Communist regime which looked very strong from the outside. One might compare with Afghanistan, many critics of American policy tend to do that. There are very large differences. Although the initial application of force was not very great in either country, the resistance in Afghanistan was immense. In Grenada, there was no resistance.

OVERT/COVERT AID QUESTION

Senator KASTEN. I want just for the record to ask each of you to comment on overt open public aid as opposed to covert secret aid, as you heard in the discussion this morning. If you can do it as briefly as possible, frankly, in the interest of all the people still waiting to testify. It is unfortunate. We could be in these kinds of discussions for a week. If you can comment, Mr. Moser, overt versus covert aid to these groups?

Mr. MOSER. As a general rule I strongly favor overt aid. I think we ought to be quite up front about it. We should make no bones about it. It may be that certain devices can be devised to reduce the likelihood of great power confrontation. I think that is a secondary issue.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Wheeler.

Mr. WHEELER. I think Secretary Armitage had some good points here that overt aid in certain circumstances, overt aid may be more appropriate than others. But I think I would like to mention that I think it is worth considering that the Central Intelligence Agency may not be the appropriate vehicle to handle these kinds of programs. It was originally conceived as an intelligence gathering organization and running paramilitary operations, perhaps it should not be in its bailiwick. It should perhaps be more appropriately in the bailiwick of Defense under a separate structure, because these are the professional military people, not the Agency, and what the Agency is doing running these paramilitary things is open to question.

One particular instance of overt aid, I think we have every right to conduct a humanitarian overt aid program to the Afghan, both Mujahideen and civilians in the villages in Afghanistan with flags flying. There is no justification for not doing it openly and saying we are going to save the Afghan people from genocide and if the Soviets don't like it, that is just too bad.

Senator KASTEN. I would like to thank both of you. We look forward to a continuing dialog. Clearly we have broken some new ground here.

Mr. WHEELER. Yes, sir, we have.

Senator KASTEN. I think it is very positive and all of us appreciate your contributions. Thank you very much. We will be back with questions for the record and hopefully you can get back to us with answers in a relatively short period of time. Thank you for your testimony.

Mr. WHEELER. Thank you, Senator, very, very much.

UNITA, CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE, AND AFGHAN RESISTANCE

STATEMENTS OF:

FIGUEIREDO PAULO, SPOKESMAN FOR THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA

SANGWAR DE LOPEZ, CHIEF, BUREAU OF INFORMATION, KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

MOHAMAD NABI SALEHI, RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE, ISLAMIC UNITY OF AFGHANISTAN MUJAHIDEEN

INTRODUCTION OF PANEL

Senator KASTEN. Our last witnesses are men who represent three of the resistance movements—UNITA, Cambodian resistance, and Afghan resistance.

If all the men can come forward and form a panel.

Gentlemen, we thank you very much for being with us today. I know that you realize that by asking you to present your views before our subcommittee, that act in and of itself is indication of the support and the sympathy that your cause has with many of us here in the Congress. Let's begin with UNITA, and then the Cambodian resistance, and last the Afghanistan resistance.

Mr. PAULO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SITUATION IN ANGOLA

The Angolan people have fought for the last 9 years against the Soviet country. During the process for the independence, the Angolan people represented by the Liberation Movement, UNITA, FLA, and MPLA signed the agreement which would permit the Angolan people to hold elections, but the democratic process was interrupted by the Soviet Union. We have been fighting for the last 9 years. In these 9 years, we have extended the war toward 15 provinces, except one, Cabinda, which is up north. But about Cabinda, the preparation is under way, maybe before the end of this year, we are going to fight in Cabinda. So before the end of the year, all the country will be under war.

Now, UNITA controls one-third of the country, effective control. The capital, Luanda, is encircled, being strangled. The enemy is very powerful.

Today in Angola, there are about 45,000 Cuban combat troops. There are more than 2,000 Russian military advisors, more than 3,000 East Yemen troops. In the last year, the Soviet Union introduced MIG-23's, helicopters, MI-8, MI-24, and now they introduce MI-25. Those are very, very sophisticated. They are called flank tanks.

Besides the military hardware, the current government in Angola is getting help from Gulf Oil. Gulf Oil is paying each year \$2 billion to the Marxist government. Besides Gulf, the American banks through import-export, Chase Manhattan, Mortgage Guarantee, City Bank, et cetera, they loan more than \$200 million.

RESTRICTIONS OF CLARK AMENDMENT

But on our side, we have just very limited support from our friends. The Clark amendment prohibits the American Government from helping us. The Clark amendment prohibits the administration to conduct effective foreign policy. Many people feel that if the Clark amendment were repealed, it would mean sending Marines to Angola to escalate the war, but the Clark amendment doesn't mean necessarily to send the Marines maybe the same day or same week send aid to Angola, but this would help, it would encourage also those who are helping us to increase their help. It would send a clear signal to the MPA that the U.S. Government has other options.

They say the Department has been negotiating for the last 5 years with the MPA on withdrawal of the Cubans. So far we haven't seen any tangible results just because the U.S. Government doesn't have any authenticity by talking. As long as the Clark amendment remains in force, I don't think the State Department will get through.

SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA

I just want to make a comment on some statements which were made this morning about the help we get. It is unfair for us to single out a country, like South Africa, that we are getting help from South Africa. We get help from some African countries, we get help from some European countries, we get help from some Middle East countries, so it would be very costly for South Africa to support a war of that type. We have been fighting for the last 9 years, and we have in the field today about 50,000 men. They are armed, they were trained. It would be great for South Africa to support that great army. Also, South Africa is fighting its own war in Namibia, so this way it is unfair to single out our country, but we have to recognize South Africa as the original economic power, original military power. All those countries are under South Africa in one way or the other. They depend on South Africa. Zambia depends on South Africa economically. Zimbabwe, Zaire, Botswana, Lesotho. There is no single country around South Africa which is not dependent on South Africa. I don't see why they single

out just UNITA, saying UNITA is popular with South Africa. We have some trade with South Africa.

We control one-third of the country, and in the area we control, there is a lot of timber. We have been sending timber for more than 5 years now. Last year we got some diamond mines and the objective is to capture all the diamond mines. So we are going to start to sell diamonds.

So besides what we can get from our resources, we get help from different countries. In 1977-78, when some dissidents were trained in Guatemala by the Cubans, some African countries which were skeptical about us, they began to realize the Cubans won't stop; the Cubans came to destabilize the continent.

So our help began to increase. So each day that we make progress, we are getting more support from other countries.

Senator KASTEN. In the interest of time, I am going to ask you to begin to summarize your statement, if you will.

Mr. PAULO. OK. What we would like to see from the United States is to encourage free elections, to encourage to find a peaceable solution so that the war ends in Angola. There is talk about elections in Namibia, but nobody is talking about elections in Angola.

Thank you very much.

Senator KASTEN. Thank you very much.

Our next witness is representing the Cambodian resistance. You might want to take the microphone.

STATEMENT OF SANGWAR DE LOPEZ

KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION

Mr. DE LOPEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the staff of the committee, my name is Sangwar de Lopez. I am representative of the Khmer People's—

Senator KASTEN. Sir, I might want you to take the microphone closer to you.

Mr. DE LOPEZ. My name is Sangwar de Lopez. I am the representative of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front in the United States. So in this capacity, I will talk about the Khmer People's National Liberation for everyone.

On behalf of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, I thank you very much for the great opportunity given me to testify today before the subcommittee. Congressman Solarz in his testimony had so very well described the situation in Cambodia. I have not much to add, but I will try to present the situation in Cambodia as seen by a Cambodian.

VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AGAINST CAMBODIA

For many of those unfamiliar with the Cambodian situation, the Cambodian conflict is a civil war between various segments of the Cambodian population. But in fact, it is an open aggression by Vietnam

against its neighbor, Cambodia. Vietnam, strongly backed by the Soviet Union, invaded Cambodia in December 1978, and has occupied it ever since. The Vietnamese claimed at that time that they came to Cambodia to save the Cambodian people from extinction as a race. But Vietnam did not say that in the meantime, they installed a new regime led by Heng Samrin, a former regional commander of that regime that they have just deposed. Most of the officials in this new regime are former officials of Democratic Kampuchea, better known as Khmer Rouge. Thus, the so-called Heng Samrin government is nothing more than a puppet regime installed by Vietnam to legitimize its presence. This puppet regime will not survive more than 24 hours if the 180,000 Vietnamese troops were to be withdrawn. Vietnam itself would not be able to maintain its troops in Cambodia without the 3 to 7 million U.S. dollars per day of the Soviet's aid.

Facing this aggression and invasion, and with the hope of receiving the support and assistance from friendly countries, the KPNLF, after 3 years of resisting an alliance with the Khmer Rouge, finally agreed on June 22, 1982, to participate in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with two other groups: the Party of Democratic Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge, and the Party of FUNCINPEC, United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia, headed by H.R.H. Prince Norodom Siranhouk.

OBJECTIVES OF KPNLF

The KPNLF is one of the two non-Communist groups within the coalition recognized by the United Nations. Its objectives are to:

Oppose the military occupation of Cambodia by the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam;

Oppose the return to power in Cambodia of any genocidal regime; and

Oppose the reestablishment of a regime of corruption in Cambodia.

The KPNLF, a genuine movement of the people, by the people, and for the people, was officially proclaimed in Cambodian territory on October 9, 1979, through the merging of nationalist non-Communist freedom fighters. With a force at less than 2,000 and a population of about 4,000 at the beginning, it has now a strength of over 15,000 armed combatants, with 5,000 trained but unarmed combatants, and thousands more waiting for training and weapons. Our forces are active in almost all parts of Cambodia, but are strongly handicapped because of an acute lack of resources. From 4,000, the civilian population living under our protection reached around 160,000 at the end of 1984.

AID TO CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Except the ASEAN countries which helped us in many ways, the free world, including the United States, beside giving humanitarian aids to the refugees, and providing us diplomatic and moral support, never give us any military assistance. Until now, the only major military assistance provider to the Cambodian resistance is the People's Republic of China.

But China, on many occasions, told us: "You have many rich friends, ask them to help you also. When we see them giving you something, then we will match their donation." Finally, the KPNLF, considered by many as the best friend of the free world among the three parties of the coalition, and the largest group between the two non-Communists, is always the last one to be taking care of, and never receive enough for its needs.

Concerning the United States, we are continuously told that the ASEAN should take the lead, and the United States will follow ASEAN initiatives. But as everyone knows, ASEAN Foreign Ministers, in a recent joint statement, called on the free world, and particularly the United States, for providing military assistance to the non-Communists. The Foreign Minister of Thailand went on even further by declaring in the press that: "The non-Communist resistance cannot fight with their bare hands." Still, the free world did not respond to these appeals.

For what I am concerned, I do not believe that the American Democracy would be founded, should General La Fayette provide only moral and political support, and General De Gaulle would not be able to liberate France, if he had received only verbal encouragements from the allied countries.

Up to now, we hear so many arguments around Honorable Solarz' proposal. I would like to present to you, Mr. Chairman and Honorable Senators, my modest point of views about this:

VIEWS ON AID TO CAMBODIA

One, U.S. aids may end up in the Khmer Rouge hands.

Due to the feelings of the United States and of ASEAN toward the Khmer Rouge, it is unthinkable that U.S. aid end up in the Khmer Rouge hands. Very frankly, for the KPNLF, we never have any doubt or worry about this for a single second.

Two, the Soviet Union may step up their support for Vietnam, should the United States provide military assistance to the non-Communist resistance forces.

The U.S. self-imposed restriction did not encourage the Soviets for any restraint. The Soviets gave and are continuing to give 3 to 7 million U.S. dollars per day to Vietnam for maintaining 180,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, and this since 1979. The Soviets did not wait for any U.S. action before deciding to back up Vietnam since 1978. That has resulted in encouraging Vietnam to become more and more arrogant militarily, politically, and diplomatically.

To show you how much Vietnam cares about the U.S. self-imposed restriction, I would like to tell you that during this year, Vietnam attacked one refugee encampment, that encampment to be visited by the U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, just 24 hours before the visit. The Chinese who have had a very long experience with Vietnam since Dien-Bien-Phu, the first Vietnam war, could very well testify on how Vietnam responds to kindness. The United States also had a very good experience with the 1973 Paris accord.

And finally, avoiding any direct confrontation with the Soviets? This confrontation is even more direct in Afghanistan, the United States is the main supporter of the Afghan freedom fighters, but still this did not change much the state of relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Senator KASTEN. I am going to have to ask you in the interest of time to summarize your statement.

AMERICANIZING THE CONFLICT

Mr. DE LOPEZ. To our understanding—three—Americanizing the conflict could serve as an invitation to Vietnam to perpetrate a new genocide. We never wanted the conflict to be Americanized. That is why we never asked for any troops commitments from the United States nor from others. For this, Mr. Son Sann, the President of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, has made it very clear on many occasions, recently during his visit to Washington, DC, in his press conference, he said, "We Cambodians ask for the honor to fight by ourselves, alone, for our freedom, and it is our duty to do so. We need only means."

To our understanding, as we say in military terms, the best defensive is the offensive, so the best way to prevent the United States to be dragged into a second Vietnam—and this time it may not be in Vietnam or even in Cambodia—is to help us now. Rather than talking about Americanizing the Cambodian conflict, I think we do best in focusing on the Vietnamization of Cambodia.

One day I have seen on one very bright green bumper sticker that says, "Help Afghans now or fight the Soviets later." This is also very true for Cambodia.

MORE INVOLVEMENT BY ASEANS

Four, ASEANS should do more for their own interests.

Personally, I do not see how much more ASEAN should pay for the price of the post-Vietnam war, but I could say that ASEAN have paid a very high price for providing multiforms of assistance to hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees who are now flooding ASEAN countries, and also by taking a very firm and courageous stand against Vietnam. To be frank, I would say that American interests in this region should be taken into consideration too, and for this I will quote His Excellency, Tommy Koh, the well-respected Ambassador of Singapore.

ASEAN is important to the United States for geopolitical reasons. The six ASEAN countries sit astride some of the most important sealanes of the world, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Lombok Strait, and the Sunda Strait. These sealanes literally represent the lifeline of Japan, America's most important ally in the Asian-Pacific region.

Senator KASTEN. In the interest of time, I am going to have to ask you to try to summarize your statement. Your entire statement will be made part of the record. I am sorry, we have serious time problems.

Mr. DE LOPEZ. The ball has been sent by all six ASEAN countries. It is now in the U.S. field. All U.S. allies and friends and even Vietnamese and their friends are watching for us Cambodians, their first victim of the Vietnam war, and the last one still fighting for democracy in the region. We will continue to fight even with our bare hands to the complete liberation of the motherland, because as John F. Kennedy said, "We refuse to choose the way of submission or surrender." We would like to see the free world, and particularly its leaders, taking a better stand and fulfill its responsibility.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, I would like to quote our President, Mr. Son Sann, saying, "We are a frontline country and frontline people in a struggle for peace, freedom, stability, and security of the entire Southeast Asia region. The outcome of our struggle shall condition the future and determine the fate of the region. We wish to see back in Phnom Penh the U.S. flag taken away under his arm by the U.S. Ambassador in 1975."

Thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Sangwar de Lopez follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SANGWAR DE LOPEZ

Chief of Information Bureau in U.S.A.
Khmer People's National Liberation Front

On behalf of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, I thank you very much for the great opportunity given me to testify today before your distinguished Subcommittee.

Honorable Stephen J. Solarz, in his testimony, had so well described the Cambodian situation, I have not much to add, but I will try to present this situation as seen by a Cambodian.

For many of those unfamiliar with the Cambodian situation, the Cambodian conflict is a civil war between various segments of the Cambodian population. But in fact, it is an open aggression by Vietnam against its neighbor, Cambodia. Vietnam, strongly backed by the Soviet Union, invaded Cambodia in December 1978, and has occupied it ever since. The Vietnamese claimed at that time, that they came to Cambodia to save the Cambodian people from extinction as a race. But Vietnam did not say that in the meantime, they installed a new regime led by Heng Samrin, a former regional commander of that regime they have just deposed. Most of the officials in this new regime are former officials of Democratic Kampuchea, better known as Khmer Rouge. Thus, the so-called Heng Samrin government is nothing more than a puppet regime installed by Vietnam to legitimize its presence. This regime would not survive more than 24 hours if the 180,000 Vietnamese troops were to be withdrawn. Vietnam itself would not be able to maintain its troops in Cambodia without the 3 to 7 million US dollars per day of the Soviets aids.

Facing this aggression and invasion, and with the hope of receiving the support and assistance from friendly countries, the K.P.N.L.F., after three years of resisting on alliance with the Khmer Rouge, finally agreed on June 22, 1982, to participate in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with two other groups: the Party of Democratic Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge, and the Party of FUNCINPEC (United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia) headed by H.R.H. Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

The K.P.N.L.F. is one of the two noncommunist groups within the Coalition recognized by the United Nations. Its objectives are to:

- oppose the military occupation of Cambodia by the Armed Forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,

- oppose the return to power in Cambodia of any genocidal regime, and

- oppose the re-establishment of a regime of corruption in Cambodia.

The K.P.N.L.F., a genuine movement of the people, by the people and for the people, was officially proclaimed in Cambodian territory on October 9, 1979, through the merging of five groups of nationalist noncommunist Freedom-Fighters. With a force at less than 2,000 and a population of about 4,000 at the beginning, it now has a strength of over 15,000 armed combattants, with 5,000 trained but unarmed combattants, and thousands more waiting for training and weapons. Our forces are active in almost all parts of Cambodia. From 4,000, the civilian population living under our protection reached around 160,000 at the end of 1984.

Except the ASEAN countries which helped us in many ways, the Free World, including the United States, beside giving humanitarian aids to the refugees, and providing us diplomatic and moral support, never give us any military assistance. Until now, the only major military assistance provider to the Cambodian resistance is the People's Republic of China. But China, in many occasions told us: "You have many rich friends, ask them to help you also. When we see them giving you something, then we will match their donation". Finally, the K.P.N.L.F., considered by many as the best friend of the Free World among the three Parties of the Coalition, and the largest group between the two noncommunists, is always the last one to be taking care of, and never receive enough for its needs.

Concerning the United States, we were told that the ASEAN should take the lead, and the United States will follow ASEAN initiatives. In this respect, everyone know that ASEAN Foreign Ministers, in a recent joint statement, called on the Free World, and particularly the United States, for providing military assistance to the noncommunists. The Foreign Minister of Thailand went on even further by declaring in the press that: "the noncommunist resistance cannot fight with their bare hands". Still the Free World did not respond to these appeals.

For what I am concerned, I do not believe that the American Democracy would be founded, should General La Fayette provided only moral and political support, and General de Gaulle would not be able to liberate France, if he had received only verbal encouragements from the allied countries.

Up to now, we hear so many arguments around Honorable Solarz' proposal. I would like to present to you, Mr. Chairman and Honorable Senators, my modest point of views about this:

1. " U.S. aids may end up in the Khmer Rouge hands".

Due to the feelings of the United States and of ASEAN toward the Khmer Rouge, it is unthinkable that U.S. aids end up in the Khmer Rouge hands. Very frankly, for the K.P.N.L.F., we never have any doubt or worry about this.

2. The second argument is: "The Soviet Union may step up their support for Vietnam, should the United States provide military assistance to the noncommunist resistance forces".

The U.S. self-imposed restriction did not encourage the Soviets for any restraint. The Soviets gave and are continuing to give 3 to 7 million U.S. dollars per day to Vietnam for maintaining 180,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, and this since 1979. The Soviets did not wait for any U.S. action before deciding to back up Vietnam. In the contrary, this has resulted in encouraging Vietnam to become more and more arrogant militarily, politically and diplomatically. These are some good illustrations of Vietnam's arrogant attitude:

-During this year's dry season offensive, Vietnam attacked one refugee encampment, that very encampment to be visited by the U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, just 24 hours before the visit;

-At the United Nation General Assembly of 1984, shortly before the vote of the Resolution, the Foreign Minister of Vietnam, Mr. Nguyen Co-Thach, said: "For 40 years the U.N. has been able to do nothing. And the changes in the world have change the U.N."

-In one of his speech during the same U.N.G.A., Mr. Thach said: "Vietnam had been through two wars, and both of them have been settled outside the United Nations".

The Chinese who have had a very long experience with Vietnam since Dien-Bien-Phu, the first Vietnam war, could very well testify on how Vietnam respond to kindness. The United States also had a very good experience with the 1973 Paris Accord.

And finally, avoiding any direct confrontation with the Soviets? This confrontation is even more direct in Afghanistan, the United States is the main supporter of the Afghan Freedom-Fighters, but still this did not change much the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

3. "Americanizing the conflict could serve as an invitation to Vietnam to perpetrate a new genocide".

We never wanted the Cambodian conflict to be "americanized", that is why we never ask for any troop commitment from neither the United States nor from others. For this, Mr. Son Sann, the President of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front has made it very clear on many occasions. During his recent visit to Washington DC, April 8 to April 18, 1985, he said again in his press conference: "We, Cambodians, ask for the honor to fight by ourselves, alone, for our freedom, and it is our duty to do so, we need only means".

To our understanding, as we say in military terms, the best defensive is the offensive, so the best way to prevent the U.S. to be dragged into a second Vietnam - and this time it may not be in Vietnam or even in Cambodia - is to help us now. I have read one day on one bright green bumper-sticker: "Help the Afghans now or fight the Soviets later"; this is also very true for Cambodia.

4. "ASEAN should do more for their own interests".

I do not see how much more ASEAN should pay for the price of the post Vietnam War, but I could say that ASEAN have paid a very high price for providing multiforms of assistance to hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees who are now flooding ASEAN countries, and also by taking a very firm and courageous stand against Vietnam. To be honest, I would say that American interests in the region should be taken into consideration too, and I will quote some of the remarks made by H.E.Mr. Tommy T.B.Koh, the well known and respected Ambassador of Singapore:

"ASEAN is important to the United States for geopolitical reasons. The six ASEAN countries sit astride some of the most important sea-lanes of the world, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Lombok Strait, and the Sunda Strait. These sea-lanes literally represent the life-line of Japan, America's most important ally in Asian-Pacific region.

ASEAN is important to the United States because two of its members, the Philippines and Thailand, are its allies and the remaining four are strong and dependable friends. The United States also has an important air base and naval base in the Philippines.

ASEAN is important to the United States because it is a major source of some of the world's strategic raw materials. ASEAN has a combined population of 275 million with a combined GNP of over U.S.\$200 billion. ASEAN has become the fifth largest trading partner of the United States. The two-way trade between ASEAN and the United States exceeds U.S.\$22 billion..... The total U.S. investment in ASEAN is estimated at between U.S.\$8 billion and 9 billion....."

By the joint statement of its Foreign Ministers, ASEAN have sent the ball to the United States. Now ASEAN, the Free World, in one word all U.S. allies and friends, and even the Vietnamese and their friends, are watching. For us, Cambodians, the first victims of Vietnam war and the last one to still fighting for Democracy, security and stability of the region, we will continue to fight, even with our bare hands until the complete liberation of our motherland, because, as stated by President John F. Kennedy, we refuse to choose the way of "submission or surrender". Nevertheless, we would like to see the Free World and particularly the leader of the Free World and the first Democracy of the World, taking a better stand and fulfill its responsibility.

I would like also to thank many good people who are so worried about the return of the Khmer Rouge, should the Vietnamese accept to withdraw, but let me assure them that this possibility is out of question simply because, as long as the Khmer Rouge still is the predominant force of the Coalition, then the Vietnamese will never leave Cambodia; it is in fact what the Vietnamese wish.

We, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, believe that, the failure to help us would, in effect, condemn the Cambodians to two equally tragic fates: to continue to live under the yoke of Vietnamese colonialism or a new reign of terror under the Khmer Rouge. After all the tragedies that our compatriots have suffered during the last 15 years, we think they surely deserve a better fate. The United States should ask itself how its present policy is designed to permit the Cambodian people to have another choice than those two equally evil alternatives.

In the other hand, for the best interest of the United States, there is no better investment for maintaining peace, stability and security in Southeast Asia than to provide us adequate means to prevent the domino theory to happen in this region. At the same time, this very small investment is also a very valuable premium the United States had ever paid as guarantee against the risk of a second Vietnam.

To conclude, I would like to quote our President, Mr. Son Sann : "We are a frontline country and a frontline people in a struggle for peace, freedom, stability and security of the entire Southeast Asia region. The outcome of our struggle shall condition the future and determine the fate of the region..... We wish to see back in Phnom Penh the United States' flag taken away under his arm by the U.S. Ambassador in 1975".

Thank you for your attention.

STATEMENT OF MOHAMMAD NABI SALEHI

Senator KASTEN. Last, the representative from the Afghan resistance force.

Mr. SALEHI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to have given me the opportunity to testify on the resistance in Afghanistan. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my written statement for the record and reduce my oral statement to allow time for questions.

Senator KASTEN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Salehi follows:]



اتحاد اسلامي مجاهدين افغانستان

حرکت وحدت اسلامي، مجاهدين، کابل، افغانستان

Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MOHAMMAD NABI SALEHI
RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE

My name is Mohammed Nabi Salehi. The Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahadeen, an alliance of three major Afghan resistance groups, appointed me in 1982 as the resident representative of the Afghan resistance in the United States. Our office is located in Annandale, Virginia and is the only resistance-sponsored office in the Washington area. Although resistance unification is not yet complete, I am glad to report that groups which do not officially belong to our alliance have recently increased their cooperation with our office. Unification will stay as one of our highest priorities until it is accomplished.

Last October, the Senate passed Concurrent Resolution 74, the Tsongas Effective Afghan Assistance Resolution. In this legislation, you (the Senate) insisted on "effective support for the Afghan people in their fight for freedom." The Afghan resistance thanks the members of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee who cosponsored this historic legislation: Senators Kasten, Inouye, D'Amato, Leahy, Rudman, DeConcini, and Specter. This legislation was a major breakthrough for the cause of Afghanistan. But it was also a breakthrough for the cause of freedom. For the first time ever, Congress went public to support

effective aid to a liberation movement. The hearing today shows a commitment to follow through what you expressed.

We in Afghanistan find it difficult to understand why America, with its revolutionary heritage, finds it so difficult to support the revolutionary aspirations of others. Throughout history, one empire after another has crumbled after attempting to conquer Afghanistan. Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and the British empires all fell apart after attempting to subjugate Afghanistan. It is an article of faith with our people that we are the rock of faith upon which God has chosen to crack the atheistic Soviet Empire as well.

Your own Revolutionary War has served as the catalyst and example for all modern battles for freedom against oppression. This spontaneous response to the British military, political and economic domination of your forefathers was the basis of the first revolution in modern times for individual freedom. This was a revolution not to displace one oppressor with another, but to institute national freedoms for all citizens under a representative government.

The French government, knowing of the widespread and deep feelings of hostility to British domination of the Colonies, sent aid to the American resistance. History remembers that French arms and assistance enabled your forefathers to defeat their occupiers. Your forefathers fought the first successful guerrilla war against trained and sophisticated troops, including mercenaries. The British Navy was the best in the world and dominated your ports, rivers, and coasts. But on important occasions your fledgling navy successfully engaged the British. Often with sheer pluck and ingenuity your army and navy took on the superior force and achieved victory.

We Afghans share a common experience with you Americans. The same British were unable to subjugate Afghanistan in 70 years of battles. But the British did not possess the tools of mass murder

that the Soviets do. Therefore, the current struggle for Afghanistan is different. The battle in our country is no longer a battle of one armed force against another. It is the systematic technological destruction of an entire population by the army of a superpower.

We have heard statements of support from many countries and the United Nations, and we thank them for their words of support. In the annals of history there have been few rapes of whole nations as universally denounced as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This has awakened the sentiments of many to our plight. But it is long past due to be merely aroused by this situation. On the ground, our freedom fighters control ninety percent of the countryside. The population is overwhelmingly with the freedom fighters. The Soviets and the element they have installed have little Afghan support. We Afghans do not accept guns being pointed by foreign invaders at our people telling us what to do.

The Freedom Fighters, or the Mujahadeen, stand ready to reclaim their country from the Soviet occupiers. What we have to accomplish this are only the old Enfield Rifles left over from the war with the British, supplemented by captured Soviet weapons. These badly outdated weapons were the basis of the Mujahadeen's defense when the war started. We now receive some outside aid. I want to thank Congress and the American people in providing the hundreds of millions of dollars in appropriations to provide material aid to our side. But nothing like the hundreds of millions of dollars of aid you have appropriated has been reaching us. Furthermore, the people delivering the aid on the ground are doing it in a way that aggravates rivalries, jealousies, and accusations of corruption. We listen with great interest and sympathy when Senators and congressmen recently insisted on coming up with a better intermediary to give

aid to the Contra resistance. In the case of Afghanistan also, we implore you to design an instrument for delivering aid that reflects American values and honor.

We are trying to fight a war against the most powerful land army in the world, the Soviet Army. They have all the resources of a modern army, including jet fighters, helicopters armed with machine guns, radar, and so forth. They have burned the crops. They have cut down the fruit-bearing trees. They are killing the livestock. They are disrupting the vital irrigation systems and have poisoned the water supplies in many villages. They have used land mines and butterfly bombs to attack the native human and animal populations. An estimated 60,000 of our people have lost limbs and arms to these mines. Many of them are children who thought these mines were toys. Hundreds of children are being kidnapped and deported for indoctrination in the USSR. What have we received to defend ourselves with?

We have received some heavy machine guns. They are essential against Soviet air attacks. However, we receive only 600 rounds per machine gun per month. This is only enough for several minutes of combat. This allows very little use from these weapons.

In the area of anti-tank rockets we receive only one round per bazooka per month. At such a rate, the Soviets make tanks faster than we can destroy them. Moreover, troops need training to use these weapons to be effective in combat. Our own freedom fighters have shocked the Soviet army and amazed the whole world with their ability to fight. But your own army could not train, let alone be effective in the field, with such ludicrous levels of arms and ammunition.

The inescapable conclusion is that the delivery mechanism for weapons being channeled now is unsatisfactory. Only a small fraction of your aid is translated into effective arms in the hands of those who fight. The American taxpayers deserve better, the Afghan people deserve better, and the rest of the world will not respect a country that makes promises but does not deliver on them.

Time is running out. Hundreds of Afghans die daily. The recent wave of bombing has driven a fresh flood of refugees off the countryside, accelerating the depopulation of the rural areas. Yet the history of your country shows that Americans do have what it takes to support a resistance movement. I am greatly encouraged by your successful support for the French and Burmese guerrillas during World War II. In both of these examples, an effective combination of the airplane, the parachute, and the radio achieved phenomenal success against Nazi and Japanese occupation troops.

The time is now or never for effective aid to the Afghan people. There are only so many people the Soviets can kill before there is nothing left of my country. Paul Revere once rode through the streets of Boston telling the people that the British were coming. I am here to warn you that our current occupiers are on the verge of consolidating their position. We share the experience of defeating the British in our homeland, an occupier who had not yet refined the technology of totalitarian terror. But this is not the case with the Soviet Union, the most savage totalitarian power in history. The time is now for you to get your money's worth from what you send us. The time is now for you to realize that this has not been happening in the past. So let us seek new ways to make this aid work for our mutual goals. Let us use our best means to bring to pass our finest common

ideals. Recently, one of our commanders visited Congressman Sander Levin. He was heartened by Congressman Levin's answer to his plea for aid, "I see that you are betting on the morality of the American people. I think that is a pretty good bet."

AFGHAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Mr. SALEHI. First, let me introduce myself.

My name is Nabi Salehi. The Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen, an alliance of three major Afghan resistance groups appointed me in 1982 as the resident representative of the Afghan resistance in the United States. Our office is located in Annandale, VA, and is the only resistance-sponsored office in the Washington area.

Although resistance unification is not yet complete, I am glad to report that groups which do not officially belong to our alliance have recently increased their cooperation with our office. Unification will stay as one of our highest priorities until it is accomplished.

Mr. Chairman, last October, the Senate passed Concurrent Resolution 24, the Tsongas Effective Afghan Assistance Resolution. In this legislation, you insisted on effective support for the Afghan people in their fight for freedom. The Afghan resistance than, the members of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee who cosponsored this historic legislation—yourself, Senators Inouye, D'Amato, Leahy, Rudman, DeConcini, and Specter. This legislation was a major breakthrough for the cause of Afghanistan, but it was also a breakthrough for the cause of freedom.

U.S. SUPPORT OF AFGHAN REVOLUTION MOVEMENT

For the first time ever, Congress went public to support effective aid to a liberation movement. The hearing today shows a commitment to follow through what you expressed.

We in Afghanistan find it difficult to understand why America, with its revolutionary heritage, finds it so difficult to support the revolutionary aspirations of others. Throughout history, one empire after another has crumbled after attempting to conquer Afghanistan. Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and the British Empire all fell apart after attempting to subjugate our country. It is an article of faith with our people that we are the rock of faith upon which God has chosen to crack the atheistic Soviet Empire as well.

We now receive some outside aid. I want to thank Congress and the American people in providing the hundreds of millions of dollars in appropriations to provide material aid to our side. But nothing like hundreds of millions of dollars of aid you have appropriated has been reaching us.

Furthermore, the people delivering the aid on the ground are doing it in a way that aggravates the rivalries, the jealousies, accusations of corruption. We listen with great interest and sympathy when Senators and Congressman insist on coming up with better ways to give aid to the Contra resistance.

In the case of Afghanistan also, we implore you to design an instrument for generating aid that reflects American values and honor.

SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Chairman, we are trying to fight a war against the most powerful land army in the world, the Soviet army. They have all the resources of a modern army, including jet fighters, helicopters armed with machine guns, radar, and so forth. They have burned the crops. They have cut down the fruit-bearing trees. They are killing the livestock. They are disrupting the vital irrigation systems and have poisoned the water supplies in many villages. They have used land mines and butterfly bombs to attack the native human and animal populations.

An estimated 60,000 of our people have lost limbs and arms to these mines. Many of them are children who thought these mines were toys. Hundreds of children are being kidnapped and deported for indoctrination in the U.S.S.R. What have we received to defend ourselves with?

ARMS AND AMMUNITION LEVELS TO AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS

We have received some heavy machineguns. They are essential against the Soviet air attacks. However, we receive only 600 rounds per machinegun per month. This is only enough for several minutes of combat. This allows very little use from these weapons.

In the areas of antitank rockets, we receive only one round per bazooka per month. At such a rate, the Soviets make tanks faster than we can destroy them. Moreover, troops need training to use these weapons to be effective in combat. Our own freedom fighters have shocked the Soviet army and amazed the whole world with their ability to fight. But your own army could not train, let alone be effective, in the field with such ludicrous levels of arms and ammunition.

The inescapable conclusion is that the delivery mechanism for weapons being channeled now is unsatisfactory. Only a small fraction of your aid is translated into effective arms in the hands of those who fight. The American taxpayers deserve better, the Afghan people deserve better, and the rest of the world will not respect a country that makes promises but does not deliver on them.

Mr. Chairman, the time is now for you to get your money's worth for what you send us. The time is now for you to realize that this has not been happening in the past. So let's seek new ways to make this aid work for our mutual good. Let us use our best means to bring to pass our finest common ideas.

Recently, one of our commanders visited Congressman Sander Levin. He was heartened by Congressman Levin's answer to plea for aid, "I see that you are betting on the morality of the American people. I think that is a pretty good bet."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Senator KASTEN. There may be some questions which the committee will submit to you in writing but I would simply like to thank the three of you for being with us today. As I mentioned, I know that you realize that by asking you to formally testify, that invitation and the fact that you are here is in itself a strong indication of the support and the sympathy for your cause on behalf of many of us here in Congress. I look forward to working with you, and I believe that we have made some real progress here today in terms of beginning to define a direction for U.S. foreign policy. This isn't the end of our inquiry. It is just a beginning.

I am hopeful that we will continue this very positive and I think very productive debate.

SUBMITTED QUESTIONS

This concludes this morning's hearing. I would like to thank all our witnesses. Should there be questions from members who were unable to be here this morning, we will get those questions to the witnesses in writing.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR D'AMATO

SENATE RESOLUTION 34 ON AFGHANISTAN

Senator D'Amato: My resolution, S. Res 34, urges the President to provide much needed medical, military, and food assistance to the Afghan Freedom Fighters. The State Department has expressed its concern over this resolution. How are the circumstances different for Afghanistan than they are for Cambodia and Nicaragua?

Secretary Schneider: The Department of State remains committed to continuing and expanding a humanitarian assistance program for the Afghans. We welcome the recent establishment of a U.S.A.I.D. office in Pakistan to administer not less than \$15 million of humanitarian aid in FY '86 to help meet the food, medical and other needs of the Afghan people. Reservations on the wording of Senate Resolution 34 were based, not on the intent of the resolution, but on specific political considerations affecting our policy toward Afghanistan. We believe that the circumstances in each country must be considered separately, so any comparisons with other countries is unhelpful.

MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS FOR AFGHANISTAN

Senator D'Amato: Senator Humphrey introduced legislation, S.925, of which I cosponsored, to withdraw most-favored-nation trading status for the illegal government of Afghanistan. Why was this status kept and how substantial is the trade between our nations?

Secretary Schneider: The Administration's authority to withdraw most-favored-nation status on its own is limited by previous legislation to certain well-defined circumstances, which do not exist in regard to Afghanistan. The Department of State clearly supports withdrawal of most-favored-nation status for Afghanistan, but welcomes a legislative initiative which gives the President authority to discontinue this status.

Our trade with Afghanistan is inconsequential and the financial impact of removal of MFN will not be substantial. Nevertheless, continued MFN treatment for Afghanistan would be totally inconsistent with our policy. In 1984, U.S. imports from Afghanistan totaled only about \$14.0 million - an infinitesimal percentage of our overall imports and only 2% of Afghanistan exports. U.S. exports to Afghanistan totaled approximately \$7.3 million - less than one percent of Afghanistan's total imports. For the first three months of 1985, U.S. imports totalled only \$2.2 million and exports to Afghanistan only \$1.0 million. We estimate that additional tariffs paid in connection with Afghan exports to the U.S. would have totalled about \$1 million in 1984 if MFN treatment had not been in effect.

Senator D'Amato: Would you support an economic boycott of

Afghanistan or something similar to our actions in Poland after the declaration of martial law?

Secretary Schneider: Other economic measures with respect to Afghanistan are under review. Given the marginal trade between the U.S. and Afghanistan, an economic boycott would have little impact.

Senator D'Amato: The State Department opposes overt military aid to the Afghan freedom fighters because of Soviet-Pakistan relations. Does the Defense Department share this concern?

Mr. Armitage: [Deleted]. The policy of the USG on this issue has been set by the President through the mechanisms of the National Security Council. Of course, the Defense Department agrees with this policy.

Senator D'Amato: In light of Gorbachev's recent threatening statements to Pakistan, and the Soviet Army's continued bombardment of Afghan refugee camps, does the Defense Department view this as justifying U.S. policy on overt aid to the Afghan Freedom Fighters, or does it call for a reevaluation of this policy?

Mr. Armitage: [Deleted]. We do not believe that a reevaluation of proposals to provide overt aid to the resistance is in order.

SENATOR D'AMATO: There have been newspaper reports of covert aid to many of the anti-communist insurgencies around the world. Would you prefer this aid to be overt instead? Do you think our message would be stronger if such aid was overt?

MR. MOSER: I feel very strongly that U.S. aid to anti-communist insurgencies around the world should be open and aboveboard. It is simply a fact of life -- though an unpleasant one -- that the international communist movement is the sworn enemy of the free democracies. The policy of the communist powers has always been unremittently hostile to the Free World, though sometimes more muted than at others. The policies of the Western democracies, on the other hand, have been schizophrenic for decades: we cannot decide whether the communists are truly our enemies. This split must be correctly resolved. A democracy cannot pursue contradictory policies simultaneously for long because it is based upon public opinion. If we give the impression there is something shameful about supporting those fighting for our own values, as we have too often done in the past, then we place our own commitment to freedom in doubt. Our friends cannot understand why we behave as we do, and to tell the truth our enemies cannot either. We should offer our anti-communist allies not only overt material support, but overt political and moral support as well, instead of treating them like unwelcome guests or even moral lepers when they visit our country.

SENATOR D'AMATO: Many of the anti-communist forces are operating against either Soviet forces or Soviet allied forces. What importance would you place on U.S.-Soviet relations when considering U.S. policy toward anti-communist freedom fighters?

MR. MOSER: Since the Soviet Union is the fundamental communist power in the world today, all the regimes which the Freedom Fighters seek to destroy are allied with the Soviet Union. That is their major source of strength, in fact. The Soviet Union makes no secret of its support for communist regimes and for communist insurgencies throughout the world, and it has no logical reason to object to similar U.S. support for anti-communist insurgencies -- although it will, of course. But we should not permit the possible deterioration of Soviet-American relations to deter us from doing what is necessary. The mining of Haiphong harbor in 1972 before the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting showed dramatically that if the Soviets want an agreement with us, they will reach it even under seemingly highly adverse conditions. They are much more realistic about these things than we are. The Soviet Union is our principal enemy in the world. Every victory for the Freedom Fighters anywhere in the world weakens the Soviet Union. And that is only to our benefit.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SPECTER

ARMS ASSISTANCE TO AFGHAN RESISTANCE

Senator Specter: One problem historically with U.S. assistance to democratic movements has been the efficacy of our efforts. Ineffective, mismanaged involvement erodes vital public support. Recent reports allege that our aid to the Afghan rebels may be less effective than it should be, in part because it is being siphoned off as it passes through Pakistan.

Would you please comment on the accuracy of these reports?

What is being done to ensure our aid reaches those who need it and can use it effectively?

Secretary Schneider: The question of what specifically any country might be doing to provide military assistance to the Afghan resistance is considered an intelligence question upon which Department of State officials cannot comment.

Senator Specter: As I understand it, any U.S. assistance to the anti-communist insurgency in Cambodia would be channeled through Thailand. What assurance do we have that the same kind of problems with aid not reaching those who need it and can use it effectively will not be encountered?

Secretary Schneider: It is our belief that any money appropriated for economic and military assistance to the non-communist Cambodian resistance should be channeled, where

possible, through the Royal Thai Government, acting on behalf of ASEAN.

Procedures appropriate to this activity will be developed for monitoring the grant. We would envision negotiating with the Thai a list of eligible uses and prohibitions, including prohibitions on aid to the Khmer Rouge and the purchase of weapons or ammunitions. An AID officer on the scene would be responsible for ongoing liaison with the Thai, for indirect monitoring insofar as possible, and for assimilating information from a variety of sources as to whether assistance was getting through on a timely basis to the resistance and to intended end users within the resistance.

However, to meet the primary policy objective of avoiding a direct U.S. role, and because of the unusual nature of the program, it should be understood at the outset that the management risks of this program may be higher than in a conventional assistance program. We are pleased that the Statement of Managers of the Conference Report on the FY 1986/1987 authorization act recognized this situation, stating that "the conferees agree that the nature of the assistance to be provided requires some degree of flexibility in the application of standard audit procedures and requirements." Notwithstanding this flexibility, we will be as prudent as the circumstances permit. We would, however, appreciate similar recognition of the need for flexibility in the report on the Committee on Appropriations.

Senator Specter: We have already seen that the Vietnamese have been willing to cross the Thai border in pursuit of Cambodian resistance forces. If we increase our support for the non-communist Cambodian resistance, and carry out assistance operations through the government of Thailand on Thai territory, isn't there a greater likelihood of direct, large-scale conflict between the Thai and Vietnamese?

Secretary Schneider: Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory and clashes with Thai forces occur as part of Vietnamese attacks on Khmer civilian camps and resistance bases along the Thai-Cambodian border. Hanoi also uses such incursions to intimidate Thailand in an effort to reduce Thai opposition to Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia.

The Khmer civilian camps have all now been evacuated to sites inside Thailand. The resistance forces have been physically separated from the civilians and are moving their forces inside Cambodia where the fighting now occurs. There are no longer tempting military targets along the Thai-Cambodian border.

It is still possible that Hanoi will attack the civilian evacuation sites inside Thailand both to disrupt the civilian camps and as a way of intimidating Thailand. U.S. assistance to the non-communist resistance through Thailand will not make such attacks either more or less likely.

Senator Specter: What would our obligations to the Thai

government be in the event of such a conflict? Could U.S. forces be drawn into another war in Asia?

Secretary Schneider: The U.S. and Thailand are treaty allies under the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat communique. The Manila Pact requires parties to consult on security threats to the region and, in accordance with its own constitutional processes, requires each party to respond in the event of an attack on the other by an outside country. This commitment has been reaffirmed by each President since that time.

The United States stands by its commitments to Thailand's security and territorial integrity and will fulfill its obligations. The exact form of a U.S. response to outside aggression on Thailand clearly would depend on the nature of the threat. Beyond this, it would not be helpful to comment on a hypothetical situation.

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Senator KASTEN. The subcommittee will now stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., Wednesday, May 8, the hearing was concluded and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

MATERIAL SUBMITTED SUBSEQUENT TO CONCLUSION OF HEARING

(CLERK'S NOTE: The following material was received by the committee subsequent to the hearing. It will, therefore, be inserted in the record at this point:).



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

May 7, 1985

The Honorable Bob Kasten
Chairman
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Committee on Appropriations
U. S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It is my understanding that the Subcommittee you chair will be receiving testimony on a proposal to initiate U.S. military assistance to the non-communist Cambodian resistance.

The House version of the foreign aid bill, which may come to the House Floor for debate next week, includes such a proposal. As I did during the House Foreign Affairs Committee markup, I will again offer an amendment to strike that proposal and to substitute instead language authorizing the President to provide humanitarian assistance to the non-communist Cambodians, modelled after authorizing language proposed by the Administration for the Afghans.

In light of the hearing you are holding on May 8, 1985, I would like to respectfully request that my statement, attached, be made a part of the official record of the Subcommittee's proceedings.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

A stylized handwritten signature of Jim Leach.

Jim Leach
Member of Congress

JL:cs

Attachment

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM LEACH
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM IOWA

Mr. Chairman, it is with the greatest reluctance that I feel compelled to oppose the proposal which will be discussed before your Subcommittee today to provide direct military related assistance to the non-communist resistance in Cambodia.

All Americans concerned with events in Indochina are sympathetic to the cause of the non-communist Cambodians, but I believe the initiation of U.S. military assistance to the Cambodian resistance is likely in the long run to prove counterproductive. That conclusion is based on the following considerations:

(1) The need for U.S. military assistance has not been demonstrated to Congress. A recent letter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee from the Department of State reads in part:

"It is our understanding that the non-communist resistance is being provided with all the military equipment it can effectively absorb at this time. We do not believe, therefore, that it is necessary or appropriate for the United States to give weapons to the resistance now."

(2) U.S. military aid, no matter how small, will inevitably alter the indigenous character of this resistance movement and elevate it another notch to the level of a superpower confrontation.

(3) It is hard to believe that \$5 million in military-oriented aid will really make a difference in the ability of the resistance to counter the world's third largest army. But while such publicly-committed assistance is nowhere near enough to make much of a dent in the struggle, it is clearly more than enough to invest the national reputation and military prestige of the United States in an operation over which we have virtually no control.

(4) Even the pledge of token U.S. military assistance at this point will raise unrealistic expectations among the resistance forces that the United States is "committed" to provide ongoing and increasing levels of military aid.

(5) Perhaps most tragically, the injection of a U.S. military component into the Cambodian struggle might provoke an unprecedented backlash by the Vietnamese forces against the resistance. U.S. aid could in effect become an invitation to the genocide of the very people with whom we sympathize most. It may also invite Vietnamese aggression against Thailand, through whom, it is proposed we funnel U.S. military aid.

(6) ASEAN has taken the lead in this regional conflict and ought to continue to do so. The U.S. has demonstrated its awareness that it is in our national interest to promote the strength and stability of ASEAN by providing security assistance to various ASEAN member states for their national defense. The U.S. has no need to "prove" anything in this regard, and certainly not by reinvolving itself directly in Cambodia.

(7) U.S. military aid might hurt -- rather than help -- the prospects for a negotiated settlement. The WASHINGTON POST on April 2, 1985, quoted State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb as saying:

"U.S. supply of weapons to the resistance could create difficulties in reaching a negotiated settlement and in

sustaining international support for the Cambodian cause by highlighting Cambodia as a U.S.-Vietnam conflict."

We do not need to give Vietnam an even greater rationalization to fight in Cambodia, nor should we happily welcome even the remotest possibility of associating ourselves once again with a failed venture against the Vietnamese communists.

(8) It is ill-advised to provide economic support funds for military use when the policy, now in law, is to bar the use of economic aid for military purposes. It is also a dangerous precedent to provide aid through a third entity -- in this case, Thailand -- because the U.S. then loses sovereign control over how such aid is used.

(9) It is fantasy to believe the fledgling democratic resistance to the Vietnamese occupation will not be dominated by Pol Pot's forces. Yesteryear's war criminals are alive and well in Southeast Asia and despite high-minded desires to the contrary, there is no way at this time for the democratic resistance to avoid complicity with Khmer Rouge atrocities when they are in tactical alliance.

The initiative for the change in U.S. policy regarding military assistance to the Cambodian resistance, presented by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, comes from the Subcommittee of jurisdiction, with the initial opposition of the Administration. Subsequent to Subcommittee and Full Committee markup, the Administration gingerly "welcomed" the approach of the Committee but in the language used by the Administration reflected obvious misgivings.

There has not been reflected, to my knowledge, any great understanding of the American public that Congress is giving serious consideration to a military (albeit through support of proxy forces) reinvolvement in Indochina. I have grave doubts that the public would be enthused about such a policy and if Congress cannot commit the U.S. to aid of a determinative magnitude for the long haul, caution would see the wiser course. It is better to head off an explosive entanglement early than late.

While supporters of military assistance would argue that we cannot forever be paralyzed by our experiences in Indochina, skeptics can rightfully suggest that neither should we attempt to assuage our national guilt over our past involvement in Vietnam by embarking on a new military venture without a clear definition of the national interest involved and an equally clear consensus among the Executive branch, the Legislative branch and the American public that the proposed course of action is in that interest.

It is not enough to conclude a cause is just. An assessment must also be made that U.S. involvement advances just goals. The first premise is met; the second remains unproven.

For the above reasons, I am convinced that the proposal to initiate a new military aid program for the Cambodian resistance would be a grave mistake at this time and would urge your Subcommittee to resist efforts to commit the U.S. Congress to such a policy.

Thank you.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL Foundation

STATEMENT of SAMUEL T. DICKENS
DIRECTOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL FOUNDATION

SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM FIGHTERS IS VITALLY IMPORTANT

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you members of the committee. I want to commend you for holding these hearings, and I certainly cannot think of a more important priority for our foreign policy and national security than to support the Democratic Resistance in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Angola. I believe the President was correct in calling the Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua the moral equivalent of our founding fathers, and I have been very encouraged by the success of the resistance in Angola and Afghanistan.

I would like to focus my remarks this morning on the present situation in Central America. This is an area in which I have long had an interest because of its vital strategic importance to the United States.

I was born in Argentina, and spent 12 of the first 19 years of my life in South America. I am a retired Air Force Colonel, and I was in uniform for 33 years. During my final four-year tour of duty at the Pentagon, I was the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division. In my present position I have traveled extensively throughout Central America, and I have met with many heads of state and opinion leaders from this troubled region.

Much has been written over the past few years on the strategic importance of the Caribbean Basin to the United States. There have also been a few articles explaining the tie between United States interests in this area and our NATO strategy. Key spokesmen of the Reagan Administration have detailed the significant Soviet and surrogate military buildup within the Caribbean on the island of Cuba and mainland Nicaragua. Despite these warnings from private spokesmen and strong statements from United States government, policy making officials, there does not appear to be any coherent strategy to directly address the growing threat.

It has been apparent that President Ronald Reagan has taken the lead in the attempt to gain public understanding for United States involvement in the Central American crisis. Few other administration officials speak up to the same level of concern. There is a government effort to raise the level of public understanding of the issues, but it bears no resemblance to the major efforts undertaken by President Jimmy Carter to sell the Panama Canal Treaties to the American people. Unfortunately the administration does not speak with one voice.

The need for a strong signal of unanimity coming from the administration is essential because of the adverse impact of numerous propaganda and skilled disinformation efforts confusing the issues. As a result a rather large, vocal segment of Americans work actively against United States involvement in Central America, through communist front organizations, manipulated Church groups and "do gooders," who are easily led astray with guided tours of Cuba and Nicaragua. The vast majority of the major news media outlets, television and print, have long since espoused liberal viewpoints which they repeatedly express. The public remains confused. Congress reflects that confusion and Democratic party leadership insists upon making the Central American crisis a partisan issue.

The end result is a drift within the administration itself and

internal internecine battles between the major executive department players in the White House National Security Council, the Department of Defense, State and the Central Intelligence Agency. Is it any wonder that the Executive Department has not been able to convince Congress that vital United States issues are at stake on our southern flank?

The distinguished writer, Arnaud de Borchgrave, for 25 years senior editor of Newsweek magazine, spoke recently at a White House gathering of private sector leadership stating we were in a period of history similar to that preceding World War II. The evidence was in, the threat should have been apparent, but no consensus for action developed. We are in that same period today, with a Congress virtually oblivious to the need to take decisive action with no sensitivity to the importance of the issues, nor any perspective of their place in history. Despite the accelerating speed of modern warfare brought about by major technological advances, human factors have increased the time element in developing consensus for decision making. In the aftermath of United States involvement in Vietnam Congress hobbled the Executive through legislation which further restricted its ability to make timely decisions during developing crises.

THE THREAT - MILITARY BUILDUP

On January 30, 1985, the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, gave a speech on Central America, identifying the Soviet and Cuban buildup in the Western Hemisphere and the role each had played in turning Nicaragua into another surrogate to carry out Soviet objectives. He identified Nicaragua as a country which, "unabashedly exports subversion and terrorism to other countries in that region." During 1982 the communist world made five shipments of arms by sea to Nicaragua. In 1983 there were twenty and then thirty-five in 1984.

The Nicaraguan-Sandinista army now has a strength of 119,000 with over 62,000 mobilized and an expressed objective of creating a total force structure of 250,000. Forty percent of those eligible for military service are in now in uniform; an action which adversely affects Nicaragua's economy. (And this is a country with a population under three million.) A few miles east of the capital city of Managua, Nicaragua, the Soviets have built an airfield called Punta Huete, with runways just under 13,000 feet in length, and with concrete so thick it has the capability of handling the heaviest of Soviet bombers, including the Bear and Backfire. Secretary Weinberger points out the obvious capability for Soviet Bear reconnaissance bombers to surveil the western coasts of North, Central and South America.

Defense Secretary Weinberger emphasized the Soviet arms buildup in Nicaragua which includes tanks, armored personnel carriers and multiple rocket launchers for the purpose of intimidating neighboring countries. He adds that the long term threat is that of a nation providing a base for subversion and terrorism throughout Central America. This buildup provides effective control over its own population. The essential purpose of this dramatic military expansion in Nicaragua by Cuba and the Soviet Union is to transform the country, as Cuba has been transformed, to serve a "much larger geo-political end." That is to assist in the projection of Soviet military power in the Western Hemisphere. The Defense Secretary states that Nicaragua, "is in effect being mortgaged to the Soviet Union."

The Soviet buildup of Cuba's capabilities in the Caribbean Basin has been extraordinary; involving the greatest flow of arms since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. During a period of four years, embracing 1981 through 1984, the Soviets poured 246,000 metric tons of weapons into Cuba, an average of 61,500 tons each year. To give some perspective to what that amount of tonnage represents, considering that the average MIG-23 jet fighter weighs 14 metric tons, the Soviet shipped into Cuba in each of four years the equivalent of over 4,390 jet fighters. Of course those shipments included besides MIG 23s, tanks, high speed hydro-foil patrol boats, frigates, surface-to-air missile launchers and missiles, artillery pieces, amphibious landing craft, ammunition, etc. Actually the Cubans have some 240 modern jet fighters to provide air defense and tactical airpower.

While the Soviets have been building up the Cuban military forces and providing over \$5 billion dollars yearly in economic assistance,

representing over 25% of Cuba's GNP, they have also been building up their own military capabilities in the region. They now have over 2,800 military advisors in Cuba, an organized military unit, a Brigade, with over 3,000 men, and so called civilian advisors totaling 8,000. Two thousand soviets at a Cuban site make up, "one of the largest intelligence gathering facilities in the world," listening to United States communications, according to the Secretary of Defense.

The type of military buildup in Cuba bears analysis. First it is designed to provide sufficient tactical air fighters and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, to provide a credible deterrent to any military attack against the island. Internally the armored units and military and paramilitary organizations, provide a force to defend against external invasion forces, protection for Soviet forces and continued insurance against the possibilities of any internal dissension. The total force structure enables Cuba to serve the Soviet Union as a surrogate with over 40,000 troops in African nations, principally Angola and Ethiopia.

Cuba's continued emphasis on building military reserves has enabled Fidel Castro to indoctrinate all youth in Marxist-Leninist ideology, while providing a strong force to train dissident forces in subversion and terrorism from all over the Western Hemisphere. This also ensures that "civilian forces" working overseas on construction projects, such as building the Grenadan airfield, have basic military skills and are capable of serving as supportive military reserve units.

After President Jimmy Carter negotiated the Panama Canal Treaties the Soviets decided to take advantage of the United States deemphasis of the Caribbean Basin. The Cuban military buildup has been primarily designed to exercise sea and air control over ship movements in the Caribbean. Their two Koni class frigates are capable of over 30 knots; the 26 Osa class Fast Attack Craft equipped with the proven surface-to-surface Styx missile, can do 36 knots and the 8 Turya class hydrofoil torpedo carrying Fast Attack Craft of a total 26 torpedo carrying vessels, will do some 40 knots. Obviously this capability, when combined with tactical jet fighters, presents a formidable threat to any shipping, naval or merchant, in the Caribbean.

The Secretary of Defense, in his January 30, 1985 talk, pointed out that Nazi Germany destroyed 114 merchant vessels within the Caribbean during the February through July 1942 period after Pearl Harbor. It took the United States six months to sink the first German submarine. Of course these World War II submarines were based in Germany, not the Caribbean. Now, not only is Cuba operating three submarines in the Caribbean but the Soviet deploys their nuclear powered submarines from the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. What is striking is that this major buildup accelerated after the Panama Canal Treaties signified a United States reduction of strategic interests on our Southern flank.

A DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS

Let us now take a brief look at an unclassified analysis of, "The Threat Posed by Soviet Expansionism," prepared by the Department of Defense. It is stunningly simple and direct, listing the significance of growing Soviet influence in the Caribbean Basin.

"Such communist expansion could lead to an extensive and permanent Soviet presence, and an increased Soviet strategic capability in the region which would create significant military consequences for the U.S.

--It could place hostile forces and weapons systems within striking distance of targets in the U.S.

--It could provide air and naval bases, such as those in Nicaragua and Grenada, for recovery of Soviet aircraft after strategic missions.

--It would furnish missile sites for launching attacks against the U.S. with short and intermediate range missiles.

--It could provide bases for use in covert operations against the U.S. and our neighbors.

--It could provide for prepositioning of Soviet equipment, supplies and ammunition in our hemisphere.

--It could allow the Soviet Pacific and Atlantic fleets to operate near our shores without having to return to the USSR for maintenance.

--It could threaten our Caribbean Sea Lines of Communication through which a large volume of our goods pass; thus endangering the economic well-being of our nation.

--And finally, it could cause the U.S. to divert scarce resources in manpower and materiel from other areas of the world to protect an area previously considered militarily secure."

This threat analysis mentions Grenada, clearly dating it to the period prior to the October 1983 liberation of that captured island. The above penetrating remarks reveal that our senior military leaders believe the Caribbean Basin is of vital strategic consequence to the United States and our survival. Note that concerns expressed were directly related to our own security and did not touch on our security relationships with our American allies throughout the Western Hemisphere, known as the "RIO TREATY," formally the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Thus any coherent strategy in the Caribbean Basin must be essentially predicated on our own security interests as well as our allies and not just some largess we offer to our friends because we are sympathetic to their problems. This has been obscured in the debate over whether we should help El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala or Costa Rica in their need to resist the subversion and terrorism thrust upon them from the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. We are all in this together.

Let us accept some information which has been repeated so many times we have forgotten its significance. Two-thirds of our oil, many strategic minerals and almost one-half of all our foreign trade enters or departs our Gulf ports. Major oil refineries and super tanker, deep water ports, are in the Caribbean Basin. Through the Panama Canal and adjacent pipeline over 45% of our Alaskan crude oil transits. The Caribbean Basin represents our fourth largest market in the world. In any period of conflict one-half of NATO resupply comes out of United States Gulf ports. (These statistics were stated by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in a White House briefing on January 30, 1985.)

Secretary of Defense Weinberger makes reference to many strategic minerals entering our Gulf ports, through the narrow straits which virtually make the Caribbean an inland sea. Some of these critical minerals are chromite, cobalt, columbium, manganese and the platinum-group metals, as reported in the "Military Posture" statement prepared by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. South Africa produces 35% of the chromite, USSR 25% and Zimbabwe 6%. The USSR and Zaire produce respectively, 15% and 50% of the world's cobalt. Brazil produces 86% of the columbium. The USSR produces 40% of the manganese, while South Africa produces 22%. In the platinum-group metals the USSR produces 48% and South Africa 45%. Other critical minerals essential for defense production include bauxite, nickel, tantalum, tin, tungsten and the titanium ores.

Aluminum, so essential to defense production, refined from bauxite ore, is primarily produced in Australia, Guinea, Jamaica, Suriname, the USSR and Brazil. Of course our bauxite imports from Jamaica and Suriname are produced in the Caribbean Basin, or transit it. Note the United States' vulnerability if we either lose access to minerals produced in South Africa because the entire region comes under Soviet control, or because of Soviet interdiction of the sea lines of communication. The Soviets now have naval port and air base access on the South Atlantic from Angola, a Marxist-Leninist state. Obviously imports of strategic minerals from Brazil transit the Caribbean on the way to Gulf ports.

What should of course be clear, but is not often mentioned, is the major strategic production of crude oil itself, in the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico. Specifically, Venezuela, Mexico and the United States have major oil fields in these areas, including oil refineries in Texas,

Curacao, (off Venezuela,) Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The major deep water tanker ports are also in this region.

SOVIET STRATEGY

Just what is the Soviet strategy, viewed from the regional perspective of our southern flank? Obviously one cannot separate this strategy from their worldwide strategy. Certainly the United States is the ultimate target, or prize, of the Soviet Union. How they gain that prize and what their various intermediate objectives are in achieving it is subject to interpretation. Response to that interpretation obviously brings about United States, or allied actions, in a series of countermeasures to include repositioning of our military forces. It is here that it is important to analyze whether Soviet initiatives in the Western Hemisphere constitute their primary strategic thrust to defeat the Western World, or whether their actions constitute a strategic feint to which they expect us to respond. Again, it is obvious that with limited forces, any United States response in repositioning additional forces in the Caribbean Basin region would weaken our efforts in other regions of the world.

This brings one back to the Defense Department analysis of the Soviet threat applied to the Caribbean Basin, where it is stated, "And finally, it could cause the U.S. to divert scarce resources in manpower and material from other areas of the world to protect an area previously considered militarily secure." If the United States responds to this Soviet "feint" then they would be able to exploit our drawdown of forces in that area, say the Middle East, the Western Pacific, or even Western Europe. It appears that most western strategists believe the Soviet efforts in the Caribbean Basin are a "feint" and are reluctant to perceive that in fact our southern flank is our "soft underbelly." The down playing of any potential threat to the United States from the south has often taken on an elitist attitude.

Latin America has so long been a backwater for United States government officials, whether from the Department of State or Defense, that it has been dismissed as being unimportant in overall economic and military strategy. One of our more knowledgeable Ambassadors, a political appointee in the Caribbean region, has said that our southern flank has been secure for so long that we have taken it for granted. We have forgotten, he adds, that our ability to project power in Europe and the Far East has been dependent upon a secure southern flank. Now it is no longer secure.

The elitist attitude among strategists, who have either dedicated their thinking to Europe or the Far East, has until recently not allowed any importance to be given to Soviet actions in the Caribbean, or dismissed them as being a "feint" to which we should not respond. Many are now changing their minds and reanalyzing the potential threat. It is often said that the Soviets are chess players, while Americans play poker. While there is a certain truth to this comment it might better be said that democracies require a consensus for action, while totalitarian dictatorships, such as the Soviets, need no general public support for the decisions they make.

The growing strategic debate as to whether the Soviets are involved in a feint or a primary thrust at mainland North America is not just academic. People are dying in the fight resisting communist expansion in Central America, while Soviet disinformation efforts would have us all believe the fighting is of national origin, a civil conflict, brought about by years of oppressive, oligarchic control over poor peasantry in each of the countries. Though there is greater understanding now of the role played by the Soviets and Cubans in causing the massive upheaval threatening the independent survival of nation states in Central America, there is still no consensus for taking strong, positive actions in resistance.

Let us take a look at this crisis from the perspective of a Soviet strategist. As the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, pointed out after removing the intermediate range ballistic missiles from Cuba after the show down with President John F. Kennedy in 1962, "I had the idea of installing missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out they were there until it was too late to do

anything about them." His "feint" then was forestalled but he was later quoted to have said in his memoirs, "Khrushchev Remembers," that "It was a great victory for us, though, that we had been able to extract from Kennedy a promise that neither America nor any of her allies would invade Cuba."

The Soviet strategist interested in long term strategic advantages sees a daring attempt to deploy missiles to Cuba foiled, but a gullible President accepting a communist state in the New World. A communist state which for over twenty-five years has been exporting subversion and terrorism to every country in the Western Hemisphere and training dissident leaders in communist discipline, theory and practice. Then that same Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, provides a major forward base for the Soviets including airfields, a submarine base at Cienfuegos and the most sophisticated, intelligence communications facility for eavesdropping on United States communications.

Now the Soviet strategic planner attempts another bold move, to develop another forward Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere, Nicaragua. This time the base is on the mainland, in a key position to handle soviet flights over the Pacific and the Atlantic, requiring no overflight permission from unfriendly governments. Since Nicaragua borders on both the Pacific and the Caribbean, soviet submarine and naval vessels have ideal port facilities to monitor mainland United States military facilities, submarine bases and missile launching activities at Cape Canaveral and California's Vandenberg Air Force Base.

True the Soviets misjudged United States reactions to their secret agreements with Maurice Bishop of Grenada. But the gamble was worth it. As the distinguished columnist Virginia Prewett stated, "Grenada was the Soviets Gibraltar." And Grenada sits astride the narrow straits all ships have to pass through on their way to deliver crude oil, strategic minerals and vital imports and exports to the region. In 1982 the United States Southern Commander, General Wallace Nutting, publicly expressed his concern that the Soviets could control the Caribbean with tactical air power from air bases in Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada. Though the long runway of Grenada is not under communist control anymore there is no reason for complacency. Two South American countries, adjacent to one another sit astride the same sea lines of communication. Both are basically communist states and under heavy Cuban influence. Suriname and Guyana have carefully watched events in Grenada and temporarily lowered their profile. Still one must be concerned over the ten hard surfaced runways in Guyana, over 6,500 feet long, and give pause to any thinking suggesting that General Nutting's "triangle of tactical airpower" has been broken.

Despite the Soviets having as Ambassador a man who had been responsible for the delivery of intermediate-range missiles to Cuba while on the ground there, followed by assignments in Colombia, Argentina and as a Deputy Defense Minister in Moscow, he was not able to bring it off. But still Soviet-Cuban efforts in Nicaragua were proceeding well. After all Grenada had developed into a chaotic situation with the murder of Maurice Bishop. Events had deteriorated with the East Caribbean States expressing concern to President Ronald Reagan over their own security. Then too the confusing situation of leadership in Grenada in the aftermath of Bishop's assassination created a concern over American students safety studying on the island. It was unlikely that those events would occur again, say in Nicaragua, where activities had been more carefully orchestrated.

Soviet efforts in Nicaragua were encouraging for Soviet strategists. Despite detailed photographic evidence of massive arms buildup and an array of Soviet and Cuban styled training facilities, military barracks, air defense emplacements and heavy airfield construction, there was no popular support for any United States military response. By early 1985 the Sandinistas had successfully consolidated their 1979 revolution. Employing all the techniques taught by the Soviets and the Cubans, and aided by advisers at every level of their bureaucracy, they now controlled the press and television, had muffled the Church, reorganized the labor unions and implemented block control to affect an influence over every Nicaraguan's daily life. Literacy programs under Cuban tutelage indoctrinated young and old with marxist-leninist teachings. The private business groups had either been taken over by the state or controlled through the state banking system. The fraudulent elections provided a

cloak of respectability for all those who wanted to grant it and made it easy for worldwide socialist governments to give their blessing, such as Argentina, Mexico, Sweden and Spain.

There are other events which should give Soviet planners hope. The Contadora process was established by four countries to peacefully resolve the Central American crisis. Leadership came from Mexico, socialist in orientation and the only country in the hemisphere which had consistently maintained diplomatic relations with communist Cuba since the beginning of Fidel Castro's takeover in 1959. Mexico continued to provide haven for every communist leadership and splinter group in exile and as a center for the distribution of communist propaganda. The other three countries in the Contadora process, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela, had with Mexico played a key role in bringing about the overthrow of Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza and providing legitimacy to the nine "commandantes" who made up the Sandinista leadership. That Contadora process, with all its apparent evenhandedness, would confirm the Sandinistas in power. Through a series of promises pertaining to removal of foreign advisers and reducing military forces, the Sandinistas would remain.

Though the Contadora process now seems at an impasse, nevertheless the continuing negotiating process had effectively provided a cover for the massive delivery of Soviet bloc weapons. It had given time to build the revolution and it had given time to develop a massive disinformation program to divide opinion in the United States, the American Congress and Western European nations. All this effort appeared to make it impossible for an American democracy to develop the consensus for action so necessary for a President.

The Soviet strategists could take pride in their efforts. Their continued probing was paying off. It was becoming more and more difficult for the Americans to take any action. There were now over 10,000 Cubans, more than a hundred Soviet military advisers, and thousands of communist bloc advisers and representatives from East Germany, Bulgaria, North Korea and Vietnam in Nicaragua. Terrorist leaders had long given support and others were joining the Sandinistas. These included the PLO, the Libyans, the Red Brigades and northern Spain's terrorists, ETA. Other experienced communist guerrillas were also helping, coming from Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. The various guerrilla groups from neighboring Colombia were present and of course FMLN leaders from the communist guerrilla groups in El Salvador.

The forward basing for Cuban fighters and Soviet Bear, Bison and Backfire bombers were virtually complete. Though President Reagan had warned of moving Migs into Nicaragua the military buildup could continue. Mi-8 Hip and Mi-24 Hind helicopters were now providing troop airlift and assault capability as well as providing a major role in direct fire support as gunships for the Sandinista army against the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. Long experienced in psychological warfare with Americans the Soviets had decided to move a Czech close air support jet fighter into Nicaragua in lieu of the highly visible MIG-21. This move had paid off and the American diplomats had decided it was acceptable to the United States. It was being passed off as a jet trainer, as the training version was the principal trainer for all Soviet bloc pilots. The Czech fighter, known by its NATO code name as "Albatross" is a deadly addition to the modern Sandinista army, now having T-54 tanks, PT-76 amphibious tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, heavy artillery and a wide variety of half track vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

Now the Soviets moved into their holding position. They know that in this second term of a strongly anti-communist President, their efforts could suddenly be lost. But they have made the process difficult through the massive arms buildup, making any military effort to overthrow the Sandinistas one resulting in heavy loss of life. Therefore all sectors have advanced negotiations as a way to ameliorate the situation. Fidel Castro has made overtures to open discussions with the United States, to follow on recent agreements over returning some elements of the Mariel boatlift in exchange for imprisoned political prisoners. The Sandinistas have also joined the team now wanting to peacefully discuss problems with the United States. This follows the negotiating efforts of the communist guerrilla leadership with the Salvadoran government. All this represents one coordinated plan to show communist reasonableness to an American

Congress, which holds the key to any actions being contemplated by the President of the United States.

Now one must question whether this is a "feint" or the primary thrust to bring down the United States. A good strategist knows when to exploit a feint and turn it into the primary winning effort. The effort now certainly is no simple probe. Soviet naval forces deploy to the Caribbean in greater numbers and frequency, now participating in joint naval maneuvers with the Cubans, involving a large helicopter carrying cruiser, or aircraft carrier. Now the Soviets have achieved major accomplishments in the Western Hemisphere which provide them with a spring board for victory. A successful psychological campaign against the United States could well prevent President Reagan from taking any direct action against Nicaragua. If this effort succeeds, and another President is elected prior to any direct confrontation, it is not likely that Reagan's successor will take aggressive actions. Then it only becomes a matter of increasing the buildup, introducing bomber and reconnaissance flights to Nicaraguan bases, adding Soviet ground forces and making ports available to submarines on the Pacific and Caribbean.

The payoff becomes increased demoralization of American Rio Treaty allies in the hemisphere. Subversion and terrorism will increase and the guerrilla movements now operating in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia will increase their cooperation, now having another ally in the hemisphere. Weak governments will continue to drift ever faster leftwards to accommodate to new communist realities in the Western Hemisphere. In time the feint will become the primary thrust as millions of illegal refugees will flood across the Rio Grande. It does not stretch the imagination to believe that southern state governors and Congressmen will insist that American overseas forces return to guard a border now protected by slightly over 500 members of the border patrol. This could well be sufficient pressure to break up NATO.

UNITED STATES STRATEGY

It is not yet clear whether the United States has the capacity, or the requisite national will to respond to the Soviet threat. Elitist European specialists would continue to argue that the real threat is in Europe, and greater use of resources in the Caribbean Basin would risk disaster across the plains of Europe. Diplomats continue to rely on negotiations for our salvation always failing to realize that some negotiations are fruitless and that it is impossible to turn the Marxist-Leninist leaders in Nicaragua into good democrats through discussions. So where does that leave us.

The Reagan Administration has developed a careful framework for success in encouraging and nourishing democracy in the region. On the whole this program has been successful. The effort has given these governments a broad basis of support in their own countries as well as increased support in our Congress. Our government has encouraged the Contadora process with a false hope that we could influence the Sandinista leadership to give up communist ties. The Department of State has deliberately discouraged Central American countries from unifying against Nicaragua so as to better effect control over events. This effort however, has greatly diminished any chance of ousting the Sandinistas.

The Central American Defense Council (CONDECA) is the result of a treaty signed in 1964 by Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Panama subsequently joined. Now Nicaragua is out. Recently Guatemala resisted United States military efforts to strengthen CONDECA, even though they host the Council in Guatemala City. There are good reasons for this intransigence, relating to a United States failure to provide security assistance dating back to the time when President Carter added them to a list of countries violating human rights. Now President Reagan is recommending economic and security assistance to Guatemala based on improved human rights reports. A unified Central America through an active CONDECA, designed to counter communist intrusion in the region, would be a major action leading to the possible overthrow of the Sandinistas, if combined with other actions.

Economic assistance recommended in the Kissinger Report, will not bring

about peace to the region. This bipartisan commission recognized that any improved economic outlook for the region was dependent upon stability ensured through military means. The continued destruction by the guerrillas of the Salvadoran economy is a graphic illustration. This means that the United States must directly address the newest communist state in the hemisphere, Nicaragua.

President Reagan's support for the Nicaraguan democratic forces fighting the Sandinistas was carefully constrained. Central Intelligence Agency assistance to these Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters was designed to limit their efforts to the interruption of arms movements from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran communist guerrillas. It is time to drop that restriction when Congress continues aid to them. What must be fully understood is that there are completely legal and legitimate reasons for overthrowing the Sandinistas. They came to power under false pretences, promising the Organization of American States they would respect human rights, have free elections, protect religious freedom and insure political pluralism. All were lies.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Treat, signed in 1947, stipulates that an attack on one government will be considered as an attack on all, requiring collective resistance. As the threat of communism increased subsequent declarations were signed by all the hemispheric nations in Caracas and San Jose, identifying international communism as an intervention in the Americas and rejecting any attempt by the Sino-Soviet powers from making use of any situation in any American State, as that could destroy hemispheric unity and endanger peace and security in the hemisphere.

Many now argue that the Rio Treaty is moribund, citing the impossibility of obtaining any consensus in the Organization of American States. Though this may be true it is still the legal instrument authorizing the ouster of a communist state, established by a regional grouping of nations acting under the Charter of the United Nations. The failure of a group of nations to meet their responsibilities is no reason to keep the public in the dark. On the contrary, if there were public understanding of our nation's responsibility in this matter, it would be far easier to gain support for needed actions.

Others would also argue that the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement has been abrogated by the Soviets. The Soviets removed their offensive weapon systems, bombers and missiles, in exchange for the promise Cuba would not be invaded by the United States. Now as many as 12 Soviet Bear bombers operate from Cuban airfields. Primarily reconnaissance versions, some have operable bomb bays and are capable of carrying the largest air-to-surface supersonic missile, equipped with a nuclear warhead. All of this spells increased Soviet efforts in the Caribbean Basin.

Key to all future actions are the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. Most of the leadership of this group fought to overthrow Somoza and then belatedly realized they could not counter the disciplined strength of the Sandinistas and were forced out. The Frente Democratico Nicaraguense (FDN) operates from Honduras and inside Nicaragua. The Miskito, Sumo and Rama Indians of northeastern Nicaragua joined forces with this group as a result of genocide perpetrated by the Sandinistas. They killed hundreds and forcefully relocated thousands of Indians after destroying their villages and churches. Other Nicaraguan forces have operated separately in their fight against the Sandinistas including a group known as ARDE, attacking Nicaragua in the south from Costa Rica.

Despite adverse communist disinformation efforts to identify all these people as followers of Somoza this force has won increasing admiration and supporters from among the people of Nicaragua. The growing support for the anti-Sandinistas among Nicaraguans reflect their dissatisfaction with the communist controlled police state in which they live. An obvious expression of opposition to the Sandinistas has been the growing numbers of young people resisting being integrated into the armed forces and the open fight parents have had with authorities to prevent their sons being drafted.

It should remain clear to all objective interpretation of events that communist attacks in the Western Hemisphere are counter to established legal treaties. These illegal actions are in defiance of established treaties and agreements, including the United Nations Charter, the Rio Treaty and the CONDECA Treaty. International law, while condemning aggression, clearly authorizes individual and regional response by nations in order to defend themselves against aggression.

Nicaraguan Freedom Forces operating from the northern borders of Nicaragua number some 15,000. As many as 7,000 are available in the south. Given unequivocal support by a United States Congress, which at the present time is denied, these liberation forces are capable of establishing an area under their control within Nicaragua. Central American unity through the CONDECA Treaty would be a major cohesive force to which the United States should respond with security assistance. These actions are consistent with our treaty obligations, which in fact require positive actions when Rio Treaty allies are undergoing attack.

SUMMARY

Whether the Soviets are involved in a strategic "feint" or in the primary thrust to defeat us may only be academic. The Soviets will exploit any weakness they discover. Despite the example of an American President liberating Grenada, the Soviets have continued to press their efforts in the Caribbean Basin. Major communist involvement in the cocaine for arms market, directly involving Cuba's Fidel Castro and the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, may reduce the Soviets economic involvement in the support of revolutions. One drug bust by Colombian military officials in the jungles captured cocaine worth over \$1.2 Billion dollars, which was being prepared for shipment to Cuba by just one communist guerrilla organization.

The Western Hemisphere is under attack by the Soviet Union and their Cuban and Nicaraguan surrogates. A determined stand in conjunction with our allies, taken now in support of the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters in their efforts to liberate their country, would be a major setback to Soviet ambitions. They would back down and we could witness the beginning of their withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere. Without that hemispheric unity, present Soviet efforts may become their primary thrust.